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ABSTRACT
The dissertation consists of three distinct essays. Each is
concerned with the implications that scientific theories of
cognition have for philosophical issues.
In the first essay I explore the relationship between common
sense belief-desire psychology and computation psychological
theories, using belief as a model. I criticize the widely-held
view that to have a belief is to explicitly store a
representation and defend an alternative explanation which
identifies having a belief with being disposed to use an
appropriate representation in reasoning and decision
processes. I argue that this dispositional account of belief
suggests that common sense belief-desire (B-D) concepts and
explanations may not figure prominently in scientific
explanations of our cognitive make-up, although it is likely
that scientific psychology will nonetheless recognize the
legitimacy of B-D concepts and explanations. The result is a
moderate realist view of common sense psychology, which does
not commit us to anything as strong as Fodor's hypothesis of a
language of thought. This dispositional account also allows us
to understand how holistic aspects of belief-fixation can be
realized in a modullar cognitive architecture.
In the second essay I recommend that semantics be naturalized
to empirical psychological inquiry. That is, I maintain that
the descriptive project of specifying how the elements of our
languages are related to the world should take into account
facts about the psychological states that underlie our
understanding and use of language. And the confirmational
status of such accounts should be the same as for any other
scientific hypothesis. I develop this proposal by sketching a
prima facde conception of naturalized semantic methodology,
which proceeds from a competence theory to postulations of
mental states and processes. After defending this proposal
against several objections, I turn to the question of whether
there is any alternative, non-scientific methodology available
to the semanticist. I argue that our pre-scientific knowledge
of meaning fails to yield sufficient ingredients for a non-
naturalistic semantics. Specifically, a substantial portion of
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our knowledge of meaning appears to be non-explicit, and the
explication of non-explicit knowledge is a task for empirical
psychology.
In the third essay I defend a neo-kantian or anti-realist view
of metaphysics, which maintains that the world we ordinarily
perceive and theorize about is mind-dependent. This surprising
result is based on the fact that our cognitive systems make a
substantial innate conceptual contribution to our perceptions.
As I show, both research on infants and methodological
considerations from computational theories of perception
strongly support the existence of a significant innate
contribution. I then argue that the conjunction of perceptual
nativism and any of the standard accounts of the justification
of belief is inconsistent with a metaphysical realist view
that claims that we can have knowledge of a mind-independent
world. Specifically, accounts of justification all advocate
some form of epistemic reliance on perceptions. But, since
there is no guarantee that our innate perceptual concepts
accurately correspond to a mind-independent world, there is no
reason to think that increasing justification, as defined by
any of the standard accounts, will bring us any nearer to
realist truth--i.e. correspondence to a mind-independent
world. Yet, it seems that justification, by its very nature,
must leads us nearer to the truth, at least in the long run.
The solution is to abandon a metaphysical realist view of
truth in favor of a verificationist view, where truth is
identified with ideal justification. This, together with the
hypothesis of perceptual nativism, implies that the world that
we know is in part constituted by the innate contributions of
our perceptual systems. Such contributions are, in effect,
synthetic a prlori.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Robert Stalnaker
Title: Professor, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
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INTRODUCTION
Each of the following three essays is a self-contained
inquiry into a distinct set of issues. There is, though, a
common theme throughout--the view that traditionally
philosophical questions about the nature of mind, meaning and
knowledge will be answered, in part, through the emerging
theories of cognitive psychology. Here I will comment briefly
on philosophical naturalism and cognitive psychology.
In general, naturalism is the view (or better, the
methodological stance) which maintains that there is no first
philosophy, no knowledge that can be established in advance of
empirical investigation (scientific or otherwise.)1 Each of my
lines of inquiry is consistent with this outlook, although
specific naturalization may take a variety of forms. First,
there is the issue of how traditional philosophical questions
are to be dealt with. It might be maintained that traditional
pursuits should be abandoned--that acknowledging that there is
no first philosophy should lead us to give up or radically
reformulate the target problems in a given area of inquiry,
such as epistemology. 2 Alternatively, we might acknowledge the
1. I see no reason for the naturalist to also be
scientistic--to reject any non-scientific inquiries. For
instance, it seems reasonable to conceive of an empirical
ethics, or perhaps a general normative empirical inquiry, that
is not part of science per se.
2. This is apparently what Quine recommends for
epistemology in "Epistemology Naturalized," in Ontological
Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University
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legitimacy of traditional philosophical questions, purged of
any demand for certainty beyond the necessity that attaches to
the laws of nature, and seek to answer them with the resources
of empirical theory. I take this latter approach to the issues
that I discuss--i.e. I think that questions about the nature
of belief, meaning, justification, and even reality are
perfectly reasonable. But they are not questions that are
independent of or prior to scientific study.
Further, different forms of naturalism result from
differing expectations about who will answer the relevant
questions. On the one hand, we might suppose tY.t the answers
will simply fall out of scientific inquiry--that the only job
left for the philosopher is that of cataloging the results
that science has produced. This outlook suggests the withering
away of philosophy as a distinct discipline. On the other
hand, it might be that while scientific (or other empirical)
theories provide the resources necessary for philosophical
inquiries, scientists themselves will be largely unconcerned
with the investigation of the issues traditionally addressed
by philosophers. The latter possibility seems likely in many
cases, for several reasons. First, philosophical questions are
often much more abstract than the lines of inquiry that drive
scientific research programs--so much more abstract that it
Press, (1969). Specifically, he seems to reject the pursuit of
a normative account of justification in favoc of a purely
descriptive account.
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seems reasoneble to think that study of philosophical issues
must remain somewhat separate from specific research programs.
Second, naturalized philosophical issues may involve meta-
questions, i.e. in the theory of theories, which suggests
separate, albeit empirical, inquiry. Finally, it may simply be
that people in philosophy departments investigate certain
issues because those issues have been investigated by people
in philosophy departments as a matter of historical accident,
and the need for training in the relevant literature serves to
insure that these issues will, for the most part, continue to
be investigated by members of the same departments.3
My particular studies fall at various points on the
continuum between naturalization to (non-philosophical)
research programs and relatively autonomous philosophical
inquiry. In the second essay, I recommend that semantics be
naturalized to empirical psychological inquiry. That is, I
suggest that questions about the meanings of our words will be
largely answered by research in cognitive psychology and
(cognitive) linguistics, with or without the assistance of
philosophers, although current philosophical accounts of
meaning may prove invaluable as starting points for the
theoretical work. By contrast, I think that it is highly
unlikely that the metaphysical and epistemological issues I
3. I assume there is no a priori division of subject
matters to legislate what a given branch of academics should
study.
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pursue in the third essay will ever be directly dealt with by
(non-philosophical) scientists, for all of the reasons
mentioned above, but particularly because of the abstract
nature of these questions. Finally, the question of the status
of the common sense attitudes vis-a-vis computational,
representational states should be answered by empirical
psychology in the long-run. However, it seems that the issues
are too broad and abstract to expect anything very specific
from scientific research in the near future. Thus, the
dispositional analysis of belief that I offer in the first
essay should be viewed as a tentative theoretical account,
which will stand or fall with future developments in
psychological research.4
I should also point out that while I am not attempting
any general defense of naturalism here, these studies do lend
some support to the outlook. The naturalist holds that there
is no a priori methodology that enables us to establish
foundational truths in advance of empirical inquiry.
Specifically, the naturalist must reject the view that we have
knowledge of meaning that enables us to determine (non-
trivial) analytic truths from the armchair. In the second
essay I argue that our knowledge of meaning is largely non-
4. As will the alternative view that I criticize in that
essay, i.e. Fodor's proposed identification of the attitudes
with explicit computational states and his language of thought
hypothesis.
explicit, which supports this rejection of a pre-scientific
philosophical methodology.$
And, as I note in that essay, naturalism cannot be
defended via a priori argument. Instead, all positive support
must come from the successful naturalization of philosophical
issues; the present studies contribute to this on-going
project.
A few words about my conception of cognitive psychology
may be helpful as well. Throughout I assume that psychology
will, ultimately, produce explanations of our behavior and
mental abilities in terms of (relatively) high-level
representations and processes characterized as operations on
those representations. My assumption rests largely on the
present existence of modestly successful theories of this
sort, but I also have several other reasons for favoring this
conception. First, the research programs that have advocated
methodological behaviorism--i.e. explanations in terms of
functions from stimuli to behaviors--have ended in failure.
The obvious alternative is to seek explanations that postulate
inner states, thereby abstracting away from the bewildering
mess of stimulus-behavior connections. Further, common sense
psychology as well as pre-theoretical reflection suggests that
many of the important aspects of our behaviors and abilities
5. This support for naturalism thus differs substantially
from the views of Quine, whose naturalism is founded on the
rejection of any substantial conception of meaning.
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involve relations to states of the world. The obvious
resulting supposition is that scientific explanations of these
behaviors and abilities will postulate states that somehow
correspond to the world. (Although h- may discover that the
world that we represent is not, in fact, mind-independent, as
I argue in the third essay.) Finally, a review of the kinds of
questions we want psychology to answer, i.e. questicns about
knowledge and abstract abilities such as the ability to speak
a language, strongly suggests that empirical theories of
representational states will postulate fairly abstract, high-
level representations. This is to say that we should expect
that psychology, to the extent that such a discipline is able
to answer questions that we are currently asking, will produce
theories that are distinct from (current) neurological
theories in the abstractness of the level of explanation.
The approach to theoretical psychology that postulates
abstract representational states and processes has been
closely associated with the idea that the brain is a computer.
While I think that the computer metaphor is generally a good
thing--i.e. it provides us with a picture of how the brain can
achieve various abilities--it is important to note that the
general cognitivist approach need not imply rigid formalism.
Specifically, while there is nothing wrong with the search for
highly formal, computational explanations--they flourish
throughout the natural sciences--it may turn out that we are
rather "sloppy" computers. That is, our representational
11
processes may resist exact, mathematical specifications, and
the content of many of our representations may be vague or
fuzzy. Ultimately, such matters reflect how many and what
sorts of generalizations we will be able to establish in
theoretical psychology. I merely assume that we will be able
to establish a substantial number--that we are not so "sloppy"
as to resist all explanations--but this hardly implies that
all or even most processes can be characterized in a
mathematically precise manner.
Finally, it is worth noting that the conception of
cognition that I rely on throughout these essays is officially
neutral on one standard philosophical issue, the question of
the ontology of mental states, and on one recent philosophical
issue, the question of how to analyze the notion of
representation or content which (apparently) underlies
theories of cognition. Surely, some sort of materialism is
ultimately appropriate to answer the general ontological
issue--dualism seems explanatorily untenable--but this leaves
open the question of whether mental states and attributes are
type-reducible to biological or physical states and
attributes, or merely token-reducible. As I have suggested
above, we should expect to find relative autonomy for
psychological research in the near future--as for the ultimate
ontological status of mental states, I have no predictions.
Nor do I have anything to offer concerning the issue of the
notion of "representation" that underlies cognitive theories--
12
if there is, indeed, a single notion here. However, as I
stress in the first essay, we should not automatically assume
that our common sense means of determining the content of
mental states must be preserved in the theories and methods of
cognitive psychology--the latter will, no doubt, revise and
improve upon the former. Most of all, the postulations and
explanations of common sense psychology should not be mistaken
for the postulations and explanations of a mature scientific
psychology. This may mean that we will have to wait fur
cognitive theories to develop before we are able to answer
ontological questions about mental states. But this is what we
should expect once we abandon the presumption of an a priori
philosophical methodology.
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BELIEF, COMPUTATION AND COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE
On the one hand, we have cognitive psychology, which
seeks to explain behavior in terms of symbolic representations
and causal, computational transformations of these
representations. We are beginning to see the emergence of
modestly successful theories within this information-
processing paradigm. On the other hand, we have common sense
belief-desire psychology--a set of concepts, ascription
criteria, explicit and implicit generalizations and
explanations that appear to characterize states with
propositional content. These concepts, ascriptions, princJiples
and explanations are very tightly woven into our daily lives
and self-conceptions, and this appears to be a good thing, for
belief-desire psychology embodies a highly successful set of
(apparently) causal explanations of behavior.
What we want for the enterprise of cognitive psychology
are successful theories, particularly theories that successful
explain our higher cognitive abilities--those that are most
abstract and furthest removed from sensory input. What we want
for our understanding of common sense psychology is an
explanation of the nature of belief-desire states, in
particular, an account of how states with propositional
content can be the causal determiners of behavior. Towards
satisfying both these needs, Jerry Fodor has championed a
14
union of belief-desire and cognitive ontologies and
explanations:
The trick is to combine the postulation of mental
representations with the 'computer metaphor.'
Computers show us how to connect semantical with
causal powers for symbols. So, if having a
propositional attitude involves tokening a symbol,
then we can get some leverage on connecting
semantical properties with causal one6 for thoughts.l
The idea is to identify states such as belief and desire with
the explicit presence or activation (i.e. "tokening") of
representations, and explicate belief-desire explanations in
terms of computational transformations of these
representations. This yields a scientific realism about
belief-desire states, i.e. the expectation that many or most
of the explanations of common sense psychology will be
included in--and thus preserved by--a mature cognitive
psychology. This alliance promises a set of successful
explanations for cognitive psychology in an area (higher
cognitive processes) where we are currently lacking them. And
the proposed identification of belief-desire states with
symbolic states promises to show us how states with
propositional content could be efficacious--i.e. if semantics
1. Fodor (1987), p. 18. It may be tempting to read Fodor
as saying that it is only common sense belief-desire states
that have representational content. But that is evidently
false, for many existing cognitive theories postulate
reprep-ntational states unknown to common sense. Arid Fodor
woulc apparently agree that the set of representational states
is larger than the set of (common sense) propositional
attitude states, since he champions theories of the perceptual
systems that postulate representational states unknown to
common sense (or introspection)--see Fodor (1983).
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mirrors syntax, them since we can see how syntax can be
causally efficacious, we can also see how states with content
cause behavior, even if content itself isn't the cause of
behavior.
These are certainly welcome consequences. However, this
viewpoint has some unpalatable implications too. First, it
appears that if we think of our central cognitive systems as
collections of explicit belief-desire states, then, owing to
the holistic properties of common sense psychology, we must
admit that the prospects of finding strict, computational
accounts of these systems, in the information-processing
paradigm, are rather dim. 2 Second, ascriptions of Attitudes to
pre-verbal children and animals implies, given this outlook,
that they have an inner high-level language similar to our
natural languages. But their apparent lack of any external
language or language skills suggests that this is implausible.
Third, if it is these explicit belief-desire states which
underlie concept acquisition, then it seems that we can only
acquire concepts that we are already able to extensionally
formulate in our inner language. But, since few concepts
reduce to simpler ones, it appears that most of our concepts
must be innate, a consequence that is generally regarded as
highly counter-intuitive, and most likely false.
2. See Fodor (1983), 101 ff.
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Thus, there is substantial motivation for questioning
Fodor's proposed form of scientific realism for belief-desire
states. The crucial point of Fodor's position is the proposed
identity of common sense states with explicit informational
states. If the position is sound, it must turn out that we can
isolate classes of explicit computational states that can
plausibly be identified as common sense state types, e.g.
belief, desire, etc. In the first section, I examine the
computational status of (the propositional attitude state
type) belief. As I will show, belief is better analyzed as a
dispositional computational state rather than as an explicit
computational state. This account can be generalized to the
view that common sense belief-desire states are typically
dispositional rather than explicit or activated cognitive
states, which is to say that Fodor's envisioned union of
cognitivism and common sense psychology is mistaken.
As I then proceed to show, the alternative, dispositional
view of common sense belief-desire states embodies a plausible
form of moderate realism for these states, i.e. a viewpoint
which avoids the undesirable implications of Fodor's account.
First, I will argue that the dispositional view allows us to
acknowledge certain worries that have lead to eliminativist
and instrumentalist views of belief-desire psychology, but
without adopting these implausible alternatives. I will then
show that the dispositional view of belief-desire states
allows us to understand how holistic central system functions
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can co-exist with a modular or otherwise non-holistic
computational architecture. Finally, I will examine the
commitments of the dispoeitional view of belief-desire states.
I will argue that we need not, as Fodor maintains, be lead to
the postulation of a language(s) of thought for all believers,
or to the claim that most concepts are innate. In sum, I shall
be presenting and defending what I believe to be a more
plausible alternative to Fodor's, and any other, account of
the cognitive make-up of belief-desire states.
I. Specifying Belief
What is it to have a belief? I.e., what sort of a state
is a belief state? The approach to this question that I will
pursue is that since belief is a psychological state, we
should expect scientific psychology to eventually tell us what
beliefs are, just as, e.g., we might expect that questions of
the form "what is it for something to be X?", where X appears
to be a specification of some category of chemical substance,
say water, will be answered by chemistry. What I will be
seeking is, in Cummins' terms, a property instantiation
explanation--an analysis the property of belief in terms of
concepts from (cognitive) psychology.3
Current wisdom has it that cognitive psychology is both
computational and representational, and so we should expect to
3. See Cummins (1983), Chapter 1, especially pp. 14ff.
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find a compitational, representational explanation of (the
property of) belief. Specifically, Fodor has suggested that
having the belief that p is a matter of being in a
computational relation to a mental representation that means
p.4 This divides the property specification project into two
parts, namely (1) specify the appropriate computational
relation for belief and specify the representations that are
so related and (2) explain what it is for mental
representations to mean p (in general.) 5 While much of the
discussion of the relationship of belief-desire psychology to
scientific psychology has focused on the content of that-
clauses or content of the representations underlying the
attitudes (2), I will instead examine the computational
relation which we might expect to find for belief (1).
4. See the introduction to Fodor (1981) as well as
"Propositional Attitudes," in that volume.
5. A standard assumption of this view about the
representations which are hypothesized to underlie attitudes,
seemingly too obvious to state, is that it appears that
different types of attitudes, e.g. belief, desire, fear, hope,
etc. are formed via combinations of the same types of tokens
in different computational relations to cognition. E.g. it
appears that the difference between hoping that abortion will
be outlawed and fearing that abortion will be outlawed is
entirely one of computational role--the that-clauses appear to
have identical meanings in such cases. So, the obvious
hypothesis is that a given representation (typed by content)
can stand in different computational roles to achieve the
various attitude types. I will make this assumption
throughout.
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The more or less standard computational explanation of
belief begins with the idea of storage. 6 More formally, the
hypothesis is that having the belief that p is a matter of
storing a representation that means p. This cannot be the full
account because it is likely that storage will also be
involved in computational explications of other attitudes,
notable memory. Thus, belief must be a matter of storing
appropriate representations "in the right way," where belief
storage is distinguished from other sorts of storage via
functional role.7
In the rest of this section I will criticize the storage
model of belief and introduce and defend the alternative view
that the property of belief should be identified with
dispositions to use a representation in explicit processes--a
6. Adherents of this view include Lycan (1988) chapters 1
and 3, Block (1990) pp. 271-4 and Field (1978) pp. 80-84.
Field suggests a general dispositional account of the sort I
will defend below, but then opts for the storage and
disposition-to-infer view as an elaboration of the former
view.
It is also worth noting that the storage model is
perpetuated to some extent by talk of "belief-boxes." This
term, as used by Schiffer and by Fodor is intended to stand
for whatever computational relation belief turns out to be.
However, talk of "boxes" invokes the idea of explicit storage.
Finally, as noted at the outset, Fodor is generally
committed to the identification of common sense states with
explicit cognitive states, and although he has not, to my
knowledge, ever explicitly advocated the doctrine, some
version of the storage view would seem to be the likely
candidate for belief.
7. See Lycan (1988), pp. 6-7.
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view which makes no commitment at all to explicit storage for
any beliefs.
An obvious and difficult problem for the storage view is
that it appears that we can have infinitely many beliefs, but
only store finitely many representations (assuming 'that the
storage view is otherwise correct.) Or at least, it seems that
the number of beliefs a person has can easily exceed the
amount of storage space that it is reasonable to postulate for
explicitly stored (high-level) mental sentences.8 Thus, the
storage view is typically supplemented with the further
hypothesis that there are certain "explicit" beliefs that are
representations that are explicitly stored, with the remainder
of our beliefs being "implicit", i.e. not explicitly stored
but related appropriately to those beliefs that are explicitly
stored, where having the implicit belief that p is a matter of
being disposed to produce (e.g. infer) a token that means p
from stored tokens, via an "extrapolator-deducer" as Dennett
calls it.9
However, this account does not stand up under scrutiny,
as Lycan and others have pointed out.l0 The difficulty is that
8. Intuitions differ widely on this matter. Also, as I
shall discuss below, a possible move here is to opt for
realism about only a select core of beliefs.
9. See "Brain Writing and Mind Reading", in Dennett
(1978), where he explicitly proposes an "extrapolator-deducer"
but ultimately rejects a realist account of the attitudes.
10. Lycan (1988), Chapter 3, which includes mention of
others who have noted these problems, including Dennett, op.
cit. Lycan sometimes refers to these as "tacit" beliefs, but I
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we also want to allow that people sometimes produce new
beliefs from old ones, and it is not apparent how we are to
distinguish these acquisitions from implicit beliefs. For
instance, we frequently infer things from what we already
believe. And we think that such inferences produce new
beliefs. However, it seems that the hypothesized extrapolator-
deducer might follow similar inference patterns. What, then,
is to distinguish implicit beliefs from those we are disposed
to acquired? There are several possible answers, though none
of them succeeds.
It might be claimed that conscious processing separates
explicitly acquired from implicit belief; i.e. it might be
claimed that the extrapolation which results in implicit
belief being made explicit is all unconscious, whereas all
belief change is the result of conscious thought. But this
will plainly not do. We allow for unconscious belief change--
especially in cases of vast, gradual revision. For instance,
many people are trained as children to believe one or another
religious ideology, and many of them abandon these beliefs
later in life, but it is implausible to claim that in all such
cases, all of these belief changes were carried out in a
conscious manner. E.g., such people haven't consciously
prefer the term 'implicit' since others, notably Chomsky, use
'tacit' in a way that suggests explicit, non-conscious
representation.
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reconsidered everything that they were explicitly taught as
children.
Also, even when belief change is partially conscious,
much of the inference process itself is not conscious. Our
conscious thoughts typically express only a few crucial
premises in what is often a fairly complex series of
inferences. Yet, it is often plausible to attribute belief to
the suppressed premises and sub-inferences used in reasoning.
For instance, I may arrive at home, see my wife's coat and
unconsciously infer to the conscious thought that she Is home.
Presumably, I believe that if her coat is here then she's
home, and have used this belief in my unconscious inference.
But my belief in the conclusion is surely belief acquisition
rather than extrapolation.
Perhaps it might be suggested that when reasoning from
conscious premises is occurring, then belief change is
occurring. But this overlooks the fact that extrapolation
might occur in the midst of reasoning. For instance if you
assert "if I'm a conservative then pigs can fly" I might
extrapolate the (implicit) belief that pigs cannot fly, and
then infer that you want me to believe that you're not a
conservative. Clearly I haven't acquired the belief that pigs
can't fly in such a case. So in general, admitting the
existence of unconscious or partially unconscious reasoning--
as we surely must--undermines the claim that being conscious
23
is what distinguishes belief change from the accessing of
implicit beliefs.
Another prima facie candidate is a temporal criterion.
Much of our belief change results from long chains of
reasoning, whereas candidate implicit beliefs, such as
"elephants don't wear pajamas", bring immediate assent.
However, a bit of reflection shows that this will not do. For
we also frequently acquire new beliefs through immediate
assent. Sometimes, a suggestion that has never occurred to us
before can seem immediately plausible. And sometimes we draw
inferences quite rapidly as well. For instance, a violation of
Grice's conversational maxim of relevance can lead us to
immediately infer that the speaker did not approve of the
previous remark. And there is no basis for thinking that such
cases of rapid assent or inference are any slower than the
(apparent) inference involved in (apparent) implicit beliefs.
Thus, any choice of a temporal criterion for distinguishing
implicit beliefs from beliefs we are disposed to acquire would
appear to inappropriately classify many cases that are very
obviously newly acquired beliefs as implicit beliefs and vice
versa, so no such criterion is acceptable.
One final suggestion might be that there are simply two
different processes in cognition, one which extrapolates
implicit beliefs and one which produces new beliefs from
stored beliefs. The problem, though, is that it is not
apparent how we could identify such processes as being either
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implicit belief "actualizers" or new belief producere. E.g.
suppose that we discover that there are 23 distinct inference-
extrapolation process which operate on a stored set of
beliefs. Which of these would be the implicit belief processes
and which the new belief processes? It seems that we need some
criterion, i.e. some conceptual distinction between implicit
belief and dispositions to acquire belief, which is more or
less prior to empirical theories of inference and
extrapolation. But this is what we are lacking.
Thus, the extrapolator-deducer view fails to yield an
adequate distinction between implicit belief and dispositions
to acquire beliefs. This leaves us with the other more or less
standard means of attempting to characterize implicit belief,
i.e. in terms of disposition to judge. Thus, it might be
hypothesized that having the implicit belief that p is being
disposed to (inwardly) judge that p upon entertaining the
occurrent thought that p. However, this faces the same sorts
of problems as the extrapolator/deducer view, since some inner
judgments signal the acquisition of new beliefs while the rest
affirm old ones. Consider the following counterexamples that
Lycan has presented against the dispositional view:
1. The opinionated people. They are Peircians, in
that they abhor being agnostic on any subject, but
not Peircian enough, in that in them the "irritation
of doubt" triggers not inquiry but snap judgments.
On many occasions, at least, when they entertain a
proposition for the first time, they immediately
affirm the proposition or deny it, depending on what
else is going on in their global psychology at the
time. Thus, at a time t our subjects have countless
dispositions to judge--determined by their global
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psychology--but we would not count these as
antecedently existing beliefs, however [implicit].11
Of course, this is mere fiction. However, it is easy enough to
find cases from everyday life. Thus, consider a second
counterexample that Lycan borrows from Audi:
2. The excited raconteur. He is regaling his dinner
companions with a voluble account of some startling
incident, waving has arms and talking too loudly. If
he were simply to entertain the proposition that he
was talking too loudly, he would instantly realize
that it is true. But not having entertained the
proposition, 1e does not already know or believe it
in any sense.
Perhaps, in an attempt to save the disposition to
judgement view, it might be suggested that the dispositions
must be of the right sort, i.e. they must result from the more
or less evidential function of the explicit beliefs. However,
this will not do either. For the following possibility seems
plausible enou.gh. Consider a scientist who has never thought
of some theory T, even though this theory would explain a lot
of relevant data and coheres wonderfully with the other
theories she believes. One day someone else suggests T to her
and she immediately sees many of its appealing features,
relative to her other beliefs, and so her immediate reaction
is to say "T must be true, I wonder why I never thought of
that..." Thus, it would seem that the disposition to affirm p
11. Lycan (1988), p. 58.
12. Lycan (1988), p. 67.
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is not the way to go in distinguishing implicit belief and
dispositions to acquire belief.
A line of response to the problem of accounting for
implicit belief is to simply give up on implicit belief and
opt for realism for only an explicit "core" of beliefs--i.e.
those that involve explicit storage.13 The proposal assumes
that science will, in general, show us what the real
extensions of our common sense natural kind-concepts are. And
since we apparently cannot computationally account for
implicit belief, the next best option would seem to be to
adopt a computational account of belief which turns out to
only include explicit beliefs. I will now examine this line.
An initial problem that arises for the core view is how
to account for apparent implicit beliefs. Thus, it seems
rather counter-intuitive to flatly deny that, e.g. I believe
that there are no anteaters in the room or that 10,013 is the
successor of 10,012 (assuming these candidate beliefs would
not make the explicit core--I shall take up the issue of
what's in the core next.) A slightly more reasonable move,
suggested by Audi14, is to claim that in such cases, while we
13. See Block (1990), p. 271. Lycan (1988) too would
apparently hold this view if, as he suggests, there is no
plausible account of tacit beliefs. And Audi (1982) also
proposes this sort of view, although he does not seem to view
his proposal as scientific revisionism. Also see Fodor (1987),
pp. 20-21 for a general advocation of the core view for all
attitudes.
14. Audi (1988).
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do not have these (apparently implicit) beliefs, we are
disposed to acquire them upon forming the appropriate
propositions in thoughts. While this is better, it is still
not completely palatable. Consider related cases where I
genuinely did not know. E.g. until I enter and look around a
room for the first time, I have no beliefs about what's in it
(expectations, maybe, but no beliefs, at least in some cases.)
And until I calculate, I do not believe that 78*67=5226. The
former cases appear substantially different from this. Thus,
in the cases of the propositions that there are no anteaters
in the room or that 10,013 is the successor of 10,012, I would
like to say I know that these things are true even before I
formulate the thoughts. It was not as though I had no
attitude, no opinion at all on such matters until I
contemplated them. This is not, I think a fatal problem for
the core beliefs proposal because one can, with revisionism,
always bite the bullet and opt to throw out certain
intuitions. But a view that advocates too much revisionism
itself becomes implausible, and this is a lot of revision--so
this problem is a strike against the view all the same.
A further issue concerns which (common sense) beliefs are
supposed to be in the core. One possible view is that it is
roughly those propositions that have been affirmed in
consciousness and are still stored. While this is not a
position that advocates of the core hypothesis typically
advance, this does seem to be the basis on which the
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distinction is actually drawn. Thus, why should it be that the
belief that dogs are animals is part of the core, whereas the
beliefs that 10,013 is the successor of 10,012 and that there
are no anteaters in the room are not part of the core?
Presumably, the decisions about how to classify such candidate
beliefs are based on our knowledge of what we have and haven't
ever consciously thought about. It is likely that we all have
at some point consciously affirmed that dogs are animals and
highly unlikely that we have ever consciously entertained, let
alone affirmed the other two propositions. Or consider Lycan's
discussion of why his wife's beliefs that she is less than 18
feet tall and that 10,329>10,328 are implicit:
There is no plausible sense in which these things
are represented explicitly within her at this very
moment, much less hooked up with the other relevant
concepts in even a quiescent way. In particular, she
never episodically judges that she is less that 18
feet tall, or the like.D
I take it that an "episodic judgement" is a conscious
judgement. Or consider Audi's rejection of the claim that he
believes before entertaining a certain thought:
But is it at all likely that my belief that the sun
is more than 100.542 miles away, was formed before I
entertained the proposition, given that (for
instance) I never perceived, inferred, or
introspected it, nor experiencfd anything in which
it figured in any special way?
15. Lycan (1988), pp. 55-56.
16. Lycan (1988), p. 117.
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Again, it would seem that what is doing the work here is
knowledge of what has and hasn't been consciously entertained.
So it is worth examining the proposal that one's core beliefs
are roughly those affirmative conscious judgments that are
explicitly stored.
This view faces two severe difficulties. One is that
there are lots of successful belief-desire explanations whose
attributed beliefs apparently do not correspond to consciously
affirmed thoughts, and it seems arbitrary to maintain that
such cases are not genuine beliefs. For example, consider
perceptual beliefs. In our daily trafficking with the world we
perceive the location and attributes of countless objects, yet
we explicitly pass judgement on only a few of these cases.
Thus, we do not typically walk around thinking "there's a blue
book about 8" by 5" by 2" lying towards the corner nearest me
of a wooden brown-lacquered table..." All the same, we can
usually volunteer such information, if need be. But on the
occurrent core belief proposal, most such states would not
count as perceptual belief. However, we typically explain a
person's actions with some of the information in perceptual
states, e.g. "he saw the table and stepped around it," and it
seems unacceptable to deem such explanations no good.
Certainly, they appear to be as successful as any other
belief-desire explanations.
Perhaps this type of case can be remedied by broadening
the class of conscious states beyond occurrent judgments to
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all conscious states that get explicit stored. Thus, it may be
that much of our perceiving is carried out in terms of iconic
states, and it is these which we frequently consult in finding
our way about. While judgement or occurrent thought does not
occur in such states, we nevertheless (apparently) consciously
entertain them, (i.e. we "receive" perceptions) and apparently
also sometimes store them, so perhaps occurrent core belief
could be expanded to include such (apparently) non-sentential
conscious states.
However, it does not appear that a similar strategy is
available for other cases. For example, we typically do not
consciously entertain Gricean attitudes when we communicate.
E.g. we do not think "I want her to come to believe that I am
uttering S to get her to believe that I uttered S in order to
get her to believe that I believe that p..." Yet, again, such
explanations offer a fairly successful explanation of how we
appear to understand one another's speech acts when we
communicate. And the occurrent core view apparently must
reject the postulation of such attitudes and the related
account of communication. Or consider that many of our
ordinary actions apparently rely on beliefs about the world.
We turn the faucet because we believe that this will produce
water, and we turn doorknobs because we believe that this will
open doors. But surely, few of us have consciously affirmed
such mundane beliefs at any recent point in our lives--e.g. I
suspect that we generally can't remember when, if ever, we
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explicitly affirmed that turning the doorknob will open the
door. But on the occurrent core view, this is to say that we
have little basis for attributing these beliefs to ourselves.
And this is quite implausible. For, again, such explanations
are the bread and butter of belief-desire explanations. I.e.
it would seem that if we are going to allow that there are
beliefs at all, we should allow that there are such basic
action-guiding beliefs.
A second major problem for the conscious core proposal is
that it simply seems unlikely that many of our consciously
affirmed thoughts are actually explicitly stored. If a
representation is explicitly stored, we can typically
reproduce it, more or less at will, or with appropriate cues.
This is true of "memorized" sentences, including quotes,
sayings, slogans and poetry. Thus, it is reasonable to
hypothesize that explicit storage underlies such
memorizations. However, reproduction is not at all
characteristic of occurrent thoughts. Rather, it seems that
our thoughts are rarely exactly the same as previous thoughts,
and if they are closely related to previous thoughts at all,
they are variations or modifications of what came before.
Thus, we are typically very bad at recalling exactly what we
were thinking after thoughts have ceased to be occurrent.
E.g., I can tell you the general content of what I was
thinking a few minutes ago and perhaps reconstruct a few
significant points, but I have no idea exactly what my inner
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utterings were--we are rarely able to quote ourselves a few
minutes after a thought is gone. In fact, an important
function of physical transcriptions is to preserve a concrete
formulation of thoughts, something we are usually unable to do
for large numbers of thoughts. For instance, you probably
would want to allow that I believe virtually all of these
sentences, as I write and re-read this paper, yet at any
moment I am lucky if I can recall even a single sentence of
this essay word for word. All this would suggest that we
typically do not explicitly store our occurrent affirmations,
which is to say that the occurrent core view is mistaken.17
There is an alternative means of formulating the core
belief hypothesis, namely in terms of representations that are
explicitly stored and potentially active in cognition. As
Lycan puts it:
A paradigm case of this would be one in which a
previously tokened representation is now stored
quiescently in long-term memory. The stored formula
is accessible to various executive agencies and can
be hauled out on cue, resulting in a new judgement
or tokening bearing the same computational shape.
What is important about the stored representations is that
they can produce appropriate effects in cognition and
17. This is not to say that no explicit storage lies
behind our thoughts and judgments, just that it probably isn't
storage of conscious thoughts themselves.
18. Lycan (1988), p. 56. This is also presumably the view
Fodor would want to maintain, as the quote on p. 1 above
suggests.
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ultimately behavior, i.e. that they have the causal role of
(the common sense notion of) beliefs. As Block suggests:
we home in on cases in which our beliefs cause us to
do something (say, throw a ball or change our mind)
and cases in which beliefs are caused by something
(as when perception of a rhinoceros causes us to
believe that there is a rhinoceros in the vicinity).
So the protoscientific concept of [core] belief is
the concept of a causally active belief.19
However, this explicit storage/causal role version of the core
hypothesis avoids the implausibility of the conscious core
hypothesis only if the two are relatively non-co-extensive.
Thus, if is also hypothesized that most of the explicitly
stored representations in cognition correspond to conscious or
potentially conscious states, then the active representation
hypothesis faces the same problems we have just noted for the
occurrent hypothesis.
On the other hand, at present we have very little idea
what explicit stored representations are behind the operations
of cognition. So the explicit representation hypothesis gives
us very little to go on. E.g. it does not tell us which
apparent beliefs will turn out to be actual--"in the core."
Nor do we have much evidence, beyond consciousness, as to
whether or not the explicitly stored representations in
cognition will correspond in any way to the beliefs that
19. Block (1990). I take it that "causally active" means
potentially causally efficacious rather than causally
activated--for otherwise, under the proposal, most of us would
probably have just a handful of beliefs at any given moment,
and would sometimes have no beliefs at all, but this absurdly
revisionary.
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common sense attributes to individuals. Thus, while the
hypothesis is not implausible, it is not particularly
plausible either, since we really have no relevant evidence
with which to evaluate it.
And further, there is a lingering implausibility. The
explicit core hypothesis has got to be somewhat revisionary,
if not radically revisionary in regard to what beliefs we
have, and, as I noted above, such revision does not come easy-
-all things being equal, a non-revisionary account of some
concept is preferable over a deeply revisionary account.
As far as I can see, this exhausts the available options
for an account of belief as explicit storage, and thus
exhausts the options for the identification of belief with an
explicit cognitive state. 20 So the explicit core/causal role
view appears to be the only reasonable form of the storage
hypothesis. However, as I will now argue, there is a more
plausible alternative to this view, an alternative which
abandons an identification of belief with explicit states in
favor of an identification with implicit or dispositional
states. As I will show, it is the causal role which does all
the work for the hypothesis we are considering--the idea of
20. Could belief be something other than storage? The
problem is that storage seems like the only informational
state that has any real over-lap with the apparent extension
of belief. I.e. all you really get in computers are storage
and computations, and since belief appears to be an enduring
rather than a momentary state, only the former seems like a
reasonable candidate.
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storage is in fact superfluous. But, since it is the appeal to
storage that motivates the core hypothesis, this means that we
should abandon the core storage view in favor of a "pure"
causal role account of belief.
The storage/causal role specification proposes that
having the belief chat p is a matter of storing a
representation that means p where this representation has an
appropriate causal zole in terms of its relations to other
representations, states and behavior. The latter clause is
required since there will presumably be other attitudes whose
computational explication involves storage, notably memory.
For instance, it is possible to remember something but not
believe it. E.g. I remember the first verse of the Bible, but
I do not believe it.21 So belief must at least be a matter of
storage with appropriate additional relations to other
elements of cognition, ones that merely remembered
representations do not share.
21. Perhaps it might be argued that there is belief
involved in such cases after all, e.g. that I believe that 'In
the beginning...' is the first verse of the Bible. However, it
seems possible to remember a quote without remembering the
source or context. In fact, this seems to be a common
occurrence. In any case, we can see that this reply will not
do on other grounds. It is an intelligible empirical
hypothesis that we remember quotes via explicitly storing
them. Thus, suppose that I remember the first verse of the
Bible by explicitly storing an English token which expresses
that verse. But, if belief is nothing but explicit storage,
then I must believe this as well since I have, by hypothesis,
explicitly stored a representation with the appropriate
meaning. But, (by hypothesis and in fact) I don't believe it,
so we need to specify something further, in addition to
storage, which enables us to distinguish belief from memory.
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Here it is worth noting that although this hypothesis is
presented as the claim that there is a "belief box" in
cognition, where this is understood as the claim that all
beliefs are stored in a unit which bears an appropriate
functional role to the rest of cognition, it is unlikely that
there will actually be a storage unit dedicated solely to
belief. This is because we apparently remember all, or most of
what we believe. But it is unlikely that there is such massive
duplication in cognition, i.e. where for most beliefs that p,
there is one representation that means p that is literally
stored in a belief box and another that means p that is stored
in a distinct memory box. A much more plausible version of the
storage account postulates one memory/belief container, where
individual representations are classified (as either
remembered, believed or both) by their individual causal
roles.
It will useful for my purposes to make the causal role a
bit more vivid. Two features suggest themselves, more or less
from traditional functionalism. First, beliefs are the basis
for our reasoning and theorizing. If we believe something,
then we are willing to draw conclusions from this belief and
to test other potential beliefs against this belief. Second,
beliefs often lead to actions, when combined in an appropriate
way with acticrn-driving states. Specificaly, we use our
beliefs to reason out courses of action which will lead us
toward our goals, and sometimes act on them. Thus, the
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relevant functional role for the belief that p is roughly to
be disposed to use p as a basis for theoretical and practical
reasoning, where the latter sometimes leads to action. Or, to
put it more traditionally, beliefs are those states which
combine with other beliefs to yield new beliefs, and combine
with desires to produces intentions, actions, or further
desires .22
I will now argue that, in fact, it is this causal,
functional 23 role alone, and not storage, which is doing all
the work in the storage/causal role model. Consider first a
case where storage is present but the causal role is removed,
i.e. a case of failure to immediately update. Suppose we
indeed have a storehouse of representations that have the
causal roles appropriate to belief. It is unlikely that all
these explicitly stored representations are updated every time
changes in belief occur. The most obvious reason is simply
22. This type of specification differs from traditional
functionalism in that no attempt is being made to give a
functional specification of the representation or its content.
That is, only the state type belief is being identified with a
functional role (assuming that storage is also ultimately
functionally specified.) By contrast, the traditional
functionalist identifies each belief that p with a distinct
functional role. Also, as I have discussed at the outset, and
will consider again below, the cognitivist assumes that these
common sense characterizations can ultimately be made more
computational.
23. I use "causal role" and "functional role" as synonyms
here, although there may be a difference. I.e., svune
traditional functionalists may wish to deny the causal
efficacy of belief, but I am not concerned with such views
here.
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that the "core" of explicitly stored representptions would
have to be quite large and it is much too computationally
expensive to be feasible to update all of them after every few
cognitive operations. It follows, then, that there will
sometimes, perhaps often, be explicitly stored representations
that are in need in of up-dating. But in such a case the
explicit presence of the representation will apparently be
irrelevant to belief attribution. Let us assume, for the sake
of example, that explicitly stored sentences underlie some
beliefs. Suppose that I once believed the Christian ideology,
but now have rejected it. Yet, at a point in time not too long
after these major belief revisions have occurred, I might
still have some explicitly stored tokens corresponding to my
former beliefs. Suppose, for instance, that I have explicit
stored a token of 'Jesus changed water into wine.' Owing to my
belief changes, I am now not disposed to act on this
representation--upon (eventually) accessing it, I will, let us
say, erase it. But I have not had occasion to access it for
years. During this dormant period, do I still believe that
Jesus changed water into wine? Someone transfixed with the
explicit storage view of belief might want to claim that I do,
but consider that, in such a case, I would have no
dispositions to act on this belief or express this
proposition--my behavioral dispositions would be
indistinguishable from someone who had never explicitly stored
this proposition. Nor would any conscious judgement or thought
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reflect this belief. Thus, it is plausible to claim that in
such a case, I would no longer have this belief even though I
have explicit stored a token which has the appropriate
meaning. In other words, the continuing presence of the causal
role is required for the presence of the belief.
The previous case suggests that the causal role is a
necessary and important part of the storage/causal role model
of (core) belief. Now, however, I will argue that causal role
alone is sufficient for belief. To see this, consider two
people, Romulus and Remus, who share a set of causal roles
that are characteristic of belief. Romulus' causal roles are
associated with explicitly stored tokens in just the way that
the core storage plus causal role model predicts. So, e.g. he
has the causal role characteristic of belief associated with
some stored representation p, and all this leads to the
attribution, on the part of himself and others, of the belief
that p. Remus, on the other hand has, for every causal role
and stored representation of Romulus, the same causal role
associated with a different set of stored representations and
the disposition to produce the (semantic) type of
representation that Romulus has stored. So, for the causal
role associated with p in Romulus, Remus might have stored a
representation that means "if q then p" and another that means
q, and have these associated with the disposition to infer a
representation that means p from these other two
representations on just the occasions when a representation
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that means p is active in Romulus. (We needn't suppose that
all this production from stored representations on Remus part
is deductive, but that's an easy way to simplify the example.)
So, in effect, for all of Eomulus' "explicit" beliefs, Remus
has causally equivalent implicit beliefs.
Now, it would seem that the storage plus causal role
model of core belief must make the dubious claim that while
Romulus has a belief that p for every stored representation
and associated appropriate causal role, Remus in fact has no
beliefs at all.24 But this is wildly implausible. Consider that
all their behaviors and dispositions to behavior are
identical, as well as all of their cognitive states beyond
those involving the storage aspect of the belief causal roles.
Exactly the same propositional attitude explanations will seem
true of them, and the same belief ascriptions will seem to
apply equally well. Moreover, they themselves will
(independently of a commitment to the storage view and
knowledge of what they store) attribute exactly the same
beliefs to themselves.
24. Note that the view would not attribute beliefs
corresponding to Remus' exp]icitly stored representations
either, since they lack the appropriate causal role. E.g. when
representation meaning "if p then q" becomes active in
Romulus, one also becomes active in Remus, though not as a
result of the stored token that means "if p then q," but
rather as a result of extrapolation from some other stored
representations, e.g. one meaning "r or if p then q" and
another meaning "not r." And, as we have just seen in the
preceding case, and in considerations of memory, storage alone
is not sufficient for the attribution of belief.
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Does the storage theorist have any basis for arguing that
only Romulus has beliefs, other than a brute appeal to the
storage model.? It would seem not, and thus it would seem that
a more plausible view than the core storage plus causal role
account is the hypothesis that it is the (appropriate) causal
role alone that should be identified with belief, particularly
given the problems we have noted with the core view--i.e. its
failure to explain apparent implicit beliefs in a satisfying
way, and the lack of any evidence for supporting the
hypothecis that there are in fact stored representations in us
corresponding to many of our ordinarily attributed beliefs. As
we have seen, the storage view requires that we are able to
identify a belief's causal role anyway, and since causal role
by itself appears to come closer to being co-extensive with
our common sense criteria for belief attribution and
explanation, it would seem that the latter is a more
appropriate scientific explication of belief. It is to this
approach that I will now turn.
The immediate problem is to provide a specification of
the causal role that does not rely on the notion of storage.
Recall that our specification was that to have belief that p
is to store a representation that means p and to be disposed
to use this representation as a basis for theoretical and
practical reasoning. As our previous example has shown us,
what we want is for such dispositions to be realized when it
matters, i.e. in situations when a token that means p is
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activated in the system. This suggests a conditional,
dispositional formulation of the causal role:
the belief that p=df the disposition to use a
representation that means p in theoretical reasoning and
as a basis for action and practical reasoning when such a
representation is explicitly formulated.
If this account is to succeed in place of the core belief
view, it must deal with the issue with which we began, namely
how to distinguish the disposition to acquire belief from
dispositional belief. I will first present some clarifications
of this "pure" causal role view, and then procee. to address
the problem concerning dispositions to acquire beliefs.
It should be noted that, while I have been using common
sense terminology, e.g. "theoretical reasoning," the
definition, in keeping with the computational approach, is
intended to define belief dispositionally in terms of non-
dispositional cognitive processes. As such, the definition is
best understood as a sketch of a more exact and formal
definition which will be possible when we have a fuller, well-
confirmed theory of cognitive processes. Perhaps a better
immediate formulation would be:
the belief that P=df the disposition to use a
representation that means p as input to processes which
use it as a basis for inference and explanation and as
input to processes which use is as a basis for planning,
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deciding and acting, when such a representation is
explicitly formulated.
I take it that it is a fairly safe bet that we do have
explicit processes of explanation, inference, decision, and
planning, or at least that we have explicit processes
underlying the states we ordinarily identify with these
terms. 25 The significant feature of the definition, however,
which will loom important throughout the rest of the essay, is
that formulation doesn't identify belief with explicit states,
but with dispositions for the use of representations in
explicit processes.26
Also note that the "explicitly formulated" clause must
imply some sort of causal role itself in order to distinguish
this view from one on which "explicit storage" replaces
explicit formulation. I take it that the representation in
question must be "on-line", that is, available to most or all
of the processes that could potentially use it as input.
Perhaps there is one central "buffer" which allows for such
25. If not, then my specification will be falsified. It
is, after all, offered as an empirical property specification
as part of very abstract cognitive psychology.
26. Note that from here on in, when I speak of this as a
"functionalist" or "dispositional" account, I mean this
special sense of functions or dispositions to use in explicit
cognitive processes, not the traditional sense of functions or
dispositions to (observable) behaviors.
Also note that the account says nothing about the output
of reasoning or decision processes. So, e.g., I am not
claiming that we always do what we believe to be the best
action.
44
availability.2 Or perhaps the necessary availability is a more
complicated matter, e.g. of a controlling unit feeding the
representation to a number of appropriate locations. In any
case, I shall rely on the intuitive notion of being "on-line,"
where required, while assuming that this part of the
definition will also be subject to suitable modifications as
cognitive theory develops.
It is also worth noting that this definition does not
imply anything about conscious or self-access to the explicit
formulations of representations and processes. It appears that
many of the explicit representations and computational
processes characterized by cognitive theories are sub-
conscious and this means that many of the processes and
representations which are relevant to this definition will be
outside the access of consciousness. The proposed definition
allows for sub-conscious causal roles and therefore allows for
sub-conscious belief.28
One final point of clarification concerning the causal
role specification concerns the need for both a clause citing
theoretical reasoning processes and a clause citing practical
27. See Baars (1988) for the suggestion that such a
buffer is what we ordinarily call conscious thought.
28. T take it that in cases of sub-conscious belief
attribution the postulated beliefs do play a role in
inference, pLanning and action. For instance, in Freudian
theory, the primary roles of repressed beliefs is to interact
with repressed desires (or repressing desires) to produce
other, conscious beliefs and desires and to determine the
content of dreams.
45
reasoning and action guiding processes. Clearly, the latter
clause alon3 is not sufficient, for this would not distinguish
belief from desires, intentions and the like which also enter
into practical reasoning and guide action. However, it might
seem that the first clause alone could suffice for our
definition, since we need not always act on our beliefs. But
this would not allow us to distinguish hypothetical reasoning
from belief. Thus, we are sometimes disposed to use hypotheses
in reasoning, and to deduce further consequences from these
consequences and so on. What seems to ultimately distinguish
belief from a supposition is that we are prepared to act on
the former, to bet on it--as they emphasize in decision
theory--but not on the latter. So it would seem that both a
theoretical reasoning and a practical reasoning and action
guiding clause are required for our functional specification
of belief. 2
Consideration of apparent cases where the two criteria
diverge further supports this specification. Suppose we have
someone who accepts a certain proposition as a basis for
various inferences, but who, in situations where the belief
appears relevant, completely fails to act on it. Thus, suppose
an individual is willing to assert with conviction that racial
29. There are cases in which we are prepared to act on
what we don't believe--e.g. when we want to act as though
something is the case. But in such cases we are be prepared to
act on p only in a limited way--we wouldn't want to make all
decisions as though it were the case.
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differences should not affect an individual's opportunities in
society, and who, in fact, draws inferences based on this
claim, but who consistently fails to hire job candidates of
certain races even when their qualifications are obviously
superior to any of their competitors. Were the disposition to
use an explicit representation in theoretical reasoning alone
a sufficient condition for belief, then we should have no
trouble ascribing belief in such cases. However, we often do
withhold belief ascriptions in such cases--failing to act on a
professed belief makes us skeptical about the actual
possession of the belief.30 I suggest that our hesitation to
ascribe belief here is evidence enough to demonstrate that
both dispositions to theoretical reason.ing and to practical
reasoning and action are required for belief. And our analysis
suggests that such cases should be difficult--it is not as
though they are the same as when there in no belief at all.
What we might expect, then, is a shift from the language of
belief to other conceptions which distinguish these two
aspects, and this is apparently what we find. We describe
individuals of the sort envisioned as having accepted the
proposition "in theory but not in practice." Or we might say
they have "become convinced" of the claim but have "failed to
30. There are some interesting complications here. For
instance, we may sometimes sincerely express an apparent
belief that in fact is not something that we would either be
willing to reason from nor act upon. Rey (1988) explores such
cases a bit. I discuss his view along with Stich's evaluation
of such cases in the Appendix (below.)
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apply it." And significantly, we do not say things such as
"they believe it in theory but not in practice"--this locution
sounds odd in just the way that we should expect if belief
requires dispositions to both "theory and practice."
Having clarified the computational functional role
specification, I now turn to the problem of distinguishing
previously held beliefs from dispositions to acquire belief.
Given that having a belief is being disposed to use an
appropriate explicit representation, if formulated, in
theoretical reasoning and decision-making processes, the
disposition to acquire a belief becomes a second-order
disposition, namely the disposition to become disposed to use
an appropriate representation, if formulated, in reasoning and
decision processes. That is, belief is defined as a certain
first order disposition B, and the disposition to acquire a
belief is the disposition to acquire B.
The counterexamples that I presented above to the
dispositional definition of implicit belief are supposed to
show that in some cases an apparent disposition to acquire
belief also satisfies B. To review, we have the opinionated
people who are disposed to "immediately affirm" or deny any
entertained proposition depending on the psychological
context. We have the excited raconteur, who is talking too
loudly. Were he to "entertain the proposition that he was
talking too loudly, he would instantly realize that it is
true." But he does not already believe it. And we have the
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scientist who has never thought of some theory T, although it
is so coherent with her other beliefs that when it is proposed
to her she immediately affirms its truth. These cases show
that believing that p cannot be a matter of being disposed to
judge affirmatively that p, since in each case the disposition
is present when, intuitively, the person has not yet acquired
the belief--in each case they do not acquire it until they
actually make the judgement.
Will these cases also serve as counterexamples to my
proposed dispositional, causal role definition of belief? It
is not apparent that they do, since it is not apparent that in
the described cases the appropriate dispositions to use a
representation in reasoning processes exist prior to the
drawing of the judgement. What characterizes these cases is
both an introspective immediacy (the subjects would
"instantly" or "immediately" affirm the proposition) and a
justificatory minimality--the affirmation requires but a
single step of reasoning given the background beliefs or
available evidence. However, this does not show that no change
in dispositions for inputs to reasoning and action processes
occur when the proposition is entertained. Consider that in
the cases presented it is as reasonable to suppose that the
judgement affects the causal role of the representation as it
is to suppose this in cases of longer, more explicitly
reasoning to belief change. That is, it is reasonable to
hypothesize that the causal effect of the judgement is to
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alter the person's dispositions to reasoning and decision
input. Presumably, the opinionated people are not prepared to
reason from or act on a representation meaning p or not p
until the psychological event occurs which causes them to leap
to the affirmation or denial of p. And likewise, the
raconteur's and the scientist's judgments cause appropriate
changes in their dispositions to reasoning and action. If they
do not, then it seems more appropriate to characterize these
as cases of affirming something that is already believed.
Thus, if the scientist already accepts every consequence
(deductive, inductive and explanatory) of the theory, then it
is no longer intuitively obvious that she does not already
believe the theory. And if the raconteur's entertaining the
thought that he is talking too loudly does not change his
dispositions to act on this representation then it seems more
accurate to describe this thought as leading him to act on a
belief that he already has rather than as changing his belief.
E.g. suppose that the raconteur had been explicitly asked a
few minutes earlier to speak louder by someone who is now
gone, so that he now no longer needs to bellow, although in
his excitement he does. Here, it is no longer clear that the
entertaining of the thought changes his beliefs--we are more
jiclined to say that he has temporarily suppressed his belief
that he is speaking loudly, or we may drop the notion of
belief and turn instead to an explanation of his attention and
access to stored information.
50
Perhaps there are cases like this where an explicit
formulation does not change the functional role. But then it
is not apparent that belief changes. For instance, consider a
case of temporary forgetting that is apparently a failure of
access. Suppose I believe some fact, say that Kant was from
KHnigsberg, and that I have achieved this belief by explicit
storing an appropriate token. But, suppose further that on a
certain occasion, when asked, I cannot immediately recall
this. However, I have not forgotten it permanently--when
someone suggests that Kant may have been from Kbnigsberg, I
immediately affirm this--"ah, of course, K8nigsberg." It is
plausible to assume that the failure was purely one of access-
-that I could not find the appropriate explicitly stored token
when I first wanted to. Here it is apparent that the following
conditional has remained true of me all along, if a
representation that means that Kant was from Ktnigsberg would
be explicit formulated--i.e. available or on-line to central
or appropriate processors, I would be disposed to use this
representations in reasoning or decision processes. Thus, my
suggested account classifies this as a case of continued
belief. However, I do not think that this is inappropriate. If
the mere suggestion of the right answer leads to my immediate
recognition, we will probably want to ascribe continued
belief, although belief seems an odd or inappropriate notion
to use in characterizing this case--instead it seems more
appropriate to just stick with an explanation of failure of
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memory or access. My account suggests that the problem here is
that the causal role for the belief apparently cannot come
into play since the appropriate representation cannot be
formulated or activated. Thus, we typically neither ascribe
belief or non-belief in such a case, but speak instead of (a
failure of) memory.
I suggest, then, that the dispositional, functional role
account does not appear susceptible to the kinds of
counterexamples that plague definitions of (implicit) belief
that are formulated in terms of dispositions to Judge.
However, there may be a great number of cases where there is
no distinguishing belief from dispositions to acquire belief.
The problems arise in cases where the acceptability of an
explicit representation for use by reasoning and decision
processes is complicated, so that there will only be a certain
probability that the representation will be used by the
processes. Thus, suppose that a given reasoning processor (or
set of processors) is disposed to use the output of another
processor, an "evaluator," that takes a representation as
input and uses a set of rules or heuristics to attempt to
derive the representation from a given data base. If it
succeeds, the representation is fed to the reasoners, if it
fails, the representation is discarded. For some
representations, the evaluative procedure may be highly
complicated, and may depend on what other representations have
recently been activated, or may depend probabilisticly on
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which evaluation procedures are applied. For cases where the
outcome is very doubtful, it does not seem appropriate to say
that the reasoning processor is already disposed to use a
given outcome. And where the outcome is very certain, it does
seem that the disposition already exists. But notice that
there is ro obvious dividing line between a likely outcome and
an unlikely one. And this would mean that there would be no
determinate point at which dispositions to use a
representation if formulated could be distinguished from
changes in dispositions to use. Unfortunately, on the
suggested account of belief, this is to say that in such a
circumstance there would be no exact dividing line between
previously held beliefs and dispositions to acquire new
beliefs.
Is the this an acceptable consequence of an analysis of
belief? It appears that our intuitions about various cases
support not only the possibility but the existence of such
indeterminacy. Consider mathematical beliefs. With
mathematical truths that are extremely simple to compute, e.g.
1000+3=1003 or 19 is the successor of 18, we are inclined to
say that we already believe them. And when they are very
difficult to compute, e.g. 77 is the square root of 5929, we
are inclined to say the we don't believe them until we compute
them, or unless we recall the result of the computation. But
notice that there is no exact point in increasing
computational difficulty at which previous belief ceases and
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acquired belief begins. Thus, 85+33=118 is probably a
borderline case, since, while the computation is easy, it is
not so easy that we are guaranteed to get it right. Similar
considerations hold for tautologies. We are willing to say
that we believe that cows are cows, but probably not the
truth-functionally valid proposition that either it's raining
and grass is not green or snow is white and it is not raining
or either snow is not white or grass is green, and it is
indeterminate as to whether we already believe less difficult
tautologies or not.
Another bit of support for the claim that in many cases
belief and the disposition to acquire belief are
indistinguishable comes from the fact that often there appears
to be no determinate time at which a given belief begins or
ceases to be. This is particularly true of very general
beliefs. For instance, most readers probably believe that the
methodologies characteristic of the "analytic" approach to
philosophy are generally superior to the methodologies by
characteristic of the "hermeneutic" approach to philosophy (or
vice-versa.) But it is also likely that in most cases, there
was no particular event, e.g. no conscious judgement, which
marked the onset of this belief. Rather, it is likely that
most individuals acquired this belief by gradually acquiring
preferences for one tradition's literature over the other's,
where there was no particular point in the study of the
viewpoints that marked the onset of the belief.
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Thus, it appears that we will have to give in to some
extent to the worries that plague implicit belief accounts and
allow for a certain amount of indeterminacy concerning the
exact determination of which beliefs an individual has. Does
this implied indeterminacy does show us that something is
wrong with our account of belief? I think not. We set out to
characterize a certain property and our investigation has
revealed that it has indeterminate cases. No a priori dictum
forces us to find that all properties are determinate in all
cases. Nor is this the same sort of trouble we raised at the
outset for the storage model of belief, for there is no reason
to think that the dispositional model of belief misclassifies
what appear to be clear cases of belief or dispositions to
acquire a belief. Rather, as I have suggested, the model
appears to reveal an indeterminacy in our ordinary conception
of belief. Nor, finally, does this show that anything is wrong
with the notion of belief itself. Many cases of belief and
change in belief remain unproblematically distinct, which
means that the concept is useful in ordinary descriptions and
explanations of our psychology.31
31. The notion of belief may not seem indeterminate,
since it is always possible to decide on a given proposition
by consciously evaluating it. But this does not show that we
can tell if the outcome of such an evaluation constitutes
belief-change or not.
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II. Other Attitudes, Explicitness and Causation
My analysis of belief suggests that there will be on the
one hand dispositional, and on the other more explicit
cognitive states, since belief, at least, is a disposition to
use an explicit representation if formulated. In addition to
the notion of belief, we need an explanation of what sorts of
representations and processes are responsible for producing
these dispositions, e.g. what representations are explicitly
present or stored and how are they manipulated? Analogously,
if we have a substance that is soluble, we still need an
explanation of what makes it soluble, i.e. what in its
chemical make-up produces the disposition to dissolve? Thus,
we might suppose that cognitive psychology will postulate
states that are different than belief in that they are states
that require the explicit presence of representations.
Perhaps it might be suggested that other common sense
attitudes will fulfill this role of non-dispositional
explanation. However, it is fairly clear that the other most
prominent attitude, viz. desire, is much like belief, and it
is reasonable to think that it too will have a dispositional,
computational specification. Specifically, it may be possible
to have infinitely many desires (e.g. I want to live for more
than 10 more years, more than 10.1 more years, more than 10.11
more years, etc.) And it also seems that we could have
functional role twins that would exhibit the same desires as
far as common sense ascriptions are concerned, despite radical
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differences Jn storage. Attitudes such as hopes and fears may
seem more occurrent, but we must be careful to distinguish
feelings and attitudes. Feeling hopeful or feeling fearful is
an occurrent state, but it is not propositional, any more that
feeling tense or joyful is. E.g. I may feel fearful but not
know what I am afraid of. Fearing that p or hoping that p are
attitudes, but these again seem dispositional--while our
thoughts or utterances may express such attitudes, they are
not identical with them.
In general, any of the attitudes that last over long
periods of time and which do not always have determinate
beginnings and endin.gs would seem to be good candidates for
the dispositional model. This leaves us with a few occurrent
attitude types, viz. occurrent thought, recognition, immediate
intention, and several related states. But it is not as though
we have a vast set of common sense explanations which deal
only with these states. Nor is there any obvious means of
transforming dispositional attitude explanations (e.g. those
involving belief and desire) into explanations that cite only
occurrent states. E.g. If I did A because I wanted p and
believed that doing A was the best means to achieve p, then it
is not always true and often false that I occurrently thought
"doing A is the best means to achieve p." Thus, it seems that
while we might acknowledge that there are some explicitly
represented attitudes that play a role in cognition, we will
have to look beyond the ordinary attitude types for a
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characterization of most non-dispositional elements of
cognitive architecture.
Notice that this is not to say that there is something
bad or wrong about belief-desire states. All that I am
claiming at the moment is that we should expect cognitive
explanations to concern states that are different from most
common sense states in that they are more explicit or
occurrent and less dispositional. So this claim should bring
no dissent from someone who is a belief-desire realist--who
thinks that there really are beliefs and desires. However,
this does effectively undermine the view that Fodor espouses
of the attitudes, quoted at the outset, namely that attitudes
are typically "tokenings" of symbols. The view I have just
outlined suggests rather that most common sense attitudes are
dispositions to token symbols, where the actual tokenings are
not states that are normally characterized by common sense
psychology. Let us then consider the general motivations and
support of Fodor's view.
Fodor's advocation of belief-desire psychology is based
on its explanatory success. As he puts it:
Commonsense psychology works so well it disappears.
It's like those mythical Rolls Royce cars whose
engines are sealed when they leave the factory; only
it's better because it isn't mythical. Someone I
don't know phones me at my office in New York from--
as it might be--Arizona. "Would you like to lecture
here next Tuesday?" are the words that he utters.
'Yes, thank you. I'll be at your airport on the 3
p.m. flight' are the words that I reply. That's all
that happens, but it's more than enough; the rest of
the burden of predicting behavior--of bridging the
gap between utterances and actione--is routinely
58
taken up by theory. And the theory works so well
that several days later and several thousand miles
away, th re I am at the airport, and there he is to
meet me.
Perhaps Fodor might attempt to defend the idea that belief-
desire states are typically explicit cognitive states by
invoking this argument from explanatory success. Suppose we
grant that common sense belief-desire psychology has a high
degree of success in terms of predicting and "coordinating"
behavior. It might be argued that this stunning success shows
that cognitive psychology will formulate explanations
primarily in terms of common sense attitude states. And from
this, together with the assumption that cognitive psychology
will generally or typically offer explanations which postulate
causal sequences of explicitly tokened representations, which
is derived independently from the computer metaphor, it
follows that most common sense attitudes must be states that
are explicit tokenings of representations.
The fault with this line of reasoning concerns the move
from belief-desire psychology's explanatory success to the
claim that cognitive psychology will explain primarily in
terms of belief-desire states. This assumes that the realm of
facts that cognitive psychology explains consists largely of
facts concerning the prediction of behavior, particularly the
coordination of behavior with utterances. However, it appears
that there is much else that psychology should explain, as
32. Fodor (1987), p. 3.
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Churchland forcibly notes ('FP' is common sense belief-desire
psychology):
As examples of central and important mental
phenomena that remain largely or wholly mysterious
within the framework of FP, consider the nature and
dynamics of mental illness, the faculty of creative
imagination, or the ground of intelligence
differences between individuals. Consider our utter
ignorance of the nature and psychological functions
of sleep, that curious state in which a third of
one's life is spent. Reflect on the common ability
to catch an outfield fly ball on the run, or hit a
moving car with a snowball. Consider the internal
construction of a 3-D visual image from subtle
differences in the 2-D array of stimulations in our
respective retinas. Consider the rich variety of
perceptual illusions, visual and otherwise. Or
consider the miracle of memory, with its lightning
capacity for relevant retrieval. On these and many
other mental phenomena, FP sheds negligible light.33
We need not, however, draw the conclusion that Churchland
does, namely that we should abandon common sense belief-desire
psychology in favor of alternative (e.g. neurological)
accounts.34 A reasonable reply here on the part of the belief-
desire/cognitive realist is that belief-desire psychology only
explains a certain range of facts. Those that Churchland cites
might plausibly be explained by representational states and
computations other than those of common sense belief-desire
psychology. And, in fact, various
computational/representational theories have been developed to
33. Churchland (1981), p. 73.
34. I briefly criticize Churchland's eliminativlst
position in the next section.
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explain many of these types of facts, including theories of
vision and perception, memory, and motor control.
This suggests, however, that cognitive theory may offer
explanations which postulate quite a wide range of states in
addition to belief-desire states. Specifically, it seems
plausible to suppose that abilities and specific states
(perhaps including belief-desire states) will be explained in
terms of explicit representational states that are unknown to
common sense. And it is consistent with this assumption to
hold that most common sense states are dispositional. Thus,
the explanatory success of belief-desire psychology does not
show us that common sense states must be mostly explicit,
since it is success for a limited range of explananda. There
is no reason to think, and some good reasons against thinking,
that cognitive theory will be little more than a cleaned up
version of common sense belief-desire psychology.
Another main motivation of Fodor's in holding the view
that belief-desire states are explicit cognitive states is the
need the explicate the causal efficacy of the propositional
attitudes. As we have seen at the outset, the causal role of
symbols allows us to see how attitudes can cause behavior if
they are explicit, symbolic states. Moreover, Fodor would
apparently insist that this is the only way we can explicate
the attitudes' causal efficacy. As he puts it, "no intentional
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causation without explicit representation."35 Is there any
basis for this insistence on explicit representation?
Fodor's support for this view appears to be the more
general claim that only explicit, occurrent states can be
causes:
Qua dispositional, attitudes play no causal role in
actual mental processes; only occurrent attitudes--
for that matter, only occurrent anythings--are
actual causes.2
The reasoning would appear to be that since causation requires
explicit causes, intentional causation must require explicit
representation.
However, this position stands or falls with the
explicitness or dispositionality of attitude concepts--what we
have investigated above in the case of belief. To see this,
first consider that it appears that there can be true causal
explanations which cite dispositional rather than explicit
states. For instance, consider the assertion that the glass
broke because it was brittle. There is no apparent reason to
deny that this is a causal explanation. For instance, the
appropriate counterfactual seems true if the former statement
is, i.e. had the glass not been brittle, it would not have
broken.
Further, consider that by anyone's estimates, and by
Fodor's own admission, there will be many ordinary belief-
35. Fodor (1987), p. 25.
38. Fodor (1987), p. 22.
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desire explanations which will be apparently true seemingly
causal explanations, but which will concern dispositional
attitudes rather than occurrent ones, since the number of
attitudes that figure in ordinary explanations appear to
outrun the number of high-level occurrent states we can expect
to find in cognition. But there is no reason for claiming that
such explanations are not causal. In particular, it seems that
this (postulated) class will not exhibit any less explanatory
success than the (postulated) class concerning core cases,
since success is pretty much uniform throughout (apparently)
true attitude explanations. And there is no obvious sub-class
of ordinary attitude explanations whose members seem any less
causal than all other attitude explanations. Thus, it would be
purely arbitrary to deny the causal status of dispositional
attitude explanations.
However, we can grant Fodor that in cases of
dispositional causation, there would always seem to be an
additional, explicit/occurrent cause present. As noted in the
opening of this section, it seems that a second, non-
dispositional explanation always underlies a dispositional
explanation. For instance, if a substance broke because it was
brittle, then there is an explanation of the breakage which
cites the structure of the physical substance. Yet, the
dispositional explanation may be more useful for at least two
reasons. First, we may be interested in very abstract features
of the substance. E.g. brittleness or solubility are qualities
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that a large number of otherwise physically and chemically
different substances share. And second, we may not know the
structural details of the substance in question, but we may
still be able to attribute at least one abstract feature of
the substance.
If we grant that in cases of dispositional attitudes,
there is another, explicit underlying cause, then Fodor's
position amounts to the claim that the state that is the
underlying cause must have the same content as attributed to
the dispositional attitude. But there is simply no basis for
this claim, particularly when we note that on Fodor's view, it
is not the content that is the actual cause of the behavior,
but rather the syntactic properties of the psychological
state. If content is, in this sense epiphenomenal with regard
to behavior, then why insist that the occurrent, causal state
must have this content? Here, I think the only reason is that
it is Fodor's hope that belief-desire explanations will turn
out to be not merely true, but at the very heart of the
theories of cognitive psychology. If the explicit causal
states underlying behavior do not turn out to have the content
assigned by the relevant belief-desire explanations, then the
latter might be relegated to the back-burner of explanatory
psychology, as strictly-speaking true, but uninteresting
explanations in comparison to the explanations which cite the
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underlying, explicit (e.g. informational) states.31 But hopes
do not provide justification--i.e. once we see that most
common sense attitudes including belief and desire are
dispositional states, there is no longer any basis for the
claim that all common sense attitude causation requires
explicit representation.
Therefore, we cannot have the union of computationalism
and common sense psychology that Fodor envisages. If the
dispositional view is correct, then belief-desire explanations
are true because there are other explicit "tokenings" of
representations which interact appropriately. On some
occasions, these tokenings may be of representations with the
same content as the associated attitudes. But it may also be
that on many occasions the tokenings and the attitudes do not
correspond in this way. Thus, I suggest that we do not really,
as yet, have any clear idea of the nature of the explicit
states that drive cognition. And determination of these states
is the difficult task of cognitive psychology. Until we know
what the explicit states of cognition are like and how they
interact, we will not know exactly what makes common sense
explanations true. But this should not be particularly
surprising. In other areas of science, the explication,
vindication, and, where necessary, reform and rejection of
common sense explanations has proven to be a long and
37. See Fodor (1987), pp. 23-24 for expression of
something similar to this worry.
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difficult matter. It would be truly amazing if this did not
happen in psychology as well.
III. Implica tons
I will now explore three implications of this
dispositional picture of the nature of belief-desire states.
The first concerns how we are to respond to the claims that
have provided the basis for non-realist vi,3ws of the
attitudes. I will argue that, on the view I have just
presented, we can accept that there are apparent features of
the attitudes that make attitude notions inappropriate for
scientific theories, without going as far as eliminativism or
instrumentalism with regard to the attitudes. Second, I will
examine Fodor's claims concerning the holistic and non-modular
nature of the central systems. I will argue that the
dispositional view shows how we might simultaneously have
epistemically holistic attitude properties, and
computationally modular elements at the heart of cognition.
Third, I will examine the commitments behind a realist view of
the attitudes, specifically Fodor's claim that realism with
regard to the attitudes leads to the hypothesis of an innate
language of thought. I will argue that while it is likely that
adult humans frequently think in an internal version of their
spoken language, there is no reason to postulate an internal
language for all instances of propositional attitudes, in
humans, animals, etc. I will also examine Fodor's argument for
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the innateness of most concepts and show that the present
account of the attitudes allows us to see how most concepts
might be both partially innate and partially acquired.
A. The Status of Belief-Desire Psychology
So far I have been working within scientific realist
assumptions regarding belief-desire states. That is, I have
been assuming that some scientific, computational account can
be given of belief-desire states. And this assumption appears
to be at least partially vindicated by the dispositional
account of belief that I have presented above. With this
account in hand, I will now critically examine non-scientific-
realist views of belief-desire psychology.
There are three main alternatives to scientific realism
concerning the attitudes that are to be found in the
literature. They are: 1) eliminativism. The eliminativist
holds that there are no beliefs, no properties corresponding
to commonsense attitude psychology's postulated states, and
envisions a scientific psychology which will operate with
completely different notions. 2) Explanatory dualism. This
view maintains that there are states corresponding to common
sense belief-desire ascriptions and explanations, but that the
investigation of such states must be completely independent
from the investigation of the states that scientific
psychology concerns itself with. 3) Instrumentalism. This view
is like the previous two in holding that scientific psychology
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will not be concerned with the states belief-desire psychology
postulates, but attempts a subtle line between realism and
eliminativism as far as the ontology of belief-desire states
are concerned, claiming that while there really are no such
states, the postulation of them proves useful in ordinary
explanations.
A majority of the arguments for these views concern the
issue of content. The view I have developed does not involve
any new claims about content per se. However, as I shall now
suggest, it appears that there has been a failure to
distinguish characteristic features of attitude states and
means to knowledge of them from the content the states appear
to have. When we make such distinctions, the case against
scientific realism for the attitudes, as far as content is
concerned, appears quite weak.
First, I think it is fairly clear that complete
eliminativism with regard to representations is implausible.
Examinations of connnctionist models--which have been offered
as an alternative to attitude explanations, e.g. by
Churchland--suggest that these theorists are actually
committed to some notion of content.38 And it seems that a
complete eliminativism is somewhat incoherent--what is the
eliminativist doing? Surely not asserting a negative theory
about representations--these are, after all, concepts that are
38. See Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988).
68
part of the representational realist framework. Thus, the full
thesis of representational eliminativism would seem to
constitute a reductio of the view. 39 So eli:vinativism with
regard to content seems highly implausible, if not downright
incoherent.
It has also been argued that psychological explanations
involving states with content are inappropriate for science
because of certain features of such states. The two most
notably problematic features are context dependence and
normativity. It has been argued that what attitudes a person
can be said to have depends on the physical or social
environment that they are situated Jn. 40 And some have taken
this to show that scientific psychology cannot involve
explanations which postulate states with content.41 Also, it
has been maintained, e.g. by Quine and by Davidson, that what
beliefs and desires a person has is a matter of how we
interpret their behavior. And interpretation is thought to
involve an essentially normativi element--we have to see
others as rational by our lights. This normative element,
39. See Baker (1987) Chapters 6-7 for development of this
argument.
40. Most notably by Putnam (1975) and Burge (1979),
(1986).
41. Most notably, Stich (1983).
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Davidson and others claim, is unacceptable for scientific
theories.42
We must distinguish two vary different claims that might
be made here. First, let us distinguish the representational
states that theories In scientific psychology ascribe from
common sense representational states, i.e. the propositional
attitudes. It might be claimed that all representational
states, common sense or otherwise, have the (apparently
unscientific) features of context dependence and normativity.
This, however, is a difficult claim to defend. Consideration
of the ascription practices and intuitions of common sense
belief-desire psychology is not necessarily relevant to such
alternative representational states "nless it can be shown
that common sense states necessarily share appropriate
features with the representational states that scientific
psychology will concern itself with. But given that we may not
as yet have discovered the appropriate representational states
for scientific psychology, it is difficult to see how this
could be accomplished. Surely, nothing in the literature
provides any basis for such a claim.
42. See Essays 11-13 in Day.Json (1980). Also see Putnam
(1988) Chapter 1. Such authors also argue that belief-desire
psychology is unscientifically "holistic" and "indeterninate."
Indeed, these properties are typically explained in a highly
inter-related way. What I have to say about normativity in
what follows, which is mostly a strategic point, applies
equally well to holism and indeterminacy.
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Moreover, the positive basis for the claim that
psychology will cite representational states as part of
theoretical explanation is simply the existence of actual,
successful theories which do so. And since there are at least
some such theories that claim at least modest success, it
would seem that either context dependence or normativity are
scientifically acceptable features of states, or psychological
theory concerns representational states that do not have these
features. Thus, it would seem that the burden of proof is on
the non-realist to show that any theories that appear to cite
representational states are either no good or are not actually
representational. And again, such a case is hardly
forthcoming.
A weaker claim on the part of the non-realist might be
that the content attributed by common sense psychology is
unacceptable for scientific theorizing. Thus, such a position
might maintain realism or agnosticism about non-common sense
representational theories, which rejecting the scientific
acceptability of the ordinary attitudes. However, there are
two further problems with such a position. First, it might be
the case that while ordinary ascription practices have certain
apparently "unscientific" features, such as context dependence
or normativity, it is possible to theorize about such states
in ways which dispense with such unscientific features. Thus,
just because we sometimes use normative means to determine
which attitudes someone has, it does not follow that those
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individualse' attitudes must be ascribed by such means. Perhaps
attitudes are like most other natural kinds, in that the
common sense means of identifying their instances and
determining their features will give way to alternative
scientific theories which do not fully incorporate the
ordinary means of identification. (E.g. think of the
difference in methods for identification of substances--water,
salt, etc.--between common sense and scientific chemistry.)
Thus, no amount of consideration of ordinary ascription
practices shows that no such reform Is possible. Indeed, it is
possible that a property instantiation explanation of the sort
I have sketched for belief above will be part of such
alternative means of specification.
A second problem for the line that common sense attitudes
have features that make them unacceptable for scientific
psychology concerns the role that such states will play in
psychology. As the dispositional account suggests, belief-
desire states may be very abstract in comparison with explicit
cognitive states. It may turn out as a matter of practical
necessity that the only reasonable means of determining the
presence of such c*'tes is through ordinary, e.g. normative or
context-dependent, methods. But this practical limitation does
not show that no in principle cognitive computational account
of belief-desire states can be given. And it seems clear that
the opponent of scientific realism must rule out not only
practically feasible specifications of belief-desire states,
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but also in principle specifications that are not practically
feasible.
Perhaps explanatiors involving belief-desire states will
not prove generally feasible for scientific interests. Perhaps
most "strict" psychological laws will be formulated in terms
that refer to explicit representations rather than the more
dispositional representations of belief-desire psychology.
This would not affect scientific realism about belief-desire
states one bit. As I understand it, scientific realism about
belief-desire states merely requires the very weak claim that
whatever sorts of notions (e.g. representational,
computational) prove o.ceptable for scientific psychology,
reductive property specifications of belief-desire states can
be given in those notions. Scientific realism, therefore makes
no claim about the explanatory role of belief-desire
explanations in scientific psychology. Specifically, there is
no claim about such concepts being paradigm psychological
explanations. Thus, the fact that belief-desire explanations
may "feel" unscientific because of context dependence,
normativity, etc. does not in and of itself provide any basis
for views which oppose scientific realism about the attitudes.
What must be shown, to repeat, is something much stronger,
that no in principle scientific psychological account of
belief-desire states can be develope3d. This is a very
difficult claim to defend for any property, and I do not see
that the considerations of coitext dependence, normativity,
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etc. have done much to support it in the case of the
attitudes.
The fact that non-scientific-realism about belief-desire
states is such a difficult position to defend may have been
obscured by the fact that some of the most noted belief-desire
scientific realists, Fodor in particular, not only think that
psychology can recognize belief-desire states but that belief-
desire explanations will be at the core of scientific
psychology--or, e.g. that scientific psychology is to be
virtually identified with belief-desire explanation, that many
or most scientific psychological theories will resemble common
sense generalizations. That is a much stronger position which
does seem susceptible to the detection of apparently non-
scientific features in common sense psychological concepts and
explanations. But the present point is that there is no reason
to go to the lengths of non-realist views, e.g. eliminativism
or instrumentalism in order to avoid this stronger position.
It is perfectly reasonable to maintain that while belief-
desire states will be accounted for by scientific psychology,
most of the "strict" laws and the best explanations of
scientific psychology will not involve common sense belief-
desire notions.
I conclude this sub-section with some specific criticisms
of each alternative to acientific realism.
Eliminativism would seem to be an over-reaction to the
intuition that common sense belief-desire concepts will not
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play a central role in scientific psychology. We can grant
this, yet nothing about the non-existence of beliefs and
desires follows, just as nothing about the non-existence of
common sense observational properties such as "warm" or
"heavy" follows immediately from the mere fact that physics
does not use them in causal explanations. Further, belief and
desire are not clearly theoretic notions, like ether and no
phlogiston, which were developed as part of science.43 Rather
they are deeply ingrained, perhaps innate, common sense
notions that most people attain in the course of normal
development. Given that belief-desire explanations achieve
certain successes, at least in ordinary applications, it seems
extremely unlikely that we will ever dispense with them
completely, if indeed we can.
The explanatory dualist, most notably Davidson, holds
that there are two separate forms of explanation, viz. common
sense attitude psychology and cognitive psychology4 , but
claims that the two are methodologically disparate. This idea
is expressed fairly clearly by Putnam, who writes:
To have a description of how a system of
representations works in functionalist terms is one
thing; to have an Interpretation of that system of
representations is quite another thing.
43. See Clark (1978) for defense of the view that belief-
desire psychology is not a theory, any more than common sense
biology or physics are theories.
44. Or, in Davidson's case, brain science--he apparently
refuses to acknowledge the existence of non-common sense
psychology, which makes it difficult for the cognitivist to
engage with his writings.
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The difference between functionalist psychology and
interpretation theory is in part due to this:
functionalist psychology treats the human mind as a
computer. It seeks to state the rules of computation. The
rules of computation have the property that although
their interaction may be complicated and global, their
action at any particular time is local. The machine, as
it might be, moves a digit from one address to another
address in obedience to a particular instruction, or to
finitely many instruction, and on the basis of a finite
amount of data. Interpretation is never local in this
sense. A translation scheme, however well it works on a
finite amount of the corpus, may always have to be
modified on the basis of additional text."
This in and of itself need not be particularly problematic.
The further claim that the explanatory dualist makes, though,
is that the ontology that common sense psychology concerns
itself with, i.e. beliefs, desires, etc., cannot be dealt with
in any way by cognitive methodology.4 That is, the view is
that cognitive psychology will never be able to explain what
beliefs are, nor have anything to say about what beliefs we in
fact have. As with eliminativism, this seems like an over-
reaction, in this case to the apparent divergence in
methodologies. An alternative possibility is this; It might be
that when we assign attitudes holisticly, normatively or
whatever, we are getting things wrong--we are only
approximating the actual attitudes that we have. It may be
45. Putnam (1983), p. 150. While Putnam does not
explicitly endorse the thesis that I have title "explanatory
dualism," this seems to be one of the implications he draws
from his explications of the differences between
interpretation and computation.
46. Putnam (1983), chapter 8, hedges on this a bit. See
pp, 150-154.
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that no perfection of interpretation methodology will ever
"mechanize" it, but that may be because we need to alter
methodologies and take a wholly computational approach to
explaining the attitudes. Unless one assumes that the
attitudes cannot be characterized except by ordinary
interpretation practices, which begs the question, then this
sort of scientific approach seems like an open possibility.
Nor would this mean that we would adopt a computational
approach in our ordinary interactions. It may be that our
normal sources of evidence to one another's psychologies
(including our own) are so limited that a normative, holistic
means of ascription is the only practical means of
approximating correct characterizations of our psychologies.
Further, it may be that while we will never able to formalize
interpretation theory, we will gradually become able to answer
various questions in semantics, epistemology and the like
through the substitution of computational explanations for
explanations which rely solely on common sense intuitions and
ascriptions practices.
In general, the main reason for thinking that attitide
explanations and cognitive theory will not be completely
unrelated is that the both attempt explanations of some of the
same phenomena, namely behavior, and do so with concepts at
approximately the same level of abstraction (compared to, say,
neural concepts.) Since it is difficult to find other areas in
which completely ontologically unrelated explanations of the
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same phenomena coexist, where the explanations are at about
the same level of abstraction, it is reasonable to suppose
that the states characterized by attitude psychology and
cognitive theory will likewise not be unrelated.
Similar problems plague an instrumental view of the
attitudes. Dennett holds47 that there are three distinct sorts
of explanatory "stances", the physical stance, the design
stance and the intentional stance. Each of these is understood
as a certain sort of explanatory strategy concerning a given
system:
The physical stance[:] If you want to predict the
behavior of a system, determine its physical
constitution and the physical nature of the
impingements upon it, and use your knowledge of the
laws of physics to predict the outcome for any
input...
Sometimes...it is more effective to switch from the
physical stance to what I call the design stance,
where one ignores the actual details of the physical
47. While Dennett has portrayed himself as
instrumentalist for many years, he has recently withdrawn this
view and has moved towards an explanatory dualism. See
"Instrumentalism Reconsidered" in Dennett (1987). Here I shall
discuss his (earlier) instrumentalist views.
While Dennett was a pioneer in the development of the
view that psychology is "sub-personal", and has alwayrs
stressed the significance of non-attitude cognitive
explanations, he has equally resisted the idea that the
attitu.es may be explained by features of sub-personal
psychology. This seems to be because he assumes that explicit
storage and manipulation models are the only plausible
candidates for realism about the attitudes. For instance, in
Dennett (1987) on p. 70, (4), after making the point that
beliefs are not to be identified with whatever explicit
representations we possess, he seems to draw the conclusion
that there are no beliefs, rather than (what I consider to be)
the obvious alternative, namely that the property of belief is
to be identified with some other sub-personal property or
properties, e.g. dispositions to certain explicit states.
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constitution of an object, and, on the assumption
that it has a certain design, predicts that it will
behave as it is designed to behave under various
circumstances...
Sometimes even the design stance is practically
inaccessible, and then there is yet another stance
or strategy one can adopt: the intentional stance.
Here is how it works: first you decide to treat the
object whose behavior is to be predicted as a
rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs
that agent ought to have, given its place in the
world and its purpose. Then you figure out what
desires it ought to have, given the same
considerations, and finally you predict that this
rational agent will act to further its goal in light
of its beliefs. A little practical reasoning from
the chosen set of beliefs and desires will in many--
but not all--instances yield a decision about what
the agent oughk to do; that is what you predict the
agent will do.
While this is surely an excellent basis for a theory of the
nature of various sorts of explanation, particularly as
regards systems' explanations, it is not clear why this is an
answer to questions about the ontology of the attitudes. Are
the ascriptions made under such stances true? If not, in
virtue of what features of the world are they successful?
Instrumentalists commit themselves to a negative answer to the
first question, but then an answer to the second becomes
difficult. I.e. what, if not beliefs and desires, explain the
success of belief-desire explanations? The only pbausible
answer I can see to this for the instrumentalist is the
following application of the notion of a "stance":
when operating within a given stance, the ground
rules of attribution are completely characterized
within the stance. But it's a mistake to think that
48. Dennett (1987), pp. 16-7.
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you can answer ontological questions outside of the
stance. When you're in a stance you're in a
different "world." Thus, the question in dispute has
neither a positive nor a negative answer from the
general physical framework. It's an unaskable
question.
But this line is surely mistaken. When we adopt the design
stance the ontology doesn't change. Auto mechanics don't
literally spend their days in a different world. When someone
successfully explains something using the design stance, we
understands the predicates he uses as referring to things in
the physical world. Carburetors and engines (and tables and
chairs, for that matter) exist just as surely as do hunks of
metal. Ultimately, we may want to tell an instantiation story-
-functionalism looks like it will succeed for most reasonably
developed design-types. Thus, a carburetor is a functional
type which is potentially instantiated in systems meeting the
physical parameters of "engine theory." And similarly for
functional kinds terms in biology. Thus, it seems that there
are independent ontological answers to questions about he
existence of design-types outside of the stance. In general,
this is because explanation is only a part of our knowledge.
We can know of things and conceive of them apart from
particular explanations. So, the instrumentalist owes us an
answer to the ontological questions surrounding the attitudes.
I conclude that a moderate scientific realism, which
claims that scientific psychological theories of computation
and representation will ultimately explain the nature of
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belief-desire states, and may, but need not, include common
sense belief-desire explanations, stands as the most plausible
view of the relationship of common sense belief-desire
psychology to scientific psychology.
B. Modularity and Cognitive Architecture
A second implication of the cognitively dispositional
view of the attitudes concerns the question of cognitive
architecture--what kinds of states and processes we will find
in cognition. Fodor has suggested that cognition consists of
central systems which embody attitude states and input systems
consisting of informationally isolated "modules."49 The input
systems are conceived of as collections of units or modules
which process perceptual input and produce tentative
perceptual representations, including parsed utterances.
Specifically, he characterizes modules as informationally
encapsulated. That is, the information inside them--other than
their output--is not typically available to the rest of
cognition, they have a limited amount of information, i.e.
rules for processing the input--and do not draw on other
outside information. Other notable features of most modules
are that 2) they are domain specific--i.e. they operate in
only a specific, limited area of knowledge, 3) their operation
is mandatory, 4) there is linited central access to their
49. In Fodor (1983). Page numbers in the rest of this
subsection refer to this work.
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contents, 5) they are (very) fast processors, 6) they have
relatively simple inputs, 7) they are associated with fixed
neural architecture, and they have 8) characteristic and
specific breakdown patterns and 9) characteristic pace and
sequencing.
The central systems are conceived of as not being divided
into modules, but rather as being a more or less homogenous
collection of states that are similar, if not identical to the
common sense attitudes. The central systems are viewed as
informationally unencapsulated, and also as not having the
(nine just-listed) properties thought to be characteristic of
modules. So the model has it that input gets processes by the
modules and it is their output which is used by the central
systems in producing belief-desire states, which ultimately
lead to actions in the usual manner (e.g. beliefs and desires
combine to cause actions.)
Fodor's thesis might simply be that input systems are the
only cognitive units that share all of these (nine) features.
With this I have no quarrel. But he also seems to be arguing
something stronger, namely that the central systems will not
be divided into any sort of units at all, specifically not
informationally encapsulated units. He suggests that the
holistic features of belief-desire states make the central
systems poor candidates for the type of divide-and-conquer
explanatory strategy that appears successful for modular
systems. What I will now argue is that once we recognize that
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many common sense states will be dispositional states of
cognitive architecture rather than explicit states, it is
possible to see how the central systems might have both
holistic properties and explicit, informationally encapsulated
units. That is, I shall argue that orce we adopt the
dispositional view of the attitudes, we no longer have any
reason to reject the idea that the central systems might
contain a substantial number of modules.
Before I consider Fodor's arguments against central
system modularity, I want to motivate the idea that there may
be informationally encapsulated non-perceptual units in
cognition. Fodor claims that "there is practically no direct
evidence, pro or con, on the question whether central systems
are modular" (p. 104.) However, there is some significant,
prima facde indirect evidence. Following Chomsky, we should
note that in general it seems plausible to postulate a domain
specific module when most of the following cluster of
properties are fulfilled for a given knowledge domain: The
knowledge in question is fairly readily distinguished from
other knowledge, the computations underlying this knowledge
are fairly specialized (compared to e.g. general reasoning),
explanation of the acquisition of the knowledge requires
postulation of domain specific innate principles, principles
that we are not consciously aware of and possession or lack
thereof of this knowledge seems independent of general
intelligence. That is, it would seem that when most or all of
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these conditions are satisfied, the postulation of a module
for approximately the domain in question is a good explanation
of these facts.
For example, linguistic theory postulates a universal
grammar to accounts for humans' ability to readily acquire a
language (at a certain age) with only minimal exposure to
data. The attained knowledge of a grammar is thought to be
highly specialized non-conscious knowledge of the structures
of sentences. A partial, plausible explanation of the
cognitive realization of this knowledge is that we have a
"language module" which develops a representation of a grammar
through the setting of "hard-wired" parameters--i.e. through
setting switches or selecting features within a fixed set of
options. In such a case, the background set of possibilities
determined by all possible parameter settings forms a limit on
knowledge of the domain, or of the domain itself, and the
initial settings plus means for determining the settings forms
a universal knowledge of the domain. Thus, we may postulate
that the fixed set of options in the language module
constitutes the domain of possible (spoken) languages, and the
initial settings in the language module, and the means whereby
parameters are fixed, constitute a universal grammar or
universal knowledge of (certain abstract aspects of) language.
So it appears that the postulation of a language module is a
plausible hypothesis about cognitive architecture that
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provides a (partial) explanation of some of the significant
facts about our knowledge of Irnguage. 50
Plau'sible candidates for domain specific central modules
include language (or a set of linguistic sub-modules including
syntax, a lexicon, phonetics and perhaps also pragmatics), 51
musical abilities,52 mathematical knowledge and ethical
knowledge. Research in these areas has, to some extent,
revealed distinctive sets of principles or competencies,
typically too complex to be acqu.red in a general way with the
small amount of training many people receive. 5 So it would
50. Chomsky hae presented these views in various places,
beginning with Chomsky (1965), Chapter 1. See also Chomsky
(1986) and see Chomsky (1980) including a discussion of the
modularity of cognitive architecture ("mental organs," as he
calls them) in chapter 1.
51. As Chomsky has argued, it seems that language is not
merely a "peripheral" input system as Fodor suggests, but is
rather a more c, ntral module. This is because it appears that
knowledge of language must be used both in input and output,
and perhaps in thought as well. See Chomsky (1986) p. 14 fn.
10. Fodor tends to minimalize the role of a grammar in central
thought since he also hypothesizes a(n innate) language of
thought. A more reasonable alternative as I will suggest
below, is that when human representations are linguistic, it
is because they make use of the same knowledge of language
which is used in comprehending and producing (external) speech
acts. This wold, in turn, suggest that the language module is
central Ized.
52. Note that while there is clearly an input element to
our musical abilities, musical imagery is central. E.g. the
claim that Beethoven's input systems composed his symphonies
is riciculous.
53. For the idea of competence principles for language in,
general, and for an introduction to the thriving research
program i4 syntactic competence, see Chomsky (1986). For an
initial attempt at a (partial) semantic competence theory, see
Jackendoff (1983). On competence in musical abilities, see
Lehrdahl and Jackendoff (1983). On competence in mathematical
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seee to be reasonable, prima facie, to postulate centralized
modules corresponding to these areas of knowledge.54
Why, then, couldn't there be informationally encapsulated
units in the central systems as well? Fodor argues against
central system modularity ·-hrough an analogy between belief
fixation and confirmation theory. He distinguishes two
apparent features of confirmation which he suggests are
characteristic of processes of belief fixation as well, viz.
they are isotropic--any knowledge may apply to a given
problem--and they are Quinean--a change in any one
representation may potentially affect any other
representation. He then argues that these holistic features
imply a lack of informational encapsulation, and thus a lack
of modularlt¼:
When we discussed input systems, we thought of them
as mechanisms for projecting and confirming
hypotheses. And we remarked that, viewed that way,
the informational encapsulation of nuch systems is
tantamount to a constraint on the confirmation
metrics that they employ; the confirmation metric of
an encapsulated system is allowed to "look at" only
a certain restricted class of data itn determining
knowledge, in children, see Gelman and Gallistel (1978/1986),
Gelman, Meck, and Merkin (1986) and Greeno, Riley and Gelman
(1984). And on the idea of an ethical knowledge module, see
Rawls (1971), pp. 46-48. Kohlberg's work might also be viewed
as a competence theory for ethics, although he does not
explicitly endorse this view. See Kohlberg (1969) and (1981).
54. See Cam (1988) for the argument that split-bra:n
research and facts about our self-attribution provide support
for central system modularity. I agree, although I think that
this evidence at most supports the postulation of one
particular module, of (roughly) self-attribution,
I discuss this evidence briefly in the appendix in regard
to Stich's and Rey's treatment of it.
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which hypothesis to accept .... encapsulation implies
constraints upon the access of intramodular
processes to extramodular information sources.
Whereas, by contrast, isotropy is by definition the
property that a system has when it can look at
anything it knows about in the course of determining
the confirmation level of hypotheses...
...Quinean confirmation metrics are ipso facto sensitive
to global properties of belief systems. Now, an
informationally encapsulated system could, strictly
speaking, nevertheless be Quinean. Simplicity, for
example, could constrain confirmation even in a system
which computes its simplicity scores over some arbitrary
selected subset of beliefs. But this is mere niggling
about the letter. In spirit, global criteria for the
evaluation of hypotheses comport most naturally with
isotropic principles for the relevance of evidence.
Indeed, it is only on the assumption that the selection
of evidence is isotropic that considerations of
simplicity are rational determinants of belief. It is
epistemically interesting that H & T is a simpler theory
than -H & T where H is a hypothesis to be evaluated and T
is the rest of what one believes. But there is no
interest in the analogous consideration where T is some
arbitrarily delimited subset of one's beliefs. Where
relevance is non-isotropic, assessments of relative
simplicity can be gerrymandered to favor any hypothesis
one likes. This is one of the reasons why the operation
of (by assumption informationally encapsulated) input
systems should not be identified with the fixation of
belief; not, at least, by those who wish to view the
fixation of perceptual belief as by and large a rational
process.(pp. 110-111.)
I do not think that these arguments show that there are no
informationally encapsulated modules in the central systems.
To see this, suppose you have a number of encapsulated modules
connected by an expert system. The expert system must test a
hypothesis using the modules. How does it deal with isotropy--
the need to possibly access anything it knows? Simple, it
feeds the hypothesis to one module after another--this way the
relevant (by hypothesis) information will eventually be
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reached. And how does it deal with Quineanism--the fact that a
change in one representation may potentially effect any other
representation? Again, simply by making the output of a given
module generally available to others. That way what happens
inside one may potentially effect any representation in any
other module.55 So it would seem that the isotropic and Quinean
nature of hypothesis confirmation does not show that the
central systems do not consist partly or even largely of
informationally encapsulated units.
Now, I have not given a plausible model of hypothesis
testing involving encapsulated modules, but that cannot be the
demand, since that is tantamount to asking for a fairly
complete theory of the central systems, and this we haven't
got yet. And until we do, any sort of skepticism is certainly
possible. But what seems to drive Fodor's arguments here is
not general skepticism so much as the pursuit of a specific
sort of identification, viz. finding a module that, on its
own, will test hypotheses, or, as the second quoted paragraph
clearly shows, a module that can be identified as the "belief
55. In the second quoted paragraph, Fodor appears to
claim that simplicity could not be computed with anything
short of an entire belief-set. But this is dubious, given that
our typical belief-sets are infinite or at least out-run any
capacities that our processors seem capable of handling, yet
we can compute simplicity. If the claim is that no
encapsulated computation could be relevant to the
determination of 4simplicity, then this requires a lot of
support that is r'ot forthcoming. I.e. we are really not sure
what simplicity xs, to say nothing of knowing how to compute
it in a model of cognitive processing.
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fixation module." All his considerations show, then, is that
it is unlikely that you will find local identifications of
belief-desire processes with cognitive processes. But this is
unsurprising, once you abandon an explicit storage model of
belief in favor of a dispositional model. Just as there is no
explicit state corresponding to a given belief, so there is no
explicit process corresponding to belief fixation. Rather, to
fixate a belief is to go through any number of "sub-personal,"
potentially modular processes, as long as you get the right
result, i.e. a disposition to use an explicit representation,
if formulated, in inference and decision.
Note that it is also plausible to think that we have some
processes that operate on very broad data bases, since, e.g. ,
we are able to reason about just about anything. But this is
not incompatible with there also being a lot of modular,
specialized units in the central systems.56 So it would seem
that consideration of belief fixation does not show that the
central systems are non-modular, but only that belief and
belief-fixation cannot be directly identified with such
modules or their contents. But that is perfectly consistent
with the dispositional view of belief I have defended above.
Thus, a dispositional account of the attitudes allows us to
56. An interesting proposal which integrates these ideas
is Baars" (1988) functional mode] of consciousness which
identifies conscious states with a generalized workspace that
takes inputs from various, competing (or cooperating) modules
and makes its output available to all or various modules.
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see how a number of separate units might interact to jointly
achieve holistic belief properties, and, Ipso facto, beliefs.
Fodor presents two other arguments against central system
modularity. The first is that (what he calls) the frame
problem in AI, 57 viz. "which of my beliefs ought I to
reconsider given the possible consequences of my action,"(p.
114) shows the inability of "local", i.e. modular theory to
deal with the central systems' features. As he puts it:
If we assume that central processes are Quinean and
isotropic, then we ought to predict that certain
kinds of problems will emerge when we try to
construct psychological theories which simulate such
processes or otherwise explain them; specifically,
we should predict problems that involve the
characterization of nonlocal computational
mechanisms. By contrast, such problems should not
loom large for theories of psychological modules.(p.117)
Again, this argument seems to rest on a faulty inference from
properties of processes to properties of individual
processors. If we grant that many (though, no doubt, not all,
perhaps not even a majority) of central system processes are
holistic (Quinean and isotropic), it does not follow that any
given central system processor must have these features as
well. As we have just seen, it seems perfectly possible for
non-holistic modules to collectively produce holistic
properties. The fact that central systems (apparently) have
57. There is little agreement about what the frame
problem is, let alone how to solve it if it exists. See
Pylyshyn (ed.) (1987) which includes a criticism of Fodor's
view of the frame problem by Hayes, along with a response from
Fodor.
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holistic properties thAt the input systems lack may be due
either to the fact that there are some non-modular processors
in the central systems or to the fact that while both systems
ar largely modular, the central systems are organized
differently than the central systems. In either case, we may
still have a lot of informationally encapsulated modules in
the central systems, perhaps as many as we do in the input
systems.
The organizational approach to the (apparent) holistic
features of the central systems is consistent with a heuristic
approach to the (apparent) frame problem. This approach
involves abandoning the pursuit of a principled solution to
this problem, and instead attempting to design local systems
that collectively accomplish appropriate solutions
"helaristically," i.e. by reconsidering appropriate beliefs in
most situations where reconsideration is required. This
doesn't produce a principled solution to the frame problem,
but rather concedes that it is not solvable within belief-
desire theory, i.e. by allowing that you can't formalize
principles of belief revision in terms of strict laws using
the concepts of belief-desire psychology. I.e., there is no
principled set of beliefs that we check for revision when
deciding what to revise. Rather, we Just check some set or
other in various circumstances. Perhaps this is because belief
revision is not a matter of the operation of a single
processor, but is rather accomplished by various prous~~re
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and modules for various knowledge domains. While this means
that we are sometimes inconsistent and perhaps much less than
ideal rational beings, we normally manage to get by.
This solution is perhaps not what one would have hoped
for, but it seems otherwise unproblematic unless you insist,
as Fodor appears to, that most psychological explanations,
particularly of the central systems, must be presented in
terms of more or less law-like belief-desire statements. Once
we acknowledge that the explanation of cognition may involve a
lot of notions other than common sense belief-desire notion,
and that the latter may not even play a significant role in
"strict" psychological theory, then the frame problem is
transformed from a problem of principle into a design problem.
Fodor's final argument against central system modularity
concerns the lack of neural identifications of central system
structures:
Roughly, standing restrictions on information flow
imply the option of hardwiring. If, in the extreme
case, system B is required to take note of
information from system A and is allowed to take
note of information from nowhere else, you might as
well build your brain with a permanent connection
from A to B. It is, in short, reasonable to expect
biases in the distribution of information to mental
processes to show up as structural biases in neural
architecture.
... in Quinean/isotropic systems, it may be unstable,
insttantaneous connectivity that counts. Instead of
hardwiring, you get a connectivity that changes from
moment to moment as dictated by the interaction
between the program that is being executed and the
structure of the task in hand. The moral would seem
to be that computational isotropy comports naturally
with neural isotropy in much the same way that
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informational encapsulation comports naturally with
the elaboration of neural hardwiring.
...there are no content-specific central processes
for the performance of which correspondingly
specific neural structures have been identified.
Everything we now know is compatible with the claim
that central problem-solving is subserved by
equipotential neural mechanisms. This is precisely
what you would expect if you assume that the central
cognitive processes are largely Quinean and
isotropic.(117-119)
There are at least four problems with this line of argument.
First, there isn't, in fact, a lot of well-supported evidence
about the full neurological instantiation of any informational
processes, except perhaps sensory "transducerse." Thus, what we
now know is compatible with almost any view of psychological
processes--witness the recent excitement over connecitonism.
Moreover, part of the problem is that we really have very
few settled views as to the make-up of cognitive architecture
at this point, much less any detailed idea of the nature of
specific processors, particularly in the central systems.
Thus, when neuro-physiologists make tentative central system
identity claims, they are usually very primitive by
cognitivist standards--e.g. identifications with "memory"
(with no specification of informational units or memory
structures) or "intention." But this is precisely what we
should expect given that most inter-scientific identities come
about through independent development of the two
characterizations to be identified. That is, it is extremely
unlikely that neural scientists will not only produce mind
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(cognition)-brain identity claims but also articulate the
terms or descriptions for the cognitive side of the identity
statement. So, again, it seems way, way too early in the game
for arguments from known neurological structures to carry any
weight.
Third, and perhaps most significantly, there might be
reasons to "build" a brain with non-hardwired modules. E.g.,
suppose a given module is not neurally hardwired, but is
rather "programmed" or "assembled" on each occasion it needs
to operate. One reason to avoid hardwiring is in order to
maximize diversity of operations. So instead of committing all
your memory to specific functions, you leave a lot of RAM,
even though what you load into RAM is often something that
could have been effectively hardwired. Thus, it is not
apparent that evolution would choose to hardwire modules.
Finally, it is not apparent why we should expect that our
brains were "built" according to rationally optimal or near
optimal design. If I were building an ideal humanoid, I
wouldn't give it human retinas or knees, but it doesn't follow
that we don't have those often less than optimally functioning
structures. I thus see little hope for an argument against
central system modularity based on current neuro-physiological
evidence.
I conclude that once we recognize that common sense
attitudes and attitude processes may not be explicit cognitive
states and proceasors, we will see that the holism of belief-
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fixation does not provide evidence against central system
modularity.
I will close this section with a comment about the
relationship of common sense attitudes and cognitive
architecture. Despite common assumptions to the contrary, it
is likely that modules will not themselves have or contain
attitudes, particularly not beliefs and desires. To see this,
simply apply my property specification of belief and note that
it is unlikely that any modules themselves contain decision or
reasoning units, though they may sometimes contribute to these
processes. Thu.j, we cannot say that, e.g. the language module
has beliefs abrut the syntax of language. The inclinatic.T to
make such a claim appears to be the mistaken identification of
belief with explicit storage. While it is quite likely that
modules do contain (and store) explicit representations, and
perhaps in some cases explicit representations corresponding
in content to actual belief states, such states are not
themselves beliefs. Rather, it is the relation of the modules
and their representations to theorizing and decision processeb
which makes it true that the individual has certain beliefs.
Thus, while modules may be largely responsible for the
dispositions that are certain beliefs, it is a mistake to
think of their explicit representations as themselves being
beliefs.
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C. The Coasitments of a Computational Account of The Attitudes
I will now turn to the question of what commitments a
computational view of the attitudes must make. Fodor has
argued that a computational account should hypothesize a
language of thought, and that this language must be innate. He
does not, I think, claim that a computational account of the
attitudes implies the innate LOT hypthesis, but only that it
is very strongly supported by computationalism--the most
viable, and perhaps only plausible hypothesis. In this section
I will examine these claims, and argue that there are more
reasonable alternativee that are suggested by a dispositional
account of belief and the attitudes.
1. The Language of Thought
First, consider whether a language of though is required
or strongly suggested by a computational account of belief.
Fodor argues that the systematicity of our belief (i.e.
attitude) capacities show that the representations responsible
for beliefs must be language like. E.g., if someone is capable
of believia.g that John loves Mary, then they are also capable
of believing that Mary loves John and that John is loved by
Mary, etc. On the other hand, anyone not capable of having any
one of these beliefs is not capable of having any of them.
This systematic aspect of belief-competence suggests that the
representations underlying belief have a combinatory structure
like that of language, e.g. that the representation underlying
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the belief that cows eat grass is composed of the concepts
COW, EAT and GRASS.58
Further, the fine-grainedness of our beliefs suggests
that the representations underlying them are linguistic. For
instance, the belief that Mark Twain wrote about life on the
Mississippi and the belief that Samuel Clemens wrote about
life on the Mississippi are different, one could have one and
not the other (e.g. someone who did not know that Samuel
Clemens was Mark Twain.) This complexity suggests the need for
a highly intricate symbolic medium that is capable of handling
such distinctions, and language-like mediums look to be the
obvioiis candidates.59
Recall my definition of the belief that p as the
disposition to use an explicit representation that means p,
when formulated, in theoretical reasoning and decision making
processes. If we also suppose that the inputs to reasoning and
decision making processes are often occurrent thoughts that
are explicitly formulated internal tokens in natural languages
(i.e. the ones an individual speaks), then it is plausible to
suppose that in us, beliefs are typically realized by the
ability to explicitly formulate such internal tokens of
natuval languages. Thus, I could have either the belief that
the Mark Twain wrote about life on the Mississippi or the
58. See Fodor (1987), pp. 147 ff.
59. I borrow this point from Georges Rey.
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distinct belief that Samuel Clemens wrote abtout life on the
Mississippi since I am able to have the occurrent thoughts
'Mark Twain wrote about life i tho Mississippi' and 'Samuel
Clemens wrote about life on the Mississippi.' Thus, we can
admit languages of thought of sorts, i.e. internal tokenings
of sentences of the languages we speak. But we have seen no
reason, as yet, to think that such occurrent thoughts are not
formulated in the languages we speak.
Fodor makes the following objection to this view:
The obvious refutation of the claim that natural
languages are the medium of thought is that there
are nonverbal organisms that think. ... * ,nsidered
action, concept learning, and perceptual
integration--are familiar achievements of infraihuman
organisms and preverbal children. ... But the
representational systems of preverbal and infrahuman
organisms surely cannot be natural languages. So
either we abandon such preverbal and infrahuman
psychology as we have so far pieced together, or we
admit that some thinking, at least, isn't done in
English."
However, notice that the claim that natural languages are the
medium of thought is ambiguous between two assertions, one
that the property of thought is in part constituted by natural
language representations, and the claim that natural language
representations sometimes or typically are the medium of
thought in natural language speakers. Thus, the former type of
claim is that:
thinking p is a matter of bearing some computational
relation to a representation in a natural language that
means p
60. Fodor (1975), p. 56.
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whereas the latter is that:
thinking p is a matter of bearing some computational
relation to a representation that means p
together with the claim that:
the relevant representations in humans are typically
natural language tokens
The latter vier: says nothing about infants' and animals'
thoughts except for the general claim that their thoughts must
involve representations with appropriate content. And it is
only the latter claim that need be advocated by a
computationalist view of the attitudes. Thus, it may be that
in some organisms one type of representation plays this role,
while in other organisms another type of representation does
the job. Specifically, it is plausible to claim that in verbal
humans, it is typically the capacity to entertain occurrent
thoughts in a language one speaks that fulfills this portion
of the explication, while holding that in other organisms and
pre-verbal children, the capacity to entertain other types of
representations is what fulfills it. The latter cases are no
counterexample since it is not being claimed that belief
necessarily includes an ability to have natural language
representations, but rather that this ability contingently
(typically) fulfills that role in us.
We have seen that the reasons for thinking that the
representations which underlie belief in us are language-like
are the systematicity and fine-grainedness of our belief
contents. However, it is not apparent that the beliefs of
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animals and the very young exhibit similar characteristics.
Could an infant be capable of believing that her mother loves
him but not be capable of believing that she loves her mother?
This seems to be at least possible--we don't know that it is
implausible in the way we do for adult humans. Nor is it
apparent that, e.g., a dog could believe that his master is
home but not believe that the person who feeds him is home,
assuming dogs can have both beliefs. In general, it is
difficult to provide very definitive claims about what classes
of attitudes infants and animals are capable of having. But it
is not unreasonable to hypothesize that the representational
abilities that underlie belief in preverbal children and
animals involve other representational types, e.g. iconic or
schematic representations, rather than linguistic
representations, or at least representations in a linguistic
code much cruder and more primitive than our natural
languages, even though this implies much less systematicity
and fine-grainedness than adult humans' beliefs exhibit.61
61. Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), in arguing for the
semantic compositionality of infrahuman thoughts, assert that
"the organism that can perceive (hence learn) that aRb can
generally perceive (/learn) that bRa." (p. 44) However, note
that a) some systematicity does not a language make--it must
be shown that much more detailed or sophisticated
systematicity underlies animal though/perception in order to
support the LOT hypothesis and b) the quoted claim itself is
not beyond dispute--in general we know relatively little about
animal perception or thought. As Block (1990), p. 277 points
out, most animal learning studies were conducted by
behaviorists who, as a matter of principle, were completely
insensitive to claims about animals' representational
capacities or thought contents.
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Fodor also offers an objection Lo the claim that images
could be the primary representational medium of thought. This
arguments might be taken as lending some support to the more
general claim that no organism could have non-linguistic
representations without also having linguistic
representations, which would undermine the present claim about
infant and animal thinkers. His argument is essentially that
resemblance, or looking-like, is too vague and indeterminate a
notion to capture the content we want for mental
representations. For instance, in Wittgenstein's example, a
picture of a man walking up the stairs will look exactly like
a man walking down the stairs. And, as Fodor notes, the
problem is even more exaggerated. A picture of John could
represent that John is tall or not fat, or not green, or a
human, etc. He suggests that what must determine the content
of an image is an associated description. E.g. an image of a
triangle serves as a representation of triangles in general if
that is how we describe it.62 This is might be taken to imply
that images, or icons, could not be the sole means of
representation for an organism. A language of thought would be
required in addition to determine the content of the images.
What I think these considerations show, however, is not
that images require associated descriptions, but rather that
resemblance cannot le what constitutes representation. As
62. See Fodor (1975), pp. 178 ff.
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Cummins has argued, there are (both kistorically and
currently) three principle views of the nature of
representation, i.e. the similarity view, the co-variance view
and the functional role view.6 The type of difficulties just
mentioned are, as Cummins states, traditional and apparently
fatal problems for the view that a metal representation
represents its referent in virtue of its similarity or
resemblance to the referent. Specifically, it is hard to see
how a token could represent abstract objects or properties on
the similarity view. 8M For instance, no image of a triangle
will resemble (the class of) all triangles, yet that is
something we can represent. So the similarity view appears to
fail. However, the two prominent alternatives each allow that
there could be images, or more generally, non-linguistic
representations, which represent without the presence of
linguistic representations.
First consider the co-variance view, which in its crudest
form, is that (semantic type) p represents (type) X in virtue
of p's being present exactly when X's are present (e.g.
suppose all and only X's cause p's to be present in the
system.)65 Could a mental image represent, say, the fact that
63. See Cummins (1989). I count functional role and
Cummins' interpretational view as the same for the purposes of
the present point.
64. See Cummins (1989), pp. 33-34.
65. Fodor holds a counterfactually sophisticated version
of this view--see Fodor (1987) chapter 4 and (forthcoming).
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someone is walking up stairs without the presence of an
associated description? There is no apparent reason why not--
just let that image be present or "tokened" just when someone
is walking upstairs, and according to the co-variance view,
the image has the content that someone is walking up stairs.
Similar considerations apply to the functional role view.
On that account, crudely speaking again, a given
representation has its meaning in virtue of its function (or,
e.g. "use") within cognition. So, a given image might
constitute a generic triangle in virtue of being the image
that is accessed when reference to a generic triangle is
required. It is easy to imagine devices that would use images
as representations, e.g. storing and reading them, but which
used no language at all.
Thus, it seems that viable theories of representation
allow for the possibility of representation in the absence of
language, and thus for the possibility of non-linguistic
attitudes. Note that the rossibility of representation without
language does not show that if we have, e.g. images, then
their content must be specifiable in the complete absence of
language. Language is apparently the dominant representational
system in us. Thus, the easiest way to specify the content of
an image, for verbal humanb, is to use a description. And,
perhaps, it is even true that all our non-linguistic
representations get tneir content in verbal humans through
association with linguistic representations. Still, the point
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remains that current accounts of representation allow for
representations in the absence of language, so the hypothesis
that our linguistic thoughts occur in natural languages
whereas non-linguistic organisms' thoughts occur in other
mediums remains plausible.
What, then, is required in order to have attitudes? The
answer to this will only come as we develop computational
specifications of all of the attitudes--for now we can note
the commitments required for belief. The dispositional account
of belief requires that there be reasoning and decision-making
processes that sometimes take explicit representations as
inputs. Thus, thermostats do not have beliefs, since they have
no such representations or processes, although belief-desire
explanations apply instrumentally to them. On the other hand,
it is plausible to suppose that a fair range of animals have
both, taking "reasoning" liberally to include any sort of
problem solving mechanism. Note that just where the presence
of beliefs ends in the hierarchy of species may be
indeterminate, since it may well be indeterminate as to when
animals, or computers for that matter, cease to have
representational reasoning or decision-making mechanisms. But
I assume there is no problem here--most people would insist
that most of the higher mammals have beliefs, but as for birds
and bees and PCs, that is anybody's guess.
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2. Nati visa
Another area where Fodor has endorsed a strong commitment
for a computational account of the attitudes is that of
concept acquisition, where he argues that all concepts an
organism can acquire must either be innate or reduce
definitionally to innate concepts. Since it appears that few
of our concepts so reduce, it follows that most of our
concepts must be innate.
Fodor's argument for concept nativism involves the claim
that to learn a language, one must learn a truth definition
which uses a predicate co-extensive with the ;redicate to be
learned. E.g. to learn the meaning of the predicate P, one has
to learn that "'Px' is true iff x is G' is true for all
substitution instances." But this requires already
understanding G. This is not to say that G has to be a simple
predicate. The traditional empiricist model of concept
learning suggests that such co-extensive predicates can be
produced though associations of simpler predicates. But, as
Fodor has often stressed, this traditional account seems
wildly implausible. Few if any predicates semantically reduce
to other predicates. For instance, most ordinary kind-concepts
such as "cat" or "chair" appear to lack definitions.67 It
66. Fodor (1975), p. 80.
67. See Fodor, Garrett, Walker, and Parkes (1980). Note
that this claim might be contested. As the solution I shall
offer shortly suggests (but does not imply), there may be
extremely complicated definitions for many terms.
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follows, Fodor argues, that most concepts must be simple, and
thus innate.1
The most common reaction to this radical concept nativism
is utter disbelief--most people find this view extremely
implausible. However, it is not always immediately obvious
what this reaction rests on. I will briefly consider several
apparent reasons for recoiling from radical nativism. First,
there are our experiences in concept attainment. For at least
some concepts, particularly artifactual and scientific
concepts, it appears that more than minimal exposure to
instances is required for concept attainment. Rather, certain
training, often rigorous training is required in order to
master concepts--consider "quark" (or "electron") or
"carburetor." In such cases, we seem to be explicitly taught
everything that we need to know to "grasp" a concept--i.e. the
extension of the concept, many or most of its (conceptual)
entailments, its theoretic role, and the like.
A second reason for rejecting radical concept nativism is
that we conceive of ourselves as conceptually creative beings.
Thus, we invented trumpets and compact discs, and it is
standardly assumed that this invention included the invention
of the concept. And although we don't think we invented
electrons or quarks, we think that we are creative theorizers
68. "Whatever is not definable must be innate," Fodor
Garrett, Walker, and Parkes (1980), p. 313. Also see Fodor
(1981), chapter 10, e.g. p. 292.
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who devised these notions in order to produce better theories.
Moreover, we like to think that we can go on inventing
concepts, artifacts and theories more or less indefinitely, or
at least we see no reason to think we are reaching the limits
of our conceptual resources.
This leads to a third reason against radical concept
nativism, namely that it is reasonable to think that our
species as a whole has already attained more concepts than any
individual could. Thus, natural science has long passed the
point where any single individual could acquire detailed
knowledge of all branches--or even of more than a half dozen
or so. While this may be solely due to the lack of memory
space for facts, it seems reasonable to think that if an
individual could do nothing but acquire concepts the vast
spread of concepts in natural and social science and art and
literature would far exceed anyone's capacity. Nor is it
reasonable to claim that we are all born with only subsets of
all human concepts--there is no evidence of anyone ever
experiencing a specific inability to acquire select concepts,
although more general concept attainment problems (e.g.
failure to attain highly abstract concepts) abound. And,
again, we seem to be increasing the species-wide conceptual
inventory.
Radical concept nativism seems implausible for the first
and third reasons and highly unpalatable for the second
reason. We are therefore in need of an alternative to Fodor's
1 0't
proposal. The alternative that I will now sketch balks at the
move from undefinable or primitive to innate. Why, after all,
couldn't we have primitive, acquired concepts? Fodor's
assertion to the contrary appears to rest on the claim that
nothing but other concepts can "produce" a concept. E.g. if
someone acquires G, then this is because G is built out of
sub-concepts. This seems to assume that acquisition must occur
at the level of explanation that such concepts participate in,
i.e. common sense belief-desire psychology. Thus, consider
part of Fodor's presentation by example of the standard
(empiricist) hypothesis formation model of concept learning:
So, for example, what goes on in your head in the
experimental situation we've imagined might be
something like this: You make your first guess--the
green and triangular card is flurg (the concept to
be acquired]--at random...Since, as it turns out,
that guess was right, you have evidence for any of a
range of hypotheses...You pick one and you try
it...ss
This does not appear to be much of an explanation. What we
want to know is not how the subject comes to believe that the
experimenter wants her to learn "flurg," but rather how the
subject comes in contact with "flurg" in the first place. As
Fodor correctly points out:
What has happened is that the Empiricist story
recruits what is really a theory of the fixation of
belief to do double duty as a theory of the
attainment of concepts. This strategy doesn't work,
and the strain shows at all sorts of places. For
example, it's surely clear that any normal adult
would have acquired such workaday concepts as GREEN
OR SQUARE long before he encountered a concept-
69. Fodor (1981), p. 268.
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learning experiment; hence, achieving criterion in
such experiments couldn't, in the general case,
require that any concept be acquired in the course
of performing the experimental task. What the
subject would have learned in the case described
above, for example, is not GREEN OR SQUARE, but only
the fact that the experimenter has decided to call
thing that are green or square "flurg" for the
duration of the run--a fact that is interesting only
because 9t controls the distribution of the
rewards.
Fodor's solution, though, amounts to accepting the
empiricists' explanatory framework, pointing out that it
doesn't work in most cases, and then throwing up his hands and
opting for innateness in all cases where definition fails. A
more plausible alternative would seem to be to seek an
acquisition account elsewhere.
Where else can we look? Our previous considerations
suggest that there is much more to cognition than just beliefs
and desires. Specifically, we have seen that it is likely that
many attitudes are dispositions that are instantiated or
realized by a variety of "subpersonal" (e.g. modular)
representations and processes. Since conscepts are standardly
thought of as constituents of common sense attitudes, this
suggests the possibility that concepts may supervene on a
collection of lower-level representations and processes. And
this will lead us away from radical nativism if what is
primitive at the belief-desire level of explanation could be
compositional at the computational-modular level of
70. Fodor (1981), p. 270.
109
explanation. Some of the representations and processes which
constitute the attainment of a given concept could then be
innate while others are acquired. It would follow that concept
themselves are neither entirely innate nor acquired but a
joint product of innate representations and structures and
acquired representations and structures--partially innate and
partially acquired, in effect.
Now, I cannot offer a genuine theory of how concepts can
be reduced to other, less abstract cognitive states. This is
something that we can only hope will happen over a long period
as we begin to learn exactly what representations and states
cognition contains. However, I think the rudimentary
beginnings of such an account are already to be had from owing
to various bits of the research on concepts over the past few
decades. Consider for example the concept "cat."71 Suppose that
the psychological realization of this concept is a result of
both a (perceptual) prototype used in recognizing cats--i.e. a
set of features72 used in detecting cats, together with a
medium-sized-self-moving-thing-detection module, as well as a
set of more abstract, categorical features in a lexical entry
71. I am controversially assuming that the meaning of
'cat' in most ideolects is somewhat vague and differs from the
scientific meaning. For a view which takes into account
Putnam-Kripke essentialism, see Rey (1983) and (1985). For
criticism of the essentialist view, see Unger (1983).
72. For the next few paragraphs, in keeping with the
psychological literature on concepts, I will refer to
representations of features of concepts as "features."
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module, e.g. a list such as +living thing, +object (rather
than mass term), +animal, etc. Think of the role of the
prototype and detection unit as that of picking out part of
the extension--i.e. things which must be cats. That is,
suppose that the features used for such detections are treated
as sufficient but not necessary. The categorical features
might be thought of as serving to qualify this partial
extension, by limiting the possible set (e.g. no things not
capable of life are cats.) Finally, suppose that indeterminate
cases are matched to the kind whose observable feature set
they are nearest to, if any. E.g. three-legged, tailless cats
still have more observable features of prototypical cats than
e.g. prototypical dogs do, so three-legged cats are included
in the extension of "cats". This is, very roughly, the line of
thinking of some prototype (or combined prototype-
definitional) theorists in experimental work on concepts and
categorization. Perhaps this is wrong in all the details, and
perhaps even in the generalities but the point is to show that
there is a reasonable line of investigation here to be
pursued.
The suggested account does not yield any definition that
decomposes "cat" into simpler concepts, since the
recognitional features are not essential and the essential
features radically underdetermine the extension. It does allow
for a rather complex description of the extension of the term,
and perhaps this is a definition of sorts, but it not obvious
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that such complicated extension specifications are not to be
had.
And we can see how this collection of representations and
processes might be partially innate and partially acquired.
Thus, suppose (as some vision theorists already do) that there
is an innate module for detecting self-moving medium-sized
living things and suppose that the features for cats are
selected from some innate feature set in this module during
the first few encounters with cats. As for the categorical
features, we might expect many of them to be innate. However,
some might be acquired through use of prototypes and related
features. E.g. if "animal" is acquired, it is probably as a
result of association with a set of recognitional procedures
toether with the functional position of this feature within
the categorical network. Finally, there is no reason to think
that all reductions of concepts must be closely tied to
perception. Some abstract concepts such as mathematical and
logical notions might be partially acquired as a result of the
expansion and development of certain specialized abilities,
e.g. innate counting abilities or reasoning skills.
The meaning of 'cat' is primitive from the point of view
of natural languages since there are no other natural language
concepts that this concept reduces to. But thJf; primitive
concept might be realized in us via a composition out of
various representations and processes at the sub-personal,
sub-natural language level of explanation. The moral is that
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most of our concepts might be primitive yet non-innate, since
what is primitive at one level of explanatton is compositional
at a lower level, and acquisition can be explained at the
lower level.
What I suggest, then, is that while Fodor is correct in
declaring the bankruptcy of traditional empiricist accounts of
concept acquisition, the solution is not radical nativism.
Instead, we need to pursue alternative accounts which reduce
concepts to less abstract cognitive states and processes and
then explain how some of these states and processes can bpe
acquired.
It should be noted that a cognitive architecture will
nonetheless be up to its ears in innateness. First, it is
plausible to think that virtually all faculty and modular
divisions are innate, and it is also plausible to think that
there must be innate very low-level, "machine" languages for
carrying out the appropriate computations. Further, there is a
strong case for thinking that many of the sub-personal states
that underlie concepts are innate. The case for such nativism
is simply Chomsky's good-old poverty of the stimulus argument:
if you have a mental state that is widely present, but you
cannot find any shared experience or (very) common training
that would account for its acquisition, it is most likely
innate. Since we uniformly attain a wide variety of common
sense concepts with little or no training, including common
sense observational concepts, common sense kinds, and common
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sense psychological concepts, it is reasonable to postulate
that most of these concepts are partially or even wholly
innate. But at the same time, we can postulate that most
artifactual and scientific concepts (and perhaps also
sociological concepts) are partially or wholly acquired.
IV. Conclusion
I have provided a dispositional, computational account of
belief and of the attitudes in general and I have used this
view to try to develop a new picture of how we should view the
attitudes in relation to scientific psychology. In closing, I
will draw out a moral that has been implicit in the past few
sections. I want to suggest that the view I have developed may
have serious implications for the use of common sense
psychology in philosophical investigatione, particularly in
examinations of the nature and plausibility of scientific
psychology. Much philosophical inquiry into the foundations of
cognitive theory does not concern actual theories formulated
by psychologistr, Lut instead relies on common sense belief-
desire psychology. Sometimes this is because no suitable,
well-developed, well-confirmed theories are as yet available,
and sometimes because common sense is simply more accessible
and convenient. This substitution is unproblematic if we can
be assured that common sense states are representative of
cognitive states in general. However, the contrast I have
outlined between dispositional common sense states and
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explicit cognitive states suggests that common sense states
may indeed have features that are uncharacteristic of many
other cognitive states. For instance, it may be that while
common sense belief-desire explanations and concepts are
holistic, indeterminate or context-relative, due to the
abstract and dispositional nature of concepts such as belief,
the concepts and explanations of scientific cognitive theory
will not generally exhibit these characteristics. My
investigations regarding the indeterminacy of belief-oncet, at
the end of the first section, lend some support to this
conjecture.
If this is correct, then this raises obvious problems for
critics of cognitive psychology who have focused on common
sense explanations. For instance, a plausible line of response
to Davidson's claim that psychological notions are
"heteronomic"--i.e. they cannot be sharpened into strict,
scientific lawst3--is to allow that while common sense notions
such as belief and desire are indeed heteronomic, alternative
representational, computational notions such as "storage",
"activation" and "computation" are "homonomic"--i.e. they can
be sharpened into strict laws. Thus, apparent failings of
common sense belief-desire explanations and ascriptions are
not necessarily failures of cognitive theory in general. In
fact, it seems coherent to acknowledge all sorts of problems
73. See Davidson (1980), p. 219.
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with common sense belief-desire concepts and explanations and
yet be an avid computationalist who sees a bright future for
scientific theories that explain behavior in terms of
computations over representations.
Of course, any apparent negative features of common sense
psychological concepts and explanations may also be features
of alternative cognitive concepts and explanations. My point,
though, is that the latter must be evaluated in their own
right. There is a tendency in philosophy to think of cognitive
psychology as the science of belief. The view that I have
presented suggests that this is misleading since the states
that common sense belief-desire psychology is concerned with
may be much more abstract and less explicit than the states
that theories of computation and representation are primarily
concerned with. So, it would be prudent for us to turn from
the armchair to the textbook and the laboratory when pursuing
questions about the nature of psychology.
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Appendix: J" 'ch and Rey on Dividing Belief
In the first section I defended the view that the
property of believing that p is being disposed to use an
explicit representation that means p, when formulated, in
theoretical reasoning and decision making processes. In this
appendix I will consider two alternative views of the property
of belief, views that are both inspired by Nisbett and
Wilson's experimental work involving inappropriate
attributions and explanations of one's own beliefs and
desires. 74
The following sort of finding motivates the views in
question: In an experimental situation, subjects were
presented with identical items, e.g. stockings, and asked to
select the best-quality item and explain why they had chosen
it. There was an overwhelming preference for the right-most
item, though virtually no subjects cited the position of the
item as any part of the basis for their selection. Moreover,
when questioned about a possible positional effect, the
subjects' strongly and sincerely denied that the position of
the items had influenced their decisions in any way. This
evidence produces the following problem for belief(-desire)
explanations. As far as the subjects' behavior is concerned,
they are clearly operating with a belief such as "the right-
most item is better" (or, e.g. a desire to select the right-
74. Nisbett and Wilson (1977).
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most item.) Yet, tzheir sincere verbal reports reflect the
absence of this belief (or desire.) Thus, it seems that people
in such situations both possess and do not posses certain
beliefs (or other attitudes.)
Wilson has claimed that such studies, along with various
other data, suggest that there may be two very separate
systems underlying these phenomena, one system which controls
behavior, and a separate, isolated system which attempts
explanations of the individual's behavior not through
accessing actual cognitive states, but through the application
of prior generalizations to salient environmental influences.75
This possibility is most strikingly illustrated by the
following result from research on a split brain patient, whose
behavior on separate sides of his body was the result of the
independent operations of his severed hemispheres. The patient
presented unified "rationalizations" of his informationally
disjoint actions. For instance, in a task where he was shown a
chicken claw with only his right eye (and thus only his left
hemisphere receives this information) and snow with his left
eye (and right hemisphere) pointed to a picture of chicken
with his right hand (LH control) and a shovel with his left
hand (RH control.) When asked to explain his action (the
speech center is in the LH), he said "I saw a claw and I
picked the chicken and you have to clean out the chicken shed
75. See Stich (1983), p. 236 for presentation of Wilson's
views.
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with a shovel." 76 The experimenters claim that this result was
uniform and straightforward:
In trial after trial, we saw this kind of response.
The left hemisphere could easily and accurately
identify why it had picked the answer, and then
subsequently, and without batting an eye, it would
incorporate the right hemisphere's response into the
framework. While we knew exactly why the right
hemisphere had made its choice, the left hemisphere
could merely guess. Yet, the left did not offer its
suggestion in a guessing vein but rather a statement
of fact as to why that card had been picked.
These varied observations on [the subject] offer us the
opportunity to consider whether we were not observing a
basic mental mechanism common to us all. We feel that the
conscious verbal self is not always privy to the origin
of our actions, and when it observes the person behaving
for unknown reasons, it attributes cause to the actions
as if it knows but in fact it does not. It is as if the
verbal self looks out and sees what the person is doing,
and from that knowledge interprets a reality.11
While it is possible that the surgery (quite minor, as brain
surgery goes) impaired a single, unified system, thereby
distorting its functioning, it is more likely that many of our
own explanations or our own behavior are similar in that they
are not based on the introspective observation of actual
psychological states, but are rather guesses by an
informationally isolated explanatory system.
What is of interest to us here is the reaction to such a
view. Suppose, for the rest of this appendix at least, that
there actually are two separate cognitive sub-systems, one of
which constitutes explicitly stored information for the
76. Gazzaniga and LeDoux (1978), p. 148.
77. Gazzaniga and LeDoux (1978), pp. 148-150.
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purpose of actions, and another which produces explanations of
the actions, but which has no access to the former's data
base. Stich argues that such a result would show that there
are no such things as beliefs:
It is a fundamental tenet of folk psychology that
the very same state which underlies the sincere
assertion of 'p' also may lead to a variety of
nonverbal behaviors...In those cases in which our
verbal subsystem leads us to say 'p' and our
nonverbal subsystem leads us to behave as though we
believed some incompatible proposition, there will
simply be no saying which we believe. Even in the
(presumably more common) case where the two
subsystems agree, there is no saying which state is
the belief that p. If we really do have separate
verbal and nonverbal cognitive storage systems, the
functional economy of the mind postulated by folk
theory is quite radically mistaken. And under those
circumstances I am strongly inclined to think that
the right thing to say is that there are no such
things as beliefs. 8
I agree with Stich that there is co saying whether or not
there is belief in the cited cases, but the judgement that
this shows that there are really no such things as beliefs is
inappropriate.79 Consider Stich's claims about what folk
78. Stich (1983), p. 231. Stich's main point in the
section the quote is taken from is not that there are no such
thing as beliefs, but rather that it is up to scientific
psychology to determine whether or not there are any beliefs,
and here I agree completely. However, Stich appears to
overlook the fact that science often tells us that a certain
(apparent) property is much different than we took it to be
with our common sense explanations.
79. It is notable that Nisbett and Wilson do not
themselves take an eliminativist position toward the
attitudes, although they do suggest that their evidence shows
that belief-desire explanations constitute an "a priori,
causal theory" Nisbett and Wilson (1977), pp. 248 ff. And it
is presumably one that is wrong in many cases. However, the
"correct" explanations that Nisbett and Wilson offer of
subjects' behavior are often couched in terms of attitude
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psychology is committed to. When he says that folk psychology
is committed to the belief that p being the state which
underlies the sincere assertion that p, he may mean one of two
things, namely either that the belief that p is the normal
cause of the sincere assertion that p, or the much stronger
claim that the belief that p is always, necessarily the cause
of the sincere assertion that p. The difference between them
is that in the former case, the explanation of typical sincere
assertions as being caused by belief is not undermined by a
few exceptions, e.g. a few cases where we cannot say if there
is belief present or not and must switch to alternative
concepts and explanations. However, the latter, stronger view
would seem to be undermined by even one exception. Now, Stich
does not distinguish these alternatives, but it seems
charitable not to saddle him with the latter view since we do
seem to allow for special exceptions in the belief-expression
connection. For instance, suppose that I intend to sincerely
express my beliefs but fail to express myself correctly,
substituting one word for another. E.g. Suppose I say "Boston
is south of New York" when I know full well it is to the
north. Have I changed my belief here? The obvious explanation
is simply that in this case the normal causal connection
between belief and sincere expression has gone a bit astray.
Thus, it would seem quite dubious to claim that we always
concepts.
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(e.g. necessarily) believe what we sincerely express. But as I
have pointed out, this weaker view does not show that because
in the cases where expression and action conflict there is no
such thing as belief, it merely shows that in some cases we
cannot apply the concept and thus much switch to an
alternative explanation, set of concepts, etc. The fact that a
concept is not determinate in a range of cases does not show
that it never applies or cannot be used to explain anything.80
What leads Stich to eliminativist conclusions in the
quoted passage, then? A close reading suggests that he has
smuggled an explicit storage view of belief into the argument.
Note that on my dispositional view, it is fine to say that
there are two separate sorts of explicit storage underling
dispositions to use explicit representations in reasoning or
decision-making, or any number of separate storage units for
that matter. The state that "really is belief" is not an
explicit storage state but the dispositions--to cognitive
systems' use of representations when formulated--that such
storage states produce.81 Nor is there any basis for claiming
80. Although I am inclined to think that the
indeterminate cases support the main sentiment of Stich's
view, namely that belief-desire concepts--the concepts of
belief and desire in particular--are not (completely) suitable
to scientific psychology.
81. As evidence of Stich's assumption, consider his
summary of the mental sentence view of belief, "to have a
belief is to have a sentence token inscribed in the brain in
such a way that it exhibits the causal interaction appropriate
to beliefs," Stich (1983), p. 74, my emphasis.
122
that "folk theory" is committed to an explicit storage model
of belief.8 I would suggest, rather, that this is a common
false picture of the property of belief, much like the mind's
eye (or camera in the head) model of mental imagery. Thus,
eliminativism with regard to the property of belief seems an
unwarranted reaction to the "dual systems" hypothesis.
Rey has offered a much stronger response to Stich's
treatment of the dual systems view. He arguez that we can
preserve attitude explanation in the problem cases by dividing
belief--i.e. replacing the notion of belief with two others,
the notion of avowed beliefs (and desires) where, roughly, "a
person avowedly believes that p if she would sincerely and
decidedly assert p if asked"8 and the notion of central
beliefs, which are supposed to do approximately what
"ordinary" beliefs were supposed to do. He sees this as a way
of making the dual systems hypothesis consistent with attitude
explanation:
Taking seriously the "two sets of books" Stich fears
we keep, we could regard a person as a computer
having two sets of addresses: the "central" set, a
set of address that contains the contents of
attitudes that enter through [certain unspecified
computational relations) into instances of practical
reasoning that largely determine one's acts in the
manner Fodor described; and the "avowal" set, a set
of special addresses that specifically provides the
contents, accessed by [certain other unspecified
computational relations], that serve as the basis
82. See Double (1985), who reports that in a survey, his
introductory (philosophy) students failed to share Stich's
eliminativist intuitions in cases of multiple subsystems.
83. Rev (1988), p. 278.
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for sincere assertions and other functions in which
one is to be taken at one's word (oaths, pr, aises,
examinations.)
Rey also maintains that this splitting of belief will allow
for successful explanations of the phenomena of weakness of
the will and of self deception. For instance, in a case of
self-deception, a person may aivowed prefer that not p (e.g.
they stop smoking), yet they may centrally prefer that p (e.g.
they continue smoking) where the latter state continues to
drive their behavior despite their contrary avowal, and
despite the avowal that not p (not smoking) is to be preferred
over p (smoking.)85
While it is an interesting attempt, I do not think Rey's
account succeeds in incorporating the dual systems hypothesis
in belief-desire explanation. I shall discuss three main
problems that his view faces.
First, and foremost, as we have considered at length in
the first section, belief cannot be identified with storage.
Thus, belief cannot be split into two separate storage units,
so Rey's account is not acceptable as far as his rough sketch
of the appropriate computational relations is concerned.
However, it is not apparent that suitable alternative
relations can be found that really do divide belief, given my
dispositional account of that attitude. The obvious route is
84. Rey (1988), p. 278
85. See Rey (1988), pp. 281-2. The example is mine.
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to identify the avowal that p with the disposition to
sincerely express p, and the central belief to use and
explicit representation that p, if formulated, in decision
making processes. But this will not capture all of the
explanatory force of the dual systems account, for the point
there is precisely that both systems are potentially capable
of driving behavior. For instance, suppose I am a subject in
an experiment who has just exhibited a preference for the
right-most item and am talking with the experimenter, avowing
that I have no such preference. I might reason "he says I've
done something that I clearly haven't, what's wrong with him?
Maybe I should try to leave..." and take action. So we need
something like a dual disposition to express and to act, and
another disposition to act (for central beliefs.) But
dispositions cannot be split in this way--either I do or do
not have a disposition to use a given representation, if
formulated, in reasoning processes. This cannot be "split"
into two contrary dispositions. Instead, if we are going to
talk about multiple influences, it seems that we must talk of
multiple influencing factors, e.g. two separate cognitive
subsystems. Thus, once we reject a storage model of belief it
is no longer apparent that the computational property can be
split into two other properties which allow us to use the dual
systems explanations within common sense attitude psychology.
A second problem for Rey's view is that while belief and
desire are central notions in attitude explanationz and
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ascriptions, which are themselves quite complex, he does not
provide much help in explaining how the two new attitudes are
to fit into these explanations and ascriptions. For instance,
consider the fear that p together with the desire that not p.
Suppose someone fears that p--will they avowedly desire that
not p or centrally desire that not p? Similarly, knowledge is
typically thought to require belief, but will it require
avowal, central belief, both, or neither? Further, what are we
to say when someone sincerely utters somthing--how are we to
tell if they centrally believe it, avow it, or both? How are
we to decide when an avowal explanation of action is
appropriate and when a central explanation applies? I.e. when
will the practical syllogism apply with avowal, and when will
it apply with central belief, and when with avowea or central
desires? Unless we have answers to these and many other such
questions, it is not apparent that the avowal-central
distinction can be integrated into the standard common sense
attitude explanatory framework without inhibiting its
usefulness in explanations and ascriptions.
In fact, it is probably true that part of the reason that
belief and desire are such successful notions is that they cut
across a lot of different cognitive systems allowing us to
provide very general explanations for a system which appears
to have a lot of isolated, different units and functions (see
my discussion of modularity in the central systems in section
III.B.) Thus, it seems reasonable to remain skeptical about
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the possibility of dividing belief until it is actually
accomplished.
The third problem is that it is fairly clear that there
are more distinctions to be drawn, more than two sources of
input for decision processes. But this will only compound the
previous problems. For instance, it is apparent that the
avowal-central distinction is not enough to account for the
wide range of "split attitude" cases. As Rey notes:
Some reasoning processes may involve only [avowal]-
like operations, as when one passes through a piece
of reasoning "merely intellectually," and so comes
to avow thing that one doesn't centrally believe."
Now consider two cases of smokers who are contemplating
quitting. Both assert that they want to quit. But one only
"avows" this superficially, although deep down she really
likes smoking, likes the image of herself as a smoker, etc.
The other person really wants to quit through and through--he
has studied the effects of smoking, has had friends die from
lung cancer, etc. But, unfortunately, (and this is a well
documented phenomenon), he is still unable to overcome the
addiction. He requires outside assistance, e.g. a behavior
modification program. Aware of his failure, he "avows" "I
guess I really don't want to quit." If we identify the former
case and this expressed desire as avowals, as Rey's quote
would suggest, then the weakness of the will in the latter
86. Rey (1988), p. 279.
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case would seem to require a further distinction, and it is
not apparent what that would be, in terms of attitudes.
Or consider the following three-tiered case of akrasia
(more or less.) I offer to try the hosts' cake. However, I am
firmly of the belief that sugar is not good for me, and so on
deeper consideration resolve to not take any when it is
served. Yet, it is chocolate, which I love, so I give into my
craving and take a piece. But I am in fact too full already
and cannot actually bring myself to eat it, although it looks
and smells delicious. We can isolate four separate influences
on decision and action here, all of which seem to require
separate treatment for the same reasons that lie behind the
avowal-central distinction. But, once again, it seems easiest
to abandon the attitude framework and instead merely speak of
different subsystems and processes, each operating on an
explicit set of representations--e.g. a "reasoner" (perhaps
with a "Gricean" data-base for reasoning about social
situations), a stored set of previously determined "goals,"
processes that attempt to satisfy "tastes," and a unit which
computes and attempts to satisfy "bodily needs." As the scare
quotes suggest, such units may correspond approximately to the
notions of common sense. Yet, we should not confuse this with
common sense explanation itself. The optimal procedure seems
to be to move from explanations which cite the dispositional
attitudes, including belief, to explanations which postulate
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processes and modules which involve explicit storage and
computations.
Thus, I suggest that Rey's attempt at preserving such
attitude explanations in cases where inconsistency in the
determination of belief and desire seem to occur does not
succeed, and we appear to be better off pursuing non-belief-
desire explanations in these cases.87
87. Note that my main objection is really the first one,
over the fact that belief or belief-substitutes should not be
identified with explicit storage. If the avowal/central belief
acc,ýunt succeeds in explaining cases of akrasia and self-
deception within the attitude framework, then that is fine
with me. But that in and of itself has no bearing on the
nature of belief states.
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SEMANTICS NATURALI ZED
In this essay I develop and defend the view that a theory
of meaning for natural languages should be naturalized to
scientific psychological inquiry. 1 This is a methodological
claim, namely that the study of the relationship between
languages and the world should be conducted as a scientific
investigation. Meaning relations appear to be determined by
the psychological states, whatever they might be, that
underlie our comprehension, production and use of language. I
maintain that we must study these psychological states in
order to determine the nature of the semantic relations.
1. For other advocations of naturalism in semantics, see
Putnam (1970) and Devitt and Sterelny (1987). A notable
difference from the present view is that neither of these
works advocates the specific naturalization that I defend
here, namely the naturalization to cognitive psychology. And
neither work presents the type of positive case I attempt to
develop here, but merely recommends the methodology. Devitt
and Sterelny's book is useful in that, as a survey text, it
provides a naturalist evaluation of a number of different
philosophical approaches to semantics. Note that I do not
follow them in endorsing a causal approach to meaning and
reference.
Also note that Chomsky has advanced the view that the
study of language is best conceived as the scientific study of
the language faculty--for instance, see Chomsky (1980) and
(1986). The present work is, for the most part, a defense of
his scientific approach for the study of meaning. However, I
wish to leave certain questions open as far as the general
thesis of semantic naturalism is concerned, i.e. if there a
specific language faculty or if our knowledge of language
distributed throughout cognition, if what we attribute as
knowledge of language (always) involves explicit
representation of the attributed content, and whether or not
languages are best conceived as abstractions out of cognitive
states.
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In other words, we should think _f "meaning" as an
apparent natural kind, to be dealt with in the way that all
other natural kinds are, i.e. by developing scientific
theories which reveal the underlying nature of the kind, often
by revising or rejecting much of the pre-scientific lore about
the natural kind in question. This is not to say that all
philosophical accounts of meaning to date are false or
misguided. However, the view I am suggesting does imply that
past and present philosophical accounts should be viewed as
empirical theories, whose validity is determined via the usual
means of scientific confirmation, i.e. explanatory success--
specifically, more success than competing theories--goodness
of fit with the (apparent) data and coherence with related
theories.
The naturalist is, of course, unable to offer any a
priori or conceptual defense of his position. Ultimately,
naturalism is proven correct when successful scientific
theories are developed which succeed in explaining the
phenomenon at issue. This seems to leave the naturalist in the
awkward position of being unable to defend the approach until
it has finally proven successful. But such success may be a
long time in coming--certainly, cognitive psychology is only
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in its infancy. 2 However, there is a means of defending
naturalism prior to the emergence of successful theories.
First, naturalism can be shown to be prima facde plausible, in
advance of actual, successful theories. That is, it can be
argued that a naturalistic conception of semantics seems
reasonable--that one could reasonably hope to produce a
substantial theory of meaning using naturalistic methods.
Second, the epistemic basis for alternative non-naturalistic
methodologies can be called into question. Specifically, it
seems that if a non-naturalistic semantic method is
legitimate, then it must be true that we have non-empirical
knowledge of meaning, or at least knowledge of meaning that is
prior to and independent from the naturalizing scientific
methodology, i.e. empirical psychology. But it can be argued
that we do not appear to possess such knowledge, thus leaving
the naturalistic account as the only plausible semantic
methodology, even though the final proof of the position will
not come until we have actually developed successful empirical
theories.
In what follows, I will develop a defense of naturalism
along the lines that I have just sketched. In the first
section, I will clarify the notions of a theory of meaning and
2. Note that the present essay is not an attempt at
demonstrating that current psychological theories form the
basis for a successful naturalization of semantics--I do not
think that they do. Nor is it any sort of survey of state-of-
the-art cognitive semantic theories.
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of naturalism--i.e. I will provide a clearer specification of
what it is that is getting naturalized, and what the
implications of naturalism are. In the process I will answer
several objections to the general idea of naturalized
semantics. I will then set out and a prima facie conception of
semantics naturalized to cognitive psychology in the second
section, and defend this view against several further
objections. With this conception in place, I will turn to the
main defense of naturalism--in the third section I will argue
that our pre-scientific explicit knowledge of meaning fails to
yield sufficient ingredients for a non-naturalistic theory of
meaning. If this is correct, then the naturalistic approach is
left as the only viable candidate for semantic inquiry.
I. What is a Theory of Heaning?
I am recommending that semantics be naturalized to
scientific psychological inquiry, but current philosophy
provides us with a variety of different notions of what
meaning is--e.g. sense, reference, truth conditions, functions
ranging over possible worlds, logical forms, verification
conditions--as well as a number of methodological and
explanatory frameworks--e.g. interpretation theory,
specification of direct reference, model theory, definitional
analysis, causal chains of reference, theories of use,
conceptual roles. It is not obvious that all of these
conceptions and all of these methodologies add up to a single,
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uniform point of view (that could be titled "semantics.") What
is it, then, that a naturalized semantics is trying to
explain, and which of these methodologies should it adopt?
I am not going to attempt to decide between these
accounts, nor am I going to attempt to assemble all (or some)
of them into a single outlook. Instead, I am going to work
with a more generalized notion of a theory of meaning that, I
claim, most of these approaches fall under. Specifically, I
will understand "semantics" to be the descriptive project of
specifying how the elements of our languages are related to
the world. Such an account might specify the relations that
attain (e.g. references), or it might (also) specify states
that are responsible for determining these relations (e.g.
senses.) Most, and perhaps all, standard philosophical
accounts that have been labeled "semantics" fall under this
conception, not for any deep methodological reasons, but
simply because then purport to specify one or another actual--
as opposed to merely possible or recommended--"semantic
feature"3 of language--as opposed to specifying structural,
syntactic features of language.
What I am asserting, then, is that any methodology (and
view of meaning) falling under this general conception of
3. I use the phrase 'semantic features' as a placeholder
for whatever sorts of states or relationships a theory of
meaning ends up characterizing--e.g. sense, reference, truth
conditions, etc.
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semantics should be naturalized to scientific psychological
inquiry. Such naturalization, as I understand it, has two
consequences. First, empirical psychological facts about the
processes and representations that speakers use in
comprehending and producing utterances are an essential part
of the evidential base for a theory of meaning. That is, any
fact about language's role in our psychology could potentially
be relevant to the truth or falsity of a semantic theory.
E.g., a theory which successfully answers the question "what
does 'dog' mean in English?" must be responsible to the
psychological facts about how speakers comprehend utterances
involving 'dog.' For instance, this data might help decide
among competing accounts of the meaning of that term.4 Such
facts need not be obvious--in fact, I suspect that we have as
yet little idea of what such evidence consists in. The facts I
especially have in mind here are not facts about psychological
states that common sense attributes such as beliefs and
desires, but rather facts about our psychological language
processing mechanisms that must be garnered through the
experimental study of cognition and the brain.
The second implication of the naturalization of semantics
to psychology is that the confirmation of a theory of meaning
is part of the confirmation of empirical psychological
theories in general, so that such a theory must plausibly
4. I shall provide several sample cases below.
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cohere with other psychological theories. For instance, if a
theory of meaning has implausible implications for a theory of
language acquisition, and certainly if it implies or supports
claims contrary to known facts about language acquisition,
then this is good reason for rejecting or modifying the
semantic theory. Thus, I am arguing that it is a mistake to
conceive of either the data base or the confirmation of a
theory of meaning as prior to or independent from empirical
psychological theories of language processing.
I take it that both of these claims, if correct, will
serve to modify existing philosophical approaches to
semantics. The effect of the first claim is fairly concrete
and obvious, i.e. it will widen the potential BAta base for
semantics since most philosophical accounts assume a much
narrower data base, e.g. only speaker's intuitions, or only
facts about speaker's beliefs and desires. Acceptance of the
claim about confirmation, though, would have less tangible
effects. Roughly, the result would be that semantics could not
be conducted in isolation from empirical theories of language
processing, nor could semantic theories be used to legislate
the explanatory goals of the latter. Put another way, if
naturalization is appropriate, then it is possible that
theories of language processing could show us that our
languages do not have the semantic teatures that our
intuitions and introspections suggest that they have.
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Perhaps it might appear that there is an easy way out for
those who wish to avoid these consequences. Someone might
simply select their favorite methodology and conception of
semantic features, and label the resulting investigation
"semantics." Semantics, would, then, by definition not involve
either the wider data base or co-confirmation with
psychological theories. However, such a move trivializes the
outcome of the investigation. The idea of the general
conception of semantics that I formulated above is to prevent
this sort of maneuver. To see this, let's suppose that the
investigation in question was supposed to describe the
references of terms. But, on the restricted view, the theorist
with a complete theory could not claim to have a
characterization of actual reference, but only reference-as-
described-by-the-methodology. To claim that the methodology
had yielded the real reference of terms, the theorist would
need to maintain that there were no facts or issues other that
those considered by the methodology which were relevant to the
determination of the reference of terms. But this is to
acknowledge that the methodology in question might potentially
face both competing methodologies and additional falsifying
data. Hence, any semanticist wishing to claim methodology-
independent validity for the semantic features her
investigation postulates must at least admit the possibility
of naturalism.
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A somewhat deeper objection to the possibility of
naturalism is that the suggested naturalization of a theory of
meaning to empirical psychology is a category mistake. This
appears to be the upshot of the following passage from
Dummett:
A theory of meaning...is not intended as a
psychological hypothesis. Its function is solely to
present an analysis of the complex skill which
constitutes mastery of a language, to display, in
terms of what he may be said to know, just what it
is that someone who possesses that mastery is able
to do; it is not concerned to describe any inner
psychological mechanisms which may account for his
having those abilities. If a Martian could learn to
speak a human language, or a robot be devised to
behave in just the ways that are essential to a
language-speaker, an implicit knowledge of the
correct theory of meaning for the language could be
attributed to the Martian or the robot with as much
right as to a human speaker, even though the r
internal mechanisms were entirely different.
Dummett might simply be making the seemingly trivial point
that a theory of meaning will be more abstract than theories
that characterize specific causal sequences of psychological
states. However, there may be a stronger claim here as well.
Specifically, we might ask in the present context, do these
considerations provide any reason for thinking that a theory
of meaning can be developed and confirmed without examining
facts about psychological mechanisms?
The first point to note here is that while consideration
of Martians or robots might immediately suggest radical
5. Dummett (1976), p. 70. I shall have more to say about
Dummett's conception of a theory of meaning below.
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psychological differences to us, this may be due to the fact
that (unreflective) common sense suggests type-type identities
for psychological states and physical make-up. Thus, we may
immediately think that systems with radically different
physical make-up than ours will have radically different
psychological make-ups as well. But if we adopt a (more or
less) standard functionalist construal of psychological events
and properties, 6 where a given psychological event is conceived
of ae only token-identical, but not type-identical to some
(complex) physical event, the examples become somewhat less
intuitively forceful. Thus, the considerations in the passage
provide no a priori reason for thinking that two systems could
speak the same language and yet have radically different
psychological mechanisms. For all we know at present, Dummett
is wrong in asserting that beings with entirc.ly different
internal mechanisms could speak the same language.
However, there is, no doubt, room for massive variation
in how a given psychological task could be accomplished. To
see this, we need simply note that cognitive explanations of
individual processes typically characterize them as taking a
certain input then proceeding through a set of rule-governed
transitions to an output state. In most cases, it is easy to
find alternative sets of rules and transitions that will yield
the same inyut-output relations. And such considerations might
6. See Fodor (1975), pp. 9 ff.
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lead us to grant that it is likely that we could produce
identical behaviors to those of any individual using radically
different internal states. So, we probably could have two
beings with isomorphic language behaviors but with completely
different sets of internal states that are causally
responsible for the behaviors. According to Dummett, it would
follow that these beings satisfied the same theory of meaning.7
Does this create problems for semantic naturalism, i.e. by
showing either that facts about psychological mechanisms are
irrelevant to semantic investigations or that the truth of
semantic claims is independent from such facts?
I do not see how. For suppose that psychological
processing actually differs in every possible way in us vs.
other kinds of speakers (machines and aliens.) Suppose
knowledge of English, S, is realized in us by one set of
cognitive mechanism states Sg, in machines by a different set
of states S%, in Martians by a third set S2 and so forth. How
would this show that the study of S could not be conducted by
studying one or more of the Si's? The only possible basis for
support of this claim would seem to be that the psychologist
given a Si is unable to abstract and idealize so as to reach a
characterization of S. But this is simply false. Psychologists
do idealize and abstract. Thus, psychologists might want to
7. I shall criticize Dummett's behaviorism below--for now
I will grant this behavioristic conception of understanding
and thus of semantics.
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idealize away from features of the processes that seemed in
some way irrelevant to what we were trying to account for.
They might want to ignore features of processes that were
irrelevant to the contents of the representations--i.e. they
might want to describe the processes just in terms of the
sequence of representational states involved, and they might
also want to idealize away from apparent errors or breakdowns
in the (normally) rule-governed processes. And psychologists
might want to classify several different sequences as being of
the same type, abstracting away from certain details of how
the process was accomplished. Perhaps they would want to
classify all processes that were input-output identical as
being of a certain type. And such idealization and abstraction
can continue indefinitely. But then, psychologists will arrive
at Dummett's conception of knowledge of meaning sooner or
later via abstraction and idealization, since a theory of
meaning, on his view, will characterize some set of functions
from impinging stimuli (e.g. others' utterances) to behaviors
and such functions are abstractions and idealizations out of
inner transitions. Thus the fact, if it is one, that beings
with radically different psychological mechanisms--i.e.
concrete psychological states--could achieve the same
knowledge of meaning does not show that a theory of meaning is
not to be based on a study of psychological states.
Nor does this example provide any basis for thinking that
the truth about the nature of knowledge of meaning, S does not
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depend on the nature of any one of the specific mechanisms, Si.
Apparently, it would do so only if there was some dividing
point at which facts about less abstract states ceased to be
relevant to facts about more abstract states. But we have been
given no reason for thinking that such a point exists between
S and the Si's. A given state of semantic knowledge might exist
independently of any given set of facts about processing, but
only because other processing facts could realize the same
knowledge state. It would not follow that the existence of the
knowledge state was independent of the collective set of
mechanism states.
There are cases, thought, where abstract states are
governed by laws and principles that are largely independent
of the laws and principles that govern more concrete states.
The obvious example here is macro vs. micro physics. I.e. an
explanation of the properties of the macro physical states is
vrerified or rejected (for most practical purposes) completely
independently of considerations about micro physical states
and vice-versa. 8 But there is no reason to think that the case
of physics is analogous to semantics and psychology. First, it
appears that semantic knowledge is relevant to specific
processing sequences--i.e. we explain cases of comprehension
or inference in terms of the application of the speaker's
knowledge of meaning. So, unlike macro and micro physics, the
8. See the wave example in Haugeland (1982).
146
two domains do not appear to be explanatorily independent.
Second, ordinary language suggests that skills are still
psychological states, which would certainly seem contrary to
the idea that knowledge of meaning constitutes an independent
levels of existence from psychological mechanisms. Indeed,
(mental) skills and abilities, including understanding, are
paradigm psychological states, albeit dispositional ones.
Moreover, when we speak of, e.g., a person's intelligence, we
often acknowledge that we are not characterizing a particular
bit of a psychological mechanism, but something much more
abstract. Yet, it is silly to insist that, e.g., "Jill is
smart" is a non-psychological claim. Thus, there would appear
to be no justification for the claim that truths about
knowledge of meaning are independent of truths about
psychological processes.
I conclude that Dummett's considerations give us no
reason to think that semantics is somehow separate from the
study of psychological processes, and hence no reason at all
for thinking that the proposed naturalization of semantics to
psychology involves some sort of conceptual mistake.
II. The Prima Facie Conception of Naturalised Semantics
I will now begin my defense of naturalism by sketching
out a tentative model of how a theory of meaning might be
developed through research into our psychological states. This
is not to say that naturalism, nor even naturalization to
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psychological inquiry must rest on the following
methodological recipe. However, as I have suggested above,
part of the burden for the naturalist is to show the prima
facde plausibility of his position, and doing this requires
having some fairly specific idea of how a scientific
investigation of meaning could possibly be developed.
Like any scientific theory, a theory of meaning will
begin by attempting to isolate the phenomena to be explained.
It appears that our languages are systematically related to
the world. Specifically, it appears that communication,
including linguistic comprehension and production, and other
uses of language such as inference and judgement depend at
least partially on our possession of knowledge of the meaning.
We want to know what this knowledge consists in and how it
enables us to accomplish these tasks. Specifically, we want
explanations of the nature of the cognitive states which
embody knowledge of meaning.
Here, a remark or two about the nature of cognitive
psychology itself is in order. The cognitive program seeks to
explain our knowledge and abilities through the postulation of
various representations and processes that operate on those
representations. The representations and processes need be
neither consciously accessible nor recognized by common sense
psychology. In fact, many current cognitive theories
characterize representations that are both sub-conscious and
are not readily identifiable with common sense attitudes such
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as beliefs or desires.9 (On the other hand, it is not
unreasonable to suppose that cognitive theories will
eventually either include reference to common sense states or
show them to supervene on states that the scientific theories
refer to.)
I suggest that the best means of naturalizing semantics
to cognitive psychology--let us call the resulting view
cognitivist semantics--is through the following line of
investigation. Theorists begin with a set of postulations
about the meaning of natural language words and statements.
These postulations might be drawn directly from our ordinary
intuitions about meaning, or they might be more complex
models, developed on the basis of these intuitions. The
initial postulations will, no doubt, include a number of non-
equivalent competing views about the semantic features1 0 of
linguistic (i.e. syntacticly specified) structures. The next
step is to determine the role that these semantic features
might play in various psychological tasks. Here, pre-
theoretical beliefs suggest that semantic comprehension and
production, inference and judgement will be the most
9. Thus, I am not necessarily advocating an intention-
based semantics, if 'intention' is understood as referring to
the common sense propositional attitudes such as belief and
desire, but something broader--a "representation-based"
semantics.
10. Note that competing theories may provide alternative
accounts of what these states or relationships are as well as
alternative assignments of specific semantic features to words
and phrases.
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significant abilities that draw upon or are in some way
dependent on languages possessing the postulated semantic
features. This in turn leads to the postulation of
psychological states and processes which are sufficient to
enable the realization of these abilities. Non-equivalent,
competing views of semantic features should, in most cases,
lead to alternative postulations of underlying states and
processes.
Perhaps the first stage, or set of stages might be
conducted along the lines that have proven successful for
theories of syntax. That is, we might attempt to develop a
competence theory for semantics. A competence theory, a
methodology introduced by Chomsky,11 is a characterization of
the knowledge which will, under ideal conditions, enable the
accomplishment of a certain goal or task (e.g. communication.)
Standardly, a linguistic competence theory is constructed by
developing rules which characterize structural descriptions
that in turn reflect speaker's intuitions about the features
(e.g. well-formedness, deviance) of various phrases.12
11. See Chomsky (1965), pp. 1 ff. See also Chomsky
(1986), Chapters 1-2, where a terminological shift occurs,
from "theory of competence", to "theory of I-language."
12. A competence theory may also include rules whose
application yields transitions between postulated underlying
structures. However, such rules should not be confused with
rules that are actually used in processing. The former are
perhaps best viewed as abstractions out of or over the latter
processes.
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The next stage is the difficult task of attempting to
determine observable measures that will help decide which of
the postulated representations and processes we actually
possess. Standard measures for representational states and
processes include reaction times, error rates and types, and
task performance under certain unique circumstances. While
there is no guarantee that data can be found which will
decisively determine which states and processes are present,
the situation is no different than that faced by any other
theoretical pursuit in natural science which postulates
unobservables. Suitable linkages of unique data to theories
will provide a basis for deciding between competing views. At
this stage, it may also be useful to draw upon results from
independently established theories of non-linguistic abilities
and processes, e.g. of theories of perceptual processes. As
with any dComain of science, compatibility of related theories
yields support for the theory under investigation, while
apparent conflict may lead to revision or even theory
abandonment.
Finally, any revisions that occur at any stage of
theorization may potentially lead to mo.ifications of the
originally postulated semantic features. This may include
revising or rejecting some of the intuitions which form the
original basis for the postulation of semantic features. In
this way a theory of meaning can be regarded as a fully
empirical undertaking, where the theory is potentially subject
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to revision with each piece of recalcitrant data concerning
psychological states and processes.
Although this methodology has not as yet been developed
to the point where sample explanations can be presented, it
will be useful to consider several highly speculative examples
in order to illustrate the relationship between questions
about content and questions about our cognitive processes.
Consider, for instance, the issue of what logical form
underlies definite descriptions. Russellians maintain that a
phrase of the form:
the 0 is P
has the logical form:
there is something that is 0 and nothing else is 0
and it is P
By contrast, the (Fregean/)Strawsonian view holds that phrases
such as the 0 have the same logical form as names--i.e. they
are singular terms. On this view, it is standardly assumed
that the uniqueness of reference of definite descriptions in
presupposed when such phrases are used, but the uniqueness of
reference is not specified by the logical form itself. What
might each view predict about the mental representations
underlying our understanding of definite descriptions? The
obvious difference is that the Russellian view predicts that
mental representations underlying "the 0" will be complex
while the Strawsonian view predicts that such representations
will be simple. Of course, complexity is relative to function.
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Specifically, we should expect a difference between these
views when it comes to inferences based on the representations
which underlie our understanding of definite descriptions.
I.e. on the Russellian view, we should expect the
representations underlying our understanding of "the 0" to be
complex when it comes to inferences. That is, we should expect
the representations themselves to license the inference from
"the 0 is F' to "something is F'. By contrast, defenders of
the Strawsonian view should hypothesize that the
representations in question do not license any such
inferences, i.e. that they such representations are
computationally simple as regards inferences. This view will
need to explain (apparent) inferences from "the I is F' to
"something is F' somehow, e.g. as based on a storehouse of
facts about conversational presuppositions. Hence, evidence
supporting either the inferential complexity or simplicity of
the representations that underlie our understanding of
definite descriptions should help decide between these
completing accounts.13
As a second example, consider, a disputed case of
analyticity. E.g. the statement 'cats are animals' seems
analytic to most speakers. But suppose, as Putnam has
13. It probably won't be this simple, of course. For one
sort of developments, see Hornstein (1984) for a defense of
the Strawsonian view based on facts about types of
quantification drawn from a (largely) syntactic competence
theory.
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imagined, that we discover cats to be cleverly constructed
robots, of alien manufacture (e.g. Mars), placed on the Earth
to spy on us. In such a scenario, Putnam claims, we would
admit that our experience has shown the falsity of 'cats are
animals.'14 In response, a defender of analyticity might claim
that the statement is analytic, and that in such a case we
would say that we have discovered that there are, in fact, no
such things as cats (at least around here), or that we have
discovered that some animals are robots.
Who is right? While cognitive semantics has hardly
advanced far enough to provide an answer to this question, it
is possible to sketch a speculative development which will
demonstrate how cognitive findings could help settle this
matter. Suppose, that it turns out that there is a cognitive
semantic framework used in the comprehension of sentences, a
framework that is not alterable in the way that ordinary
stored facts (e.g. "cats like to play with yarn") are
revisable. Thus, 'cats are animals' might ordinarily be
comprehended in a way that makes it analytic, since, e.g., the
'cat' node is subordinate to the 'animal' node in the semantic
framework. But this may not constitute the entire cognitive
realization of 'cat's meaning--the term is also tied to cat
recognition, in that it is the label used for such instances.
14. See Putnam (1962) for introduction of this case--
though he does not use it to attack the intuition of
analyticity there--he calls the statement "analytic."
154
Thus, a positive case of "cat-recognition" may excite the
'cat' node.
We can apply this crude cognitive model to see where the
conflicting intuitions arise. Consideration of robot cats
suggests that in such a case, it is not appropriate to have
the 'cat' node--for what we recognize as 'cats'--subordinate
to the 'animal' node; a different categorical structure must
be used for comprehension of the term, e.g. one where the
'cat' node is subordinate to 'machine.,
We might say that this cognitive analysis has shown us
that 'cat' in fact has two components to its meaning, "catl"
for which it is analytic that cats are animals and "cat2" which
means roughly "the things we typically recognize as cats."
Thus, 'cats are animals' has both an analytic and a synthetic
component to it. Ordinarily, there coincide. However, in the
imagined case they diverge, we have synthetic grounds for
rejecting 'cats 2 are animals', so 'catsl' must be abandoned in
favor of, say, 'cats3', where 'cats 3 are machines' is
analytically true. Thus, cognitive theory might provide us
with a basis for claiming, e.g. that 'cats are animals' is
analytic and that cases such as the robot discovery wou'd lead
to changes of meaning. (Or perhaps we will find that the
meaning is determined by the perceptual componexat alone--or,
e.g., if it turns out that only at least one component must be
used in comprehension--disJunctively as it were--then it seem
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that the reaction to the original case that has it that the
statement is not analytic is correct.)
Let us return to general considerations about the
methodology for a cognitivist semantics. As I Xave presented
it, this methodology appears as a rational progression of
stages, each dependent on the previous one's near completion.
Roughly, 1) construct competence theories--which may take a
number of stages in itself, 2) postulate (abstract) processes
and abilities that realize competence, 3) develop specific
theories about the representations and computations that
realize these processes and abilities 4) tie the postulated
representations and computations to specific behavioral
predictions and, coinciding with (2-4), 5) seek corroboration
from independent psychological theories of the realizations of
other abilities and processes. However, with science being the
methodologically messy enterprise that it is, we might expect
that investigation will, to some extent, be conducted at all
stages simultaneously. Indeed, it appears that work is already
underway at most stages,15 although with the early stages
15. For instance, Jackendoff (1983) presents a partial
semantic competence theory, Johnson-Laird (1983) presents a
theory of the psychological processes underlying semantic
comprehension and Jackendoff (1987) is, consciousness aside,
an attempt at linking postulated linguistic faculties with
other postulated faculties, notably visual and musical
faculties.
These are only token, highly representative examples.
Much of the work in cognitive psychology concerning concepts
and categorization, and concerning language-processing could
be construed as providing partial, tentative accounts for one
or another of the stages I have outlined.
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relatively undeveloped, theories at the later stages become
extremely tentative. Whether or not a given stage will prove
more difficult than others is an open question that I will not
address here. I merely emphasize that all stages in this
conception appear to require substantial inquiry--this model
suggests how empirical semantics can be conducted, but it does
not imply that it will be easy.
Is this, then, a plausible naturalization of semantics?
One major issue that I will not examine here is whether or not
a methodology which postulates representations and
representational processes is indeed legitimate and can in
fact be successful. I assume that the answers to both
questions are affirmative for the same reason that I assume
that various other scientific methodologies are legitimate,
namely that there are, at present, modestly successful
scientific theories that those methods have produced.
Beyond such worries, there is, I claim, nothing
incoherent or conceptually impossible about any particular
stage of the undertaking. While there is no guarantee of
success at any particular stage, just as there is never any
guarantee of success for any attempt to produce a scientific
explanation of any particular phenomenon, there is also no
reason to think that any particular stage cannot be
successfully accomplished. Thus, this model of cognitivist
semantics provides a prima facle case for the naturalization
of a theory of meaning to cognitive psychology.
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A. Neaning and Representation
I will now consider several objections to the view of
naturalized semantics that I have just sketched. The first
concerns the assumption of a representational psychology.
Specifically, a cognitivist semantics will rely on theories
that postulate various mental representations. Perhaps it
might be objected that this presupposes that the content of
such representations can be specified. But providing an
account of the notion of representation that is at work here,IS
it might be claimed, is an a priori line of investigation, and
moreover one that, if successful, will already provide an
answer to the question which the cognitivist semantics was
supposed to answer, namely what the content of linguistic
expressions is. Thus, it might be argued, the proposed account
relies on an a priori investigation and therefore does not
provide a naturalization of semantics after all.
In response to this line of objection, I will distinguish
between meaning and representation, and also between a theory
of meaning and an analysis of representation. Doing so shows
us that even if the latter is an exercise in a priori
analysis, the former can still plausibly be regarded as an
empirical theory. Let us then let 'meaning' stand for the
16. See, e.g., Cummins (1989) for presentation of the
current alternatives, and defensive of his interpretational
view. Also see Fodor (forthcoming) and Block (1986).
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relation(s) that elements of natural language bear to items in
the world, and 'representation' stand for the relation(s) that
mental entities bear to items in the world. Notice that it
appears to be an open question as to whether or not these are
the same type of relation (or properties, etc.) Thus, having a
conceptual analysis of "representation" does not automatically
imply that the same analysis applies to "meaning", or even
that there is a conceptual analysis of the latter notion.
And if there is an a priori analyses of "representation,"
it does not follow that a theory of meaning is an a priori
undertaking. Given a broadly cognitivist model for meaning, a
theory of meaning will need to tell us what mental
representations and states are relevant to the meanings of
natural language expressions, what the relationship between
the mental states and expressions consists in, and what the
representational content of the mental states is. An analysis
of the notion of representation would seem to providi us with
nothing beyond a partial answer to this third question. The
bulk of a theory of meaning would be undetermined--we would
need to investigate what mental states we have, which are
relevant to a theory of meaning, and how the relevant ones
determine meaning. And further, even the question of the
content of particular representations would seem to require
empirical investigation. E.g., if the analysis is in terms of
certain causal relations, then we still need to look to see
when and if such causal relations hold between specific mental
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states and items in the world. So the possession of an
analysis of "representation" would not affect the plausibility
of the claim that these other tasks are part of an empirical
program.
To help see this point, it is important to note that the
cognitive picture is not in any way committed to the view that
each word in a language is mapped 1-1 to a representation,
where that representation's content is equivalent to the
meaning of the word.17 On such a model, the use of
representations seems almost superfluous--adding a simple
mapping from words to representations accomplishes very
little. And the questions of what representations we have and
how they relate to language are trivialized. What is more
likely, though, is that a complex set of representations and
cognitive processes is associated with each term, or
linguistic structure. For instance, it may be that most common
sense kind terms are given their meaning via an association
with detection mechanisms, a "semantic network" that places
the kind in a conceptual hierarchy, and a description or image
of an exemplar of the kind. Thinking of the cognitive approach
to semantics only in the first way, in terms of an almost
trivial word to representation mapping, may suggest that the
only interesting project for this model of semantic
investigation is a specification of "representation." But this
17. The most well-known version of this view is found in
Fodor (1975).
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is only one possible model of how cognition connects language
to the world, and it is an open matter as to what sort of
model is correct. While the word-representation relationship
may turn out to be more or less trivial, we cannot know this
prior to empirical investigation, and can only establish it by
non-trivial investigation.
So cognitivist semantics does not rely on an a priori
analysis of representation that will actually do all of the
work in an account of meaning. But I wish to make an even
stronger claim here, namely that there is no reason to think
that there is any a priori investigation proceeding here at
all. Philosophers who are currently seeking a naturalistic
analysis of the notion of representation may be viewed as
engaging in a certain empirical task, i.e. the job of
attempting a theoretical explanation of the instantiation of
"representation" in non-psychological terms.
Cummins has argued that sciences, psychology in particular,
not only involve transition theories that explain causal
properties but also analyses that explain the instantiation of
properties:
Many scientific theories are not designed to explain
changes but are rather designed to explain
properties. The point of what I call a property
theory is to explain the properties of a system not
in the sense in which this means ""Why did S acquire
P?" or "What caused S to acquire P?" but, rather,
"What is it for S to instantiate P?" or, "In virtue
of what does S have P?" Just as we can ask, "Why did
the gas get hotter (or expand)?", we can ask, "In
virtue of what does a gas have a temperature
(volume)?" Understood as an answer to the latter
questions, the kinetic theory of heat (and the
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molecular theory of gases that it presupposes) is
not a transition theory but a property theory: it
explains temperature in a gas by explaining how
temperature is instantiated in a gas; it d es not,
by itself, explain changes in temperature."
It seems that the task of providing a naturalistic analysis of
the notion of representation might be reasonably viewed as
just this sort of undertaking--a bit of very abstract biology
or physics, or perhaps a bit of "theory of theories."
Therefore, the model of cognitivist semantics, in so far as it
relies on a notion of representation, need not, contrary to
the objection, rely on any sort of a priori account.
And finally, note that even if we never get a
naturalistic account of "representation," it is possible that
we will have successful theories that postulate mental
representations and specify their content. I.e. cognitive
psychology might succeed without reductionistic foundations in
the same way that mathematics has succeeded (apparently)
without decisive foundations. The proposed semantic
methodology merely requires that we have successful theories
of representational states--no explicit appeal is ever made to
an analysis of "representation." So it is not really apparent
that cognitivist semantics requires any treatment of the
notion of representation at all.
18. Cummins (1983), pp. 14-5.
162
B. Psychologi sm
Perhaps some readers will be worried that the view of
cognitivist semantics that I have presented is committed to an
implausible claim, namely that meanings are in the head. I
will now address such concerns.
First, it should be noted that the methodology I have
endorsed is not committed in advance to any particular
conception of what meanings--or "semantic features"--are. We
might divide traditional accounts into two types--those that
endorse only relational semantic features, e.g. reference, and
those that also endorse intrinsic semantic feattures, e.g.
sense. Cognitivist semantics, as I have said, is not committed
to either type of view in advance of theoretical
investigation. However, to the extent that there do turn out
to be intrinsic semantic features, it seems plausible for the
cognitivist to think of them as either being abstract mental
states, or as being determined or fixed by mental states. And
to the extent that there turn out to be relational semantic
features, it seems plausible for the cognitivist to maintain
that they are largely determined by mental states, although,
of course, identification of an intrinsic mental state with a
relational state amounts to a category mistake.
In this innocuous sense, the cognitivist is committed to
the view that meanings are in the head--i.e. that meanings are
determined by mental states. As I shall now point out, this
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does not commit the cognitivist to either of two problematic
psychologisitc views, namely subjectivity and individualism.
Traditional psychologism claims that meanings are the
sort of mental states that can be known subjectively, i.e.
from the first-person point of view, no matter what the
external environment is like. As far as I can tell, the
cognitivist methodology that I have outlined has no
commitments at all concerning subjective knowledge. Mental
states, as conceived by cognitive psychology are as objective
as any other sort of states. While (apparent) introspective
knowledge and intuitions might prove useful in forming
theories of psychological states, there is no reason for the
cognitivist to be committed to the view that such knowledge
and intuitions are either infallible or provide complete
semantic knowledge. In fact, below I will argue that it
appears to be false that we have complete explicit,
(potentially) conscious knowledge of meaning. Thus, the
cognitivist is not committed to any sort of subjective
psychologism.
A second problematic commitment for some forms of
psychologism is the thesis of individualism, i.e. that the
meanings of terms are determined solely by what is in the
head. This traditional psychologistic thesis has come under
sever attack through Putnam's twin-earth cases and Burge's
subsequent development of them. But this has no obvious
bearing on the cognitivist semantic methodology. That is,
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there is no particular reason for the cognitive semanticist to
be committed to the view that the content of mental states is
determined solely by what's in the head. While the slogan
"meaning ain't in the head" might seem to directly oppose
psychologistic semantics, this is only because the slogan is
highly misleading. All that the twin-earth and similar cases
show is that meanings are not solely in the head. Yet,
language comprehension and production and inferential
abilities surely are in the head, and meaning is relevant to
these, so there must at least be a substantial portion of
meaning determination in the head even if anti-individualism
is correct--a substantial portion worthy of investigation. And
what's not in the head might be left to sociology or related
sciences. So a semantics naturalized (mostly) to cognitive
psychology is perfectly consistent with anti-individualism. In
fact, we might even want to infer from the intuitions against
individualism, as Burge does, that psychology isn't concerned
solely with what's in the head. So even if individualism is
incorrect, semantics might be completely naturalized to
cognitive psychology.
One final point on these matters concerns Fodor's
recommendation of "methodological solipsism" as a research
strategy for cognitive psychology. 9 He argues that the most
promising methodology for cognitive psychology to pursue is
19. See Fodor (1980).
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one that focuses only on intrinsic mental features rather than
on relational features. Perhaps the same recommendation might
be apt for cognitivist semantics. Thus, there is no reason to
believe that the relations that form the external, mind-
independent part of word-world relations exhibit any salience
or order that make them good candidates for scientific study.
In this sense, the only interesting candidates for a
scientific semantics may be mental states. For instance, one
could imagine that we will be able to develop theories which
specify how our words inherit their meaning from mental states
and processes, although we will find the task of specifying
the specific relations that our mental states stand in to
external objects too difficult to capture theoretically. That
is, such relations may be too complex and diverse for us to be
able to provide general theories about them.
In any case, it is important to see that the
methodological solipsist strategy is distinct from both
subjectivism and ind.vidualism. The recommendation that the
psychologist or semanticist study only intrinsic psychological
states says nothing about what knowledge of those states
consists in. Specifically, there is no reason for the
methodological solipsist to be committed to either the view
that we have subjective knowledge of all our intrinsic mental
states, or even the view that we have (correct) subjective
knowledge of any of these states. Second, the methodological
solipsist strategy need not be conjoined with individualism,
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which is a metaphysical thesis. One could reject the latter,
but still maintain that the only the study of states from
(e.g.) the skin in offered hopes for a prom!zing research
program. Thus, methodological solipsism is a strategy which
may prove highly successful for cognitivist semantics, though
I remain officially neutral on this matter in the rest of the
essay.
III. Knowledge of Heaning--The Need for Scientific
Investigation
So far I have been defending the plausibility of the
specific form of naturalism that I have proposed for
semantics--naturalization to cognitive psychology. I now turn
to the second main portion of my case for bemantic
naturalization, the claim that there is no alternative, non-
scientific source of knowledge sufficient to yield a non-
scientific metholology for a theory of meaning. My argument
will have two parts. First, I will address the general view
that non-scientific knowledge of meaning sufficient for a
semantic theory is provided by ordinary knowledge of language.
Then I examine a number of specific conceptions of meaning and
semantic methodologies, each of which might appear to offer an
alternative source of semantic knowledge and thus an
alternative, non-naturalistic methodology. I shall argue that
they in fact do not.
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A. Kinds of Knowledge
It would appear that the main opposition the
recommendation that semantics be nxturalized to scientific
inquiry is a position that maintains that we already have
(relatively) complete knowledge of the meanings of our terms
in virtue of being able to speak a language, so there is no
need for empirical investigation since we already know all
that we need to in order to develop a theory of meaning.
In response, I claim that the knowledge that we have in
virtue of being able to speak a language need not be explicit,
conscious knowledge that is either readily accessible or can
be expressed through a bit of reflection. We are able to speak
languages, and thus can be said to have knowledge of the
semantic aspects of these languages. But this fact alone does
not show that we have explicit knowledge of the meanings of
the terms of the languages. It is possible that our knowledge
of meaning is either tacit or implicit.
By saying we have tacit knowledge of p, I mean we may
have explicit representations of p that are accessed by
certain processes, e.g. language comprehension processes, but
which we are not able to access in a way that allows us to
generally report on them. Thus, tacit knowledge is essentially
unconscious (or non-conscious) knowledge. By saying that we
have implicit knowledge of p, I mean that while we do not have
an explicit representation of p, some behaviors or ability can
be successfully explained by postulating such a
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representation. However, in most such cases it is likely that
some other representations and processes actually account for
the ability or behaviors. Thus, implicit knowledge ascription
is essentially an instrumental means of preserving certain
successful knowledge explanations. I shall illustrate each
sort of non-explicit knowledge and suggest how each type might
realize our semantic knowledge. 20
The paradigm case of tacit knowledge is our knowledge of
the syntax of language, as characterized by theories from the
research program stemming founded by Chomsky. Certain
evidence, e.g. speaker's intuitions about the well-formedness
of sentences, suggests that we possess explicit rules which
allow us to produce (and apply) representations of the
underlying (syntactic) structures of sentences. However, we
20. A deep issue here, which I shall not attempt to
address, is the question of when we can definitively assign
implicit knowledge. E.g. any bodily movement could be
explained as though we had representations of the complete
laws of physics at our disposal. Perhaps the whole idea of
implicit knowledge is spurious, and we should simply abandon
such explanations, no matter how successful, in favor of the
alternative explanations. Nevertheless, I present the idea
here because it has seen some popularity in both philosophical
and psychological circles.
Also note that I am not necessarily using the terms
'tacit" and 'implicit' as others use them. There is a
frustrating lack of agreement about how to use these terms,
Just as there is a lack of agreement about what the
alternatives to explicit knowledge are. Nor is there any
agreement about whether, e.g. non-conscious knowledge is
really "knowledge." However one uses these terms, the present
claim is that some cases we ordinary label as "knowledge" (of
p) could turn out to be cases where a representation that p is
present but not consolously accessible or where alternative
representations underlie these ascriptions.
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clearly have no explicit, conscious knowledge of such rules.
Thus, the following method has proven successful for the study
of syntax: native speakers' intuitions concerning the (e.g.
syntactic) well-formedness of sentences are used as data for
formulating theories that are taken to characterize rules that
speakers' tacitly know.
This yields somewhat of an "armchair" enterprise, in that
the relevant data is readily accessible to native speakers.
But this should not be confused with the idea that linguistics
is an autonomous enterprise independent of empirical
psychology. Chomsky's view is that this methodology is no more
than a means of attempting to abstract away from inappropriate
psychological data towards formulating a theory of one aspect
of our psychology, viz. our knowledge of the syntax of
language. Which is to say that the "armchair" methodology is
not to be conceived of as yielding a domain of inquiry that is
in principle distinct from psychology. So we should expect
that a competence theory will be subject to potential
modification when it comes to producing a performance theory
of language use--data and theories of the latter may
potentially cause revisions in the former theory. And, while
there is an initial reliance on speaker's intuitions, we
should on this view of the matter, regard such intu.ticns as
potentially fallible, so that other data may ultimately cause
us to revise or reject these data. Thus, the idea of a (more
or less) armchair methodology in the study of competence does
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not show that such an area of study is something other that a
branch of empirical psychology. 21 And, if there is also a set
of semantic rules which can be studied based largely on native
speakers' intuitions, this does not provide any support for
the claim that semantics is not a part of empirical
psychology.
While there is no corresponding paradigm case for
implicit knowledge, there are plausible examples. For
instance, in knowing how to ride a bike, it is likely that we
do not have any explicit representations of any of the actual
laws of mechanics. But it is plausible to suppose that knowing
how to ride a bike coes involve the possession of appropriate
rules (or heuristics) for coordinating motor behaviors with
sensory input (and intentions). However, we can successfully
explain our ability to balance and steer by postulating
explicit knowledge of certain mechanical principles. Thus, we
might say that our bike-riding know-how involves implicit
knowledge of such principles.
If our semantic knowledge is implicit, then while there
is no explicit representation of the meanings, various
21. Note that a long running debate in the foundations of
linguistics concerns the psychological reality of the grammars
that linguists study. Given the present distinctions, the
central question may be formulated as, is a grammar tacitly
known, or (merely) implicitly known? For two recent views, see
George (1989) and Peacocke (1989). However, neither does
justice to Chomsky's views of competence as idealization, or
to his conceptualist (as opposed to platonist) views about the
nature of language itself.
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representations and processes may function in a way that
produces the appropriate relations between our words and the
world, For instance, it may be the case that the meaning of
'cup' is determined by a number of different representations
and processes, none of which individually means "cup". It may
be that the psychological determination of this meaning is a
result of both (perceptual) prototypes used in recognizing
cups, e.g. a set of features used in detecting cups, and a set
of features (or "markers") in a lexical entry, e.g. +artifact,
+object, etc. In such a case there need be no single,
accessible representation that is the "meaning of 'cup,"' yet
it is (apparently) as though we had such a representation.
Another possibility as far as implicit knowledge of
meaning is concerned is that while individual representations
with appropriate representational contents underlie our
semantic competence, we do not access that representational
content either consciously or unconsciously. E.g., suppose
that knowing that 'dog' means dog is a matter of possessing a
token in mentalese that refers to dogs, but also suppose that
we do not access the representation's semantic features. Those
who do not like the label 'implicit knowledge' here might
prefer to say that while we possess or instantiate meanings--
e.g. just as we instantiate the digestive process--we have no
representation of the meanings. However, this is not to say
that there is no difference between cases we now label as
"knowing the meanings" and cases we label as "not knowing the
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meanings." The suggestion is that in the former cases but not
the latter, the speakers have correctly associated the
relevant terms with appropriate mental representations, even
though it may be inappropriate to describe them as having
access to the content of these representations.
Thus, the fact that we know the meanings of the terms in
the languages we speak does not show that such knowledge can
form the basis of a semantic methodology that does not require
recourse to empirical psychology. Such knowledge may be either
non-conscious or it may not be knowledge at all, so much as a
matter of possessing appropriate representations that are
appropriately associated with terms in the language. In either
case, we require scientific investigation of cognition in
order to reveal and explain our non-explicit knowledge.
B. Specific Conceptions of Semantic Knowledge and Methodology
The general concern of this section is to show that there
is not any non-scientific methodology that is capable of
yielding a semantic theory. I have argued that ordinary
knowledge of language does not, per se, provide the materials
for a non-scientific theory of meaning. What I will now do is
turn to an examination of a number of specific semantic
methodologies and conceptions of meaning that might appear to
provide such a basis. In each case, I will argue that the
source of knowledge of meaning that the methodology relies on
1 3
does not provide a sufficient basis for a non-scientific
semantics.
1. Truth and Reference
Davidson's suggestion, following Quine, that we
substitute the notion of truth for that of meaning in a
recursive semantical theory has been widely adopted in
philosophical circles, thus inviting the conclusion that truth
and reference are the sole or at least the key notions in a
theory of meaning. Perhaps it might be suggested that we iiave
explicit (or potentially explicit) knowledge of the references
of terms or of the truth conditions of sentences, and such
knowledge is sufficient for constructing a semantics, in a
Davidsonian manner, without the need for empirical psychology.
Do all competent speakers have explicit, or potentially
explicit knowledge of reference and truth conditions for the
words and sentences of their languages? Perhaps it might be
suggested that any competent speaker will assent to
disquotational facts such as:
'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white
'Snow' refers to (or, e.g., "stands for") snow
But, as has been noted on several occasions,22 knowledge of
such facts is not appropriately characterized as knowledge of
truth conditions or reference. Thus, suppose that, in the
22. See Higginbotham (1989) who in turn credits Harman
with this insight.
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ordinary sense of the phrase, you do not know the meaning of
'hautbois.' However, if I tell you that 'hautbois' is an
English count noun, then you will known that:
(1) 'hautbois' refers to hautbois.
and:
(2) 'Something is a hautbois' is true iff something is a
hautbois.
However, those who really know the meaning of this term will
know further truths, e.g.:
(3) A hautbois is an oboe.
(4) 'Hautbois' refers to oboes.
Thus, it seems that knowledge of disquotational truths such as
(1) and (2) is not knowledge of reference or truth conditions,
or is at best a very partial knowledge that is insufficient
for attributing semantic competence.
Therefore, if the claim that speakers have potentially
explicit knowledge of reference and truth conditions is to be
sustained, it must be on grounds other than the fact that
speakers assent to disquotational truths. However, when we
look beyond disquotational knowledge, the claim that we have
(potentially) explicit knowledge of the reference and truth
conditions of our languages becomes extremely dubious.
Consider reference. Often, there is much about the
extension of terms that competent speakers do not know. For
instance, most speakers do not know that 'brown' does not
refer to a spectral color. Nor do most know that the primary
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spectral color terms exhibit the following features: There is
a range of the spectrum which each term will be judged to
correctly classify, and this range trails off gradually into
adjacent ones. Within this range there is a narrow band of the
spectrum that will be judged as the "true" variety of this
color (e.g. true red), although the width and location of this
band on the spectrum varies from person to person. Or
consider, is a virus an animal? Surely, most speakers can't
answer this, yet, if they knew the references of the terms
'animal' and 'virus,' we might expect them to be able to
determine if those extensions overlapped or not. Or think of
false beliefs about reference. Many competent speakers think
that a tomato is not a fruit, and some think that whales are
fish. Again, it would seem that if semantic competence
included some sort of explicit knowledge of the reference of
these terms, they would know otherwise.
Further, consider that there are problematic questions
concerning reference that speakers surely cannot answer. E.g.,
what is the reference of 'two' or 'justice?' Do abstract
notions refer to abstract objects, or to mental states or to
collections of concrete objects? Does 'phlogiston' refer to
something which doesn't exist, or does it not refer at all?
Does 'red' refer to a dispositional or intrinsic property of
the world or neither? Does 'I' refer to consciousnesses,
brains, or what? Again, if we had any sort of substantial
(potentially) explicit knowledge of the reference of our
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terms, it would seem that we should have answers for such
questions, but we do not.
Finally, speakers need not be able to give much of a
recipe for specifying the extensions of terms whose meaning
they know. E.g. someone who knows what 'fruit' means might be
able to do nothing but name a number of typical fruits, which
certainly wouldn't show us that (e.g.) tomatoes or kiwis are
in the extension. Yet, if we had explicit knowledge of
reference, we might expect that such a specification would
issue from this knowledge.
The idea that we have (potentially) explicit knowledge of
truth conditions, where truth conditions are viewed as
something other than knowledge of reference, is even more
problematic. Thus, consider "logical form." Surely, we do not
have explicit knowledge of anything like the propositional
calculus or (the linguists') LF--knowledge of these forms is
axplicitly taught in the same way as any other (scientific)
theory, and sometimes competent speakers cannot explicitly
master the appropriate concepts. And, in any case, there are
ongoing disputes about the logical forms of various sentences,
but we should expect such disputes to be readily decidable if
all competent speakers possessed (potentially) explicit
knowledge of logical forms.
It might be suggested (but not by Quine or Davidson!)
that what we do have is knowledge of semantical entailments,
and that this could be used to determine the logical forms of
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statements without recourse to psychology. However, there are
well-known problems with this view. As Quine and others have
pointed out, it's simply not apparent that we can distinguish
conceptual from non-conceptual entailments. Thus, the first
inference seems acceptable and the second unacceptable:
Bob or Sally will win.
Therefore, Bob and Sally will not both win.
John is greedy.
Therefore, if John is a Republican, then he is greedy.
There is no obvious "common sense" way to tell if these
acceptability intuitions are due to the meanings of the terms,
or to pragmatic aspects of language use. In general, it is not
apparent that we have definitive intuitions about a wide
enough class of semantic entailments in order to establish the
logical form of sentences. What we have, at present, are
conflicting, compfting accounts of the logical forms of
natural language expressions and there is no reason to believe
that all such conflicts can be resolved without recourse to
the data and theories of empirical psychology.
Is there some other construal of "truth conditions" which
makes it plausible that we have potentially explicit knowledge
of them? If truth-conditions are understood in some
metaphysical sense, then we face the problem that outside of
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philosophy, few competent speakers have knowledge of such
matters. E.g., few competent speakers have explicit knowledge
of the set-theoretic universe championed by some model
theories.
Thus, it seems that speakers who know the meanings of
terms and sentences do not necessarily have potentially
explicit knowledge of the reference or truth conditions of the
elements of their languages. Therefore, if we are going to buy
into the Davidsonian view that a theory of meaning is to be
developed using the notions of truth and reference, we have no
reason not to maintain that this is an empirical psychological
theory, e.g. one which will characterize speaker's tacit or
implicit knowledge of reference and truth conditions.
2. InterpretatIon
The other cornerstone of the Davidsonian conception of
semantics is the view that a theory of meaning should be a
theory which provides interpretations of speaker's utterances.
Perhaps it might be maintained that a theory of meaning could
be developed that is based solely on ordinary interpretation
practices, without any recourse to scientific psychology.
The independence of an interpretation-based semantics
from a scientific semantics could be understood in any of the
following ways: it could be held that the interpretation
methodology will be complete--that it will explain everything,
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or most everything about meaning that could possibly be
explained. Or it could be
claimed that while the results of interpretation methodology
will not explain all aspects of meaning, the explanations the
methodology does produce will be insulated, as a result of the
methodology, from overthrow by alternative scientific
accounts. That is, it might be maintained that the results of
the investigation are autonomous in relation to scientific
semantics. Or, if not complete or autonomous, it might be
maintained that the goals and results (to date) of
interpretation methodology will at least be required by a
scientific semantics, even if the latter reforms the results
of the former to some extent.
However, as I shall now argue, none of these claims is
plausible. First, consider the view that interpretation
methodology will yield a complete semantic theory. The problem
here is that our ordinary interpretation skills rest on tacit
or implicit knowledge of meaning, knowledge which is
apparently not revealed by ordinary interpretation. To see
this, note that to interpret another's utterance, on the
Davidsonian view, is to relate it to a phrase that the
interpreter understands. Thus, a sample interpretation will
be:
A's utterance, "snow is white", on occasion 0, is
true iff snow is white.
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In order to maintain that interpretation methodology will
provide a complete semantics, the interpretation theorist must
show that we have good reason to think that such native
understanding will be explained by interpretation methodology.
But this is implausible. As we have seen in the preceding
section, it seems that we do not have potentially explicit
knowledge of many facts concerning the reference and truth
conditions which we assign to statements in ordinary
understanding. Nor is it clear how interpretation prac , ice
could uncover such facts. Suppose that some of us possess
mental state M which contributes some semantic feature as part
of understanding--let us suppose it fixes the reference of
some term--although we do not have explicit knowledge of this
fact. Now, what will happen as far as interpretation
methodology is concerned? Either an interpreter will have M as
part of hor non-explicit understanding or she will not.
Suppose she does. Then she will assign the reference that M
fixes to terms of other speaker's utterances, when
interpretation methodology so dictates (or recommends.) But
doing so in no way uncovers, explains or explicates the facts
about what reference M fixes. Nor does any sort of self-
interpretation serve to uncover these facts. Making use of
non-explicit knowledge does not make it explicit. On the other
hand, suppose the interpreter does not possess M, or something
equivalent as far as semantic theory is concerned. Then, as
Davidson has repeatedly emphasized, she will not be able to
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interpret others' terms as having the appropriate reference. 23
So it appears that interpretation m6thodology will not uncover
non-explicitly known semantic facts. Given that there appear
to be some such facts, it seems that interpretation
methodology cannot provide a complete semantic theory.
At this point it might be tempting to argue that
understanding really is nothing more than interpretation, so
interpretation methodology must yield a complete semantics.
Consider, for instance, Davidson's claim that "translation
begins :it home":
The problem of interpretation is domestic as well as
foreign: it surfaces for speakers of the same
language in the form of the question, how can it be
determined that the language is the same? Speakers
of the same language can go on the assumption that
for them the same expressions are to be interpreted
in the same way, but this does not indicate what
justifies the assumption. All understanding of the
speech of another involves radical interpretation. 24
Here I think Davidson is primarily making the point that, if
Quine's mythical radical translator tnought-experiment is
valid, than the results hold not just for actual radical
translation, but for any interpretation of another's speech.
In other words, the available evidence which we use to assign
interpretations to our neighbor's utterances does not overcome
the (apparent) gaps in determinacy that the case of radic 1
translation is supposed to reveal. However, the stated
23. E.g. see Essay 13 in Davidson (1984).
24. Davidson (1984), p. 125.
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conclusion appears to run this point together with another.
I.e. the conclusion might be r-ad as the claim that the
process of language comprehension is the same proc~6z as that
of interpretation. It might be claimed that whenever we
comprehend the meaning of any utterance, we are using the very
same processes, or doiing the very same thing that we are doing
when we attempt to translate a foreign language, or when we
attempt to make rational sense of the behaviors and speech
acts of another. But Davidaon's po.nt in the quoted passage
does not support the identification of meaning-assigning and
intention-assigning processes. The fact that, as Davidson
claims, we are not justified in assigning a given meaning says
nothing about how such tentative meaning assignments were
producei. For instance, we may think of our (largely
subconscious) linguistic processors as making the assumption
of homophony. If we grant that there is an epistemic
equivaler.ce between our case and the mythical radical
translator--we are no more justified in our homophonic
translation that the radical tcanslator is in affirming one of
a variety of -.videntially uquivrlent translation manuals 25--it
does not follow that the processes that produce our homophonic
translations are the samo ones that the imaginary linguist
would 'ise in the process of developing an interpretation.
25. See Quine (1960). Chapter 2.
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Moreover, there is no reason to think that by attempting
the radical interpreter's task we could duplicate the meaning
assignments that we typically produce tacitly or implicitly.
For instance, it could well be that case that our ordinary
knowledge includes knowledge (tacit or implicit) of semantic
universals, and other universals of cognition for that matter,
which enable us to acquire meanings from a relatively small
set of chaices, and which in turn enable the selection of one,
or occasionally several, meaning assignments for a given
utterance. The only way to develop explicit knowledge of such
universals and their role in cognition is to empirically
investigate our cognitive procesoes--that is, in essence, the
point of this essay.
Notice that the position I am advocating leaves it open
that we may really have no good grounds for believing that our
neighbors are speaking the same language that we are. There is
a tendency to assume (as we shall see with Dummett below) that
the:,e must not only be some ultimate evidence concerning which
language, if any, someone is speaking, but that such evidence
must be available to every sp'eaker. However, it seems
perfectly intelligible that the average speaker not have
determinate evidence about what language is being spoken, in
just the same way that he has no justification for ind,. tion
and no explanation of the foundations of his mathematical and
ethical beliefs. Some utterances (e.g. those in "English," for
me) sound intelligible, some do not. Perhaps this means that
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my language faculty "assumes" that it is receiving English
input in much the same way that my visual system "assumes"
that it is receiving input caused by a three-dimensional,
spatial-temporal world of relatively discrete, medium-sized
objects. The fact that I might, in my full cognitive capacity,
resort to interpretation to justify the assumption shows
nothing about how I ordinarily comprehend speech, just as
facts about how philosophers might attempt to defend claims
about the existence of an external world shows nothing about
how our visual systems operates.
Thus, there is no apparent basis for the claim that
interpretation methodology will yield a complete semantics.
What of the claim that it will yield an autonomous portion of
semantics? The problem with this claim is simply that in all
other areas of investigation, we (speaking in the western,
pro-scientific voice) as a rule decide conflicts between
(well-established) scientific theories and ordinary, pre-
scientific knowledge in favor of science, even if we remain
disposed to the ordinary views in daily life. Why should we do
otherwise in the case of semantics?
Suppose, for instance that we discover that some way of
representing the world is innate, and typically underlies
ordinary understanding. E.g. suppose we discover that we have
an innate Euclidean representation of space. The defender of
interpretation autonomy must claim that such a discovery would
be wholly irrelevant to how we interpret other speakers. But
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this is completely implausible. Surely this would have some
impact on how we interpret speakers' spatial terms. E.g., we
might maintain that unless we can uncover evidence that the
speaker has acquired, or had the opportunity (e.g. training)
to acquiLe a deviant set of spatial concepts, a Euclidean
interpretation of his spatial terms is correct--even if this
makes him appear rather irrational. But this is to say that
interpretation methodology, which holds that rationality is to
be maintained in interpretation above all else, would be (at
least slightly) reformed in the case of such a discovery.
Thus, it is readily conceivable that a scientific semantics
could yield results which were in conflict with those of
interpretation methodology. So it does not seem that the
results of interpretation methodology are autonomous,
Could we at least maintain that something like
interpretation theory, i.e. a theory of what interpretation
methodology attempts to explain, must be a required part of
any semantic theory? Again the answer appears negative. This
is simply because, by anyone's estimates, cognition is a
vastly complex place. And interpretations of utterances appear
to rest on various and sundry facts about cognition--as
Davidson and others have pointed out, anything you believe
might be relevant to what interpretation a given utterance is
assigned. The coclusion to draw from this is not that there
is no hope of developing a scientific semantics, but rather
that we should seek a semantic theory which idealizes away
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from as many background facts as possible. I.e. instead of
seeking a performance theory which explains behaviors that are
the complex outcomes of diverse data bases and processes, we
should seek a competence theory (or theories) of the knowledge
that lies behind such behaviors.
This strategy has proven enormously successful for the
syntax of language. Is there any basis for thinking that it
will succeed for semantics as well? The following seems like a
reasonable prima facle case. It appears that when we interpret
speech, we make use of knowledge that is distinct from general
considerations about the speaker's psychology. First, much of
what we read we find meaningful without assigning any
intentions to the author. When we read impersonal accounts,
such as textbooks or journalistic reports, we often do not
conceive of them as authored by anyone--but this does not
affect their meaningfulness for us at all. In the extreme, it
is commonplace nowadays to encounter sentences that have been
produced by computer programs. We find them no less
semantically comprehensible than convursational utterances.
Yet we do not, in most cases, think of them as utterances of
anyone. There is no interpretation of any sort in such cases--
we do not assign propositional attitudes to anyone in deciding
what is meant.
Second, when we do adjust our assignment of the meaning
of another's utterance based on their apparent attitudes and
intentions, we virtually never do so because the utterance
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sounds like bare noise, the way an utterance in a language
that we do not speak often sounds. Rather, we hear the former
sort of utterances as meaningful, and then readjust
accordingly, based on various other sorts of information. For
instance, we may decide that the speaker is joking or engaging
in metaphor or inaccurately expressing her beliefs. Or we may
hear an utterance as ambiguous--we may hear it as having two
or more possible meanings--and attempt to decide on one on the
basis of the context. Such cases strongly suggest that there
are at least two distinct types of processes and outcomes
here. It seems a reasonable hypothesis that semantic
comprehension is a largely non-conscious process that
typically results in the assignment of a semantic
representation to the utterance. On the other hand, there
appears to be a mostly conscious process of attempting to
assign rational intentions to the speaker. The latter appears
to make use of the former's output. And this, in turn,
suggests that we might do well to seek a theory of meaning
that idealizes away from the latter knowledge and procedures
and seeks to isolate the knowledge which appears to underlie
the former procedures. Which is to say that the goal of
providing interpretations of utterances with a theory of
meaning may not be an appropriate one.
I therefore conclude that there is no basis for the view
that an interpretation-based semantics will yield a theory of
meaning that is independent from a scientific semantics.
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3. Con ven tionallas
Recall that the general question is whether or not
semantics is possible without recourse to scientific, and in
particular, psychological theories. I have been contending
that this is a reasonable view only if speakers have largely
explicit knowledge of meaning, and, I claim, we do not.
Perhaps, though, the explicitness of knowledge of meaning may
appear to be already given by the idea that the selection of
meanings is conventional. The reasoning might go roughly as
follows:
To follow a convention, you need to be aware, in a
potentially explicit way, of what the convention is.
For instance, in Lowis's analysis of a convention,
the final condition is that conformity to the
regularity and the wutual interest in this
conformity "are matters of common (or mutual)
knowledge: they are known to everyone" or at least
this is "knowledga that would be available to
overyone if one bothered to think hard enough.',
What is co ventional in (our) languages is the
relationship between words and the world. E.g.,
'red' could stand for any object or property you
like. That it stands for redness is a matter of
conventionally associating this term with the
property, and to do this, in a way that we can agree
on, we need to be (potentially) explicitly aware of
the word-property association, which is to say that
we need (potentially) explicit knowledge of the
meaning.
The fault with this line of argument is that it overlooks
the possibility of suostantial mental states which do the work
as far as the meanings of natural language terms are concerned
26. Lewis (1983), p. 165.
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and are explicitly associated with elements of language, but
are not themselves explicitly known. Assume that the term t is
conventionally associated with property P. One possible way to
achieve this association is the following: If a given speaker
already has mental states that represent P, then all that is
required is that s.Ae asr-ziate t with those mental states.
Specifically, the speaker does not need any explicit knowledge
of the nature of the mental states in question in order to
achieve the association; all that is necessary is knowledge of
when the appropriate utates are occurring, i.e. knowledge that
they are occurring.
Let Ise consider an example. Take any common sense natural
kind concept, such as the concept "cat." None of us know how
it is that we recognize cats, nor do we appear to know much
else about how we represent cats. Nor do all speakers have
much (completely) common knowledge about the property of
"cathood." What we do know is when we have recognized a cat.
This, I suggest, is the sort of knowledge appropriate to
conventionally associating 'cat' with cats. To put it a
slightly different way, we need to know when we are having
"cat ideas" so we can associate them with the term 'cat' (if
conventionalism is correct), but we don't need explicit
knowledge of "cat ideas" themselves to do this. And if "cat
ideas" are meanings, as I have been (more or less) arguing
throughout, this is to say that we do not need explicit
knowledge of meanings in order to achieve conventionalistic
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associations. Thus, it seems that there is actually no basis
in the conventionalistic picture for claiming that we must
have explicit knowledge of meanings, and thus no basis for
thinking that a theory of meaning can be constructed
independent of empirical psychology.
4. Dummett on Meaning
Another influential account of the nature of meaning and
semantics comes from Dummett, who, while not recommending a
specific methodology for semantics, has had a lot to say about
the nature of a theory of meaning itself. We have already
considered one of Dummett's arguments against psychologistic
semantics above. I will examine two other aspects of his views
which bear on the idea of a non-scientific basis for a theory
of meaning, namely, verificationism and his rejection of the
idea of non-conscious knowledge of meaning.
First, consider Dummett's verificationistic view of truth
and truth conditions. He recommends a theory of meaning on
which a statement's meaning is given in terms of conditions of
warranted assertability:
For any [decidable] sentence, we may say that the
speaker's knowledge of the condition for it to be
true consists in his mastery of the procedure for
deciding it, that is, his ability, under suitable
prompting, to carry out the procedure and display,
at the end of it, his recognition that the condition
does or does not, obtain.
27. Dummett (1976), p. 81.
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And this, together with the following:
The sense of a statement is determined by knowing in
what circumstances it is true and in what false."
yields the claim that the meaning of a statement is determined
by knowledge of an effective decision procedure for the
statement's truth. Does this support the claim that empirical
psychology is not required for a theory of meaning? It might
be taken as doing so if we read Dummett as suggesting that the
relevant decision procedures are potentially explicit--that
is, by sufficient self-examination, or "coaxing" of others, it
might be suggested, we can bring the relevant decision
procedures out into the open for examination, so that all
relevant knowledge for a theory of meaning is already
possessed by competent speakers, thus ruling out the need for
recourse to a psychological theory.9
However, the conception of meaning as justification
conditions just sketched suems wildly implausible, if we also
suppose that the relevant decision procedure must be possessed
by competent speakers and available upon a little coaxing or
reflection. First, the sort of justification or assertability
conditions that we know explicitly, or can give upon a little
28. Dummetc (1978), p. 8.
29. I don't really think that this is Dummett's view, I
read him as holding that while the outcome must be explicit,
the process itself need not be explicitly accessible and
frequently isn't, But even this view is dubious in light of
the cases I suggest below--most notably, knowledge of the
meaning of scientific terms.
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reflection, are typically largely or completely irrelevant to
a statement's meaning. Thus, an average person justifies many
of their beliefs by appeal to authority. What do most people
take as warranting assertions such as "2+2=4", "objects are
made of atoms", "there are angels" or "the free market is the
best possible economic system"? Typically, the answer is the
authority of teachers, religious and political leaders. But
clearly this is irrelevant to the statements' meanings.
Further, it often seems that we understand statements
with little if any explicit knowledge of what would justify
them. Thus, consider the case of scientific theories. Often, a
theory is propoaed for which its observable consequences are
not immediately obvious. It takes years in some cases to
deduce specific observational tests which play a significant
or even decisive role in the confirmation or rejection of the
theory. And indeed, it is not clear that there is ever any
effective decision procedure for the confirmation of high-
level scientific theories. However, on the more or less brute
verificationist view we are considering, until such conditions
are determined, scientists cannot be said to know the meaning
of the sentences expressing the theory. But this is completely
implausible. Moreover, from time to time, new empirical tests
are deduced from longatanding theories, e.g. the theory of
general relativity. Again, it seems completely implausible to
claim that such deductions alter the knowledge of meaning of
statements expressing such theories.
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Or consider moral statements. It is extremely dubious to
claim that anyone wiio knows the meaning of "abortion is
permissible" has an explicit decision procedure for
determining the truth of this claim. While virtually all
English speakers appear to know the meaning of this statement,
some are deeply convinced it is true, others are equally
certain that it is false and many others remain uncertain. Nor
is there any agreement on how the issue is to be settled.
Even in what constitutes the paradigm case for Dummett's
verificationism, namely mathematigs, knowledge of meaning as
explicit knowledge of warranted assertability seems deeply
counter-intuitive. Now, it may be (though this seems
questionable) that when most mathematicians comprehend a
mathematical expression, they have a good idea of what would
constitute a prcof or disproof of the statement. But it seems
perfectly obvious that most other people can comprehend
statements in logic or mathematics while having no idea at all
how Co go about proving or disproving them. For instance, one
of the reasons that Gbdel's proof of his first incompleteness
theory is regarded as brilliant is that one can get a very
good idea of the meaning and consequences of the theorem
without ever conceiving of the proof's key notion of Gbdel
numbering. And, indeed, this is one way to teach this and
related theorems--first teach the students the relevant formal
language, then explain the meaning of the theorem and its
significance, and finally teach them the technique of the
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proof. In such cases, it seems clear that people are often in
a state of understanding the relevant theorem without having
the slightest idea how to prove it (or even if it is
provable.)
For such reasons, there seems little point in attempting
to identify meaning with explicit knowledge or potentially
explicit knowledge of conditions of warranted assertability.
Or, at least, it seems clear that the explicit and potentially
explicit knowledge we have of decision procedures for
sentences is not plausibly viewed as the sole material needed
for constructing a theory of meaning (if it is needed at all.)
On the other hand, it appears that we have non-explicit
knowledge of verification conditions, at least for certain
concepts. For instance, the verificationist might claim that
our knowledge of the meanings of 'dog,' 'cup,' 'green' and the
like is to be identified with our means of recognition for
such types or attributes. And here, there is really no reason
to suppose that there is no role for empirical psychology to
play. On the contrary, introspection and reflection tell us
very little about how we recognize dogs, cups, or greenness.
So if the possession of such recognitional abilities is to be
identified as the possession of knowledge of the meanings of
these terms, then the study of this meaning would seem
obvtously linked to the ways we are seeking to study such
abilities, i.e. psychological theories of recognition and
perception. Which is to say that if verificationism is to be
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plausible it is best viewed as a doctrine that is consistent
with a naturalized semantics.
Let us turn to a second aspect of Dummett's views.
Perhaps in virtue of some of the facts such as those just
cited, he does not claim that we have explicit knowledge of
meaning, but rather that suich knowledge Is implicit. Now, if
implicit knowledge is understood as I h.ve characterized it
above, i.e. in terms of the possession (or "instantiation") of
representations and processes which accomplish what explicit
knowledge of meaning would accomplish,30 where such
representations and processes are not consciously accessible,
there is no reason to think that such implicit knowledge would
allow for anything but empirical (psychological) study.
However, an important aspect of Dummett's conception of
implicit knowledge is that its attribution requires an
associatod set of observable behaviors:
An individual cannot communicate what he cannot be
observed to communicate: if one individual
associated with a...symbol or formula some mental
content, where the association did not lie in the
use he made of the symbol or formula, then he could
not convey that content by means of the symbol or
formula, for his audience would be unaware of the
association and would have no means of becoming
aware of it.
...Implicit knowledge cannot, however, be
meaningfully ascribed to someone unless it is
possible to say in what the manifestation of that
knowledge consists: there must be an observable
difference between the behavior or capacities of
30. See Kirkham (190o), pp. 212-3 for this "as if"
interpretation of Dummett's use cf the phrase "implicit
knowledge."
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someone who is said to have that knowledge and
someone who is said to lack it.31
This might be read as supporting the claim that a theory of
meaning can be developed without recourse to empirical
psychology, because all relevant data is already available in
terms of the observable behaviors that form the basis for the
ascription of implicit knowledge of meaning.
But Dummett's claim that content can only be conveyed by
use seems plainly false. If a given speaker non-observably
associates a meaning with a term and her audience likewise
associates the same meaning, then, it would seem, all is well
for effective communication. No explicit "use," or observable
signs of the meaning are required. Suppose, for instance, that
speakers have innate, or typically acquire, a concept C, and
suppose also that this becomes associated with a given term,
t, by a few triggering experiences, some training, or
whatever. And suppose further that no behavioral signs of the
acquired association are ever present. |ow, the individuals in
question may be fortunate, in the sense that they all live in
a community which has such associations, so that when they
speak to one another and use t they interpret it as meaning C
and are correct. So they communicate successfully, despite the
fact that their use of t would fail to indicate the
association of C to anyone who had not had the appropriate
experiences or training. This, I suggest, is not only
31. Dummett (1978), pp. 216-7.
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intelligible, it may correspond approximate to the state we
are all in at least with regard to most of our "common sense"
notions which were attained in early childhood. Thus, it is
false that "an observer cannot communicate what he cannot be
observed to communicate."
What seems to underlie this argument of Dummett's is the
view that to have successful communication one must not only
achieve the desired (i.e. shared) mental states with one's
audience, but one must also be in a position to fully Justify
the attribution of those states. For instance, in discussing
the view that knowledge of meaning might be unconscious, he
writes:
meaning becomes private and hence no longer in
principle communicable. This is to say that faith is
required if we are to believe that we communicate
with one another. The hearer must presuppose that he
is interpreting the speaker as the speaker intends:
but the speaker's intention and the hearer's
interpretation are, at best, constituted by inner
states of each respectively, not accessible to
themselves, let alone to the other.
...If communication is not to rest on faith, it is
necessary to maintain that any misunderstanding can come
to light.3
But why shouldn't communication rest partly on faith, or
rather, on luck? Two speakers communicate when it is their
good fortune to share tacit or implicit knowledge of rules of
language including (e.g.) appropriate syntax-mental state
associations. When the relatively degenerate evidence is
evaluated, we might suppose, the speakers come to believe that
32. Dummett (1989), p. 202.
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they are communicating, although, we might suppnse further,
their evidence is insufficient to rule out various alternative
mental state hypotheses and they have no in-principle means of
ruling out such hypotheses. What is counter-intuitive about
this? Certainly, this is the position most speakers are in
with regard to many claims, e.g. that inductions are
acceptable, or that the causal principles they apply to the
world are correct. The former might be established by some
(relatively) obscure philosophical argument, and the latter by
the theories of physics. But ordinary people, lacking
substantial training in philosophy or physics, can provide no
real justification for such beliefs. But, so what? Skepticism
is always possible. What we want to know is not if they have a
suitable justification, for they certainly do not, but rather
if there is some justification for their beliefs, even if it
is not accessible to them. And the cognitivist who holds that
knowledge of meaning is not explicit may maintain this, in
that there are some observable consequences of a scientific
theory of meaning, or at least of the conjunction of such a
theory with various other psychological theories. But such
consequences need not be immediately obvious or tied to the
isolated ascriptions--they may be linked in quite complicated
ways to the entire cognitive theory and take years to
determine. So they need not be accessible in any reasonable
way at all for the ordinary communicator.
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Note that actual verification of communication is
typically very unprincipled. Outside of academics, we rarely,
if ever, test one another's semantic competencs in any serious
hay. Rather, as long as we are able to interpret one another's
speech in ways that we find rational, we assume that we have
communicated. Perhaps many such assumptions are false. But,
then again, there is nothing bizarre about allowing that
science may show our ordinary beliefs and property
attributions about a given domain to be either largely false
or systematically mistaken.
Of course, there are times when we fail initially to
communicate and are able to achieve successful communication
after some negotiations about meaning, but it is important to
see that this need provide no support for the claim that
knowledge of meaning must be in principle publicly manifest.
One ordinary means of fixing a common meaning is by ostension-
-if I'm not sure that you mean baseball by 'baseball,' I might
show you one and label it. What is going on here might be
described as follows. I am attempting to activate an
appropriate concept in you, the concept BASEBALL, and thus
produce an appropriate association, if I'm lucky. But doing so
does nothing to demonstrate that this concept, this knowledge
of meaning, must itself be behaviorally manifestable. As noted
above in discussion of conventionalism, all that is going on
in such cases is that we can make good guesses about when a
given concept has been activated--we do not have the concept
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(.r mental state) available for conscious, explicit
examination, and we can't provide certain evidence that it has
been activated in others.
Thus, it seems that Dummett's insistence that we must be
able to fully justify our beliefs in the success of ordinary
communication is unfounded, and therefore, there is no basis
for the claim that there must be in principle manifestations
of knowledge of meaning, if these are understood to be
manifestations accessible to ordinary speakers, as opposed to
manifestations accessible to (ideal) theoretical psychology.33
I will close this discussion of Dummett's views by
echoing a point of Chomsky's concerning the issues just
discussed. Dummett is guided by the motto that meaning is use.
But, as Chomsky has pointed out, use is not to be equated with
observable behavior. How one uses a symbol (or an object in
general) is partly a matter of what intentions lie behind
behaviors. To take a simple example, my uttering 'cat' only in
circumstances appropriate for ostending cats (let us
generously imagine that we can define such situations) does
not show that I am using 'cat' to mean cat. I might be using
it to mean pet and doing a poor job of it, or perhaps I
believe that only cats are pets. Without some basis of
determining my intentions and beliefs, observable behavior
33. Nor is it oven evident that ideal science must rest
entirely on observable data. After all, it is generally agreed
that scientific theories are confirmed by factors other than
observable data.
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does not determine use. And, as several decades of criticisms
of logical behaviorism have made clear, it is false that
isolated attitudes must have necessary behavioral
manifestations. (E.g. what are the necessary behavioral
manifestations of believing that baseballs exist?) So the
claim that meaning must be manifest in use need not lead to
any sort of claim about meaning being manifest in observable
behaviors.
Thus, to the extent that Dummett s views concerning
verificationism and meaning as use are plausible, they offer
no basis for the assertion that a theory of meaning is
anything other than an enterprize of scientific psychology.
5. A Priori Knowledge
Perhaps the most obvious competitor to tht view of
naturalized semantics is the view that knowledge of meaning is
a priori, and that such knowledge forms the basis for an a
priori theory of meaning. However, few philosophers have
actually explicitly endorsed either the view that ordinary
knowledge of meaning is a priori, or the claim that a given
semantic methodology is a priori, perhaps owing to the fact
that the notion of the a priori has generally fallen into
disrepute, or at least disuse in recent times. For instance,
there is no well-received view of what a priori knowledge
consists in.
202
One semantic theorist who does explicitly champion an a
priori approach to semantics is Katz. On his account, meanings
are abstract, platonic objects, and we know of them via a
faculty of intuition which enables consciousness experience of
platonic objects (in the form of intuitions.) Specifically,
this faculty is viewed as giving us a priori knowledge of
meaning. And, if we do have a priori knowledge of meaning,
then it would seem that we have a basis for constructing a
semantics independently of empirical psychological inquiry,
i.e. by drawing on this a priori knowledge.3
Now, we should first note that an endorsement of a
platonic ontology does not appear to have any direct bearing
on the question of whether or not the study of meanings is
part of empirical psychology. To see this, consider that if
the general platonistic view is correct, then all properties
are platonic objects. But it does not follow that the study of
such objects is not a matter of empirical science, for after
all, all scientists investigate properties of one sort or
another. Thus, the cognitivist conception of semantics appears
to face no problems from platonism that would not also apply
to the rest of the sciences were this view to turn out to be
correct. It is only the view that there is a faculty of
intuition which gives us a priori knowledge of meanings, along
34. See Katz (1981), especially pp. 202 ff.
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with Katz's proposed methodology, which directly bears on the
issue. 35
As noted, Katz' methodology rests on appeal to native
intuitions about meaning--i.e. the semantic properties of
words and sentences. His main theoretical construct is the
semantic marker, which is a decomposition of a concept into a
structured (tree-like) set of semantic primitives. Using
intuitions about decomposition, semantic markers can be
developed to represent the (apparent) underlying structure of
meanings. This structure is then used to explain other
semantic intuitions concerning synonymy, analyticity, analytic
entailment, ambiguity, subordination, etc. For instance, the
fact that:
Anyone who strolls walks
is (apparently) analytic can be explained via the fact that
the semantic marker for "walks" is part of the semantic marker
for "strolls. "36
35. As far as I can see, one could adopt a naturalized
approach, specifically, a competence theory approach to
semantics, and either maintain a platonistic view of meanings
and language, a conceptualist view such a Chomsky's, or some
other ontological view. This is not to say that there would be
no deciding between these ontological views in the long run.
Indeed, it does seem to me that the conceptualist view--that
languages are, roughly, abstractions and idealizations out of
psychological states--is the most plausible given this
approach. But there is certainly room for debate here.
36. See Katz (1987) for an overview and defense of this
methodology.
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Applying the cases I suggested above, we can ask whether
there are reasons for thinking that this methodology could
yield a complete theory of meaning independent of a scientific
semantics, whether it will produce results whose validity is
autonomous from any results of scientific semantics, and
whether the sort of explanation this methodology seeks to
provide will be required by any theory of meaning. The idea of
a priori knowledge would seem to be relevant only to the claim
of autonomy, but I shall briefly consider the other two as
well.
It is fairly apparent that semantic marker theory will
not produce a complete semantics, since it does not appear to
say anything about reference, but this is something that it is
plausible to think a complete semantics will explain.37 For
instance, suppose that "red" is a primitive element in
"Markerese." This is to say that it does not decompose into
any another sub-meanings. But it seems that one might ask what
the extension of the term 'red' consists in. E.g. Is there a
property, physical or otherwise that all red things share? Is
the extension absolute, or are there fuzzy boundary cases?
Marker theory provides no answers to these type of questions.
Yet, there appear to be answers to these questions
(tentatively, "no", and "fuzzy") and it seems that the pursuit
37. See Lewis (1983) p. 190.
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of these answers might reasonably be regarded as part of the
explanation of the meaning of the term 'red.'
Should the results of Katz' approach be regarded as valid
no matter what any other sort of semantic enterprise, in
particular a scientific semantics, produces? While Katz claims
that the intuitions his approach is based on are a priori
knowledge of meanings, he has not provided a means of
establishing theoretical semantic claims a priori, in the way
proof establishes mathematical or logical theorems. For
instance, suppose that a psychological semantics is developed
which takes the same intuitions that Katz uses as a basis for
producing a theory of competence, and this in turn leads to a
theory of performance. But suppose, as seems likely, that the
competence theory will make some claims that conflict with
marker theory, and that both the competence and performance
theories will cause us to reject or revise some of out
intuitions. In such a case, it seems, we would regard the
scientific semantics as providing us with the real meanings of
our terms, whereas marker theory merely shows us the meanings
(and semantic structure) we pre-theoretically think that our
terms have.
I take it that Katz would dispute the idea of throwing
out or revising any of our native semantic intuitions, on the
grounds that they are the result of a faculty of a priori
intuition. But what is to provide the warrant for the
judgments of a faculty of intuition? Thus, suppose we
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determine that we have a faculty that spits out claims such as
"to kill is to cause to die." How are we to tell that this is
a faculty of a priori intuition? After all, it might also be a
faculty that provides theoretical guesses about the meanings
of our terms. Perhaps feelings of certainty accompany such
claims, but feelings of certainty accompany many other clearly
empirical claims that we make as well, e.g. "the sun rose
yesterday." The only tenable response here would seem to be
that a true faculty of a priori intuition, as compared to an
"imitator," is actually in contact with meanings, e.g.
platonic entities. But we have no idea of what this means, and
we certainly have no idea if we have such a faculty or not.
Thus, it seems that the postulation of a faculty of intuition
is insufficient to explain or justify the a priori status of
the statements which result from its operation. And this is to
say that there is no basis for the claim that such intuitions
are a priori true, and thus no basis for thinking that the
intuitions which marker theory relies on could not be revised
or rejected by a scientific semantics, which is to say that
marker theory is not autonomous in relation to a scientific
semantics.
finally, will the sort of explanations that marker theory
seeks to provide be required by any theory of meaninxg? The
obvious answer is no, since it is conceivable that semantics
could concern only reference and truth conditions. However, it
seems plausible to think that something like marker theory
207
will form the first stage of a competence theory for a
semantics naturalized to cognitive psychology. Katz, in fact,
once conceived of marker theory in this way. He notes that
"very little changes in the formal theory of semanticse" when
the theory is reinterpreted as being a explanation of a priori
knowledge of platonic objects. 8 This also suggests that little
would change for someone who wanted to reinterpret it as a
competence theory, a move which the present considerations
support.
6. Nodel Theory
There is a substantial amount of work devoted to model
theoretic semantics, in the tradition of Carnap, with Montague
Grammar being the most well-developed version of this
approach. The methodology consists in interpreting a fragment
of natural language into an intensional logic, which is in
turn given an interpretation in terms of possible worlds. In
effect, the approach characterizes the meanings of natural
language expressions as consisting of functions from
expressions and contexts to sets of possible worlds.
Does the model-theoretic approach yield a methodology
that promises a semantics that is independent from empirical
psychological investigation? Montague apparently thought so--
the view that is usually attributed to him is that model-
38. Katz (1987), p. 173.
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theoretic semantics is not in any sense a psychological
competence theory, but is rather a branch of mathematics.39
However, this outlook appears to run into problems that have
been noted in our previous considerations. While the study of
intensional logics themselves can reasonably be regarded as a
completely non-psychological, mathematical investigation, when
it comes to interpreting bits of natural language in terms of
logics interpreted in terms of possible worlds, it seems that
we need information about how our mental states relate our
words to the world, and here psychology comes into the
picture. Specifically, the questions of which intensional
logics, if any, correctly interpret natural languages, and
what the correct interpretation of these logics should be are
questions which appear to require recourse to facts about our
knowledge of meaning, including our tacit and implici;'
knowledge of meaning. For instance, we might ask if a first-
order logic will suffice for natural languages, or if a
higher-order logic is required. Or, do the predicates of
natural language terms have exact or "fuzzy" extensions? Does
our use of definite descriptions imply existential commitment,
as Russell thought, or does some other logical form underlie
these expressions?
To answer such questione--which model-theorists typically
claim or presume to have answers to--we must move from the
39. See Thomason (1974), p. 2.
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realm of the purely mathematical and consult our knowledge of
meaning. In providing interpretations of fragments of natural
languages, model-theorists appear to consult native intuitions
about truth-conditions, semantic well-formedness and the
like.# Perhaps it might be claimed that this is different from
a full-blown psychological investigation of our semantic
competence. However, such a position runs afoul of two issues
that have been noted above, the incompleteness of explicit
knowledge of reference and truth conditions, and the non a
priori nature of our intuitions. First, we have seen that it
appears that there are many questions about the truth
conditions of our sentences that cannot be answered with our
(potentially) explicit knowledge of meaning. It would seem
that the only way to answer these questions is to move from
complete reliance on intuitions to additional data and
information that can be derived from a psychological study of
the processes of comprehension, inference, etc. Second, as we
have considered in the previous section, there is no apparent
basis for the claim that our intuitions are immune to
revision. Again, it would seem that the most reasonable
construal of an investigation that relies on these intuitions
is as an empirical theory that might be revised by further
psychological investigation.
40. See Thomason (1974), pp. 51 ff.
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It therefore seems that model-theoretic semantics is best
viewed as one attempt at developing a semantic competence
theory, a theory which might, in principle, be revised or
rejected in due course as part of a naturalized semantics. The
study of intensional logics themselves might best be viewed as
relating to the task of semantics in much the way that
mathematics relates to physics. There is much to be done in
the development of various models in isolation from empirical
inquiry, just as mathematics is typically developed in
isolation from questions in the physical sciences. But, all
the same, it is a confusion to think that semantics itself can
be conducted in insolation from empirical psychology, just as
it is a mistake to think that physics can be conducted without
empirical investigation.
This concludes my examination of several of the more
influential accounts of meaning and methodological approaches
to the study of meaning. In each case, I have argued that the
particular conception does not show us that there is any basis
for a theory of meaning that does not require recourse to
scientific psychology. Rather, it appears that our knowledge
of meaning is largely tacit or implicit, i.e. it is knowledge
that can only be fully revealed and explicated through the
scientific study of cognition.
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PERCEPTUAL NATIVISM, JUSTIFICATION AND NEO-KANTIANISM
At the heart of Kant's account of knowledge and
metaphysics is the claim that the constitution of the mind is
what is responsible for the truth of certain substantial
general principles:
If intuition must conform to the constitution of the
objects, I do not see how we could know anything of
the latter a priorl; but if the object (as object of
the senses) must conform to the constitution of the
faculty of intuition, I have no difficulty in
conceiving such a possibility...we can know a priori
of things only what we ourselves put into them.1
While it is notoriously difficult to determine what exactly
the arguments of the Critique are, the following general line
is at least suggested.2 First, establish that certain
principles are a priori, specifically synthetic a priori.
Next, show (by way of transcendental deduction) that this
implies that the mind's constitution makes such principles
true. Finally, show that the mind's making such principles
true implies an (transcendental) idealist metaphysics, where
the world we perceive and think about is understood as being
mind-dependent.
1. Kant (1787), pp. 22-3.
2. See also Kant (1787) pp. 174-5. Nothing in the main
body of the essay hangs on this being the correct reading of
Kant's deduction.
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In this essay I am going to develop a similar position by
a much more modest route. I will begin with the empirically
supported claim that the mind contributes many abstract
concepts to our perceptions, and argue that this together with
an acceptable account of justification supports both an ideal
verificationist theory of truth and the view that the world is
mind-dependent. I shall then conclude by suggesting that this
may lead us to suppose that there is a substantial synthetic a
priori element to our knowledge, although the exact
specification of this element may be a quite difficult and
elusive matter.
My allusion to Kant should not be misunderstood. I will
not be attempting any sort of a priori investigation of
knowledge or truth--my methodology is consistent with a
conception of naturalized epistemology. Thus, while I shall
use the term "neo-Kantian" for my position, my methodology
will not resemble Kant's a priori investigations at all. Yet,
as I have just noted, the resulting view bears an obvious
resemblance to Kant's position--I believe it is closer to his
view than any other current outlook in the analytic tradition.
But whether or not the result is in any way Kantian, the
investigation and its implications should be of interest to
anyone concerned with the nature of justification, truth and
metaphysics.
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I. Overview
I have said that I will be arguing for a form of
metaphysical anti-realism based on perceptual nativism I
suspect that most readers will find this a very odd line of
investigation to pursue. Why, it might be asked, should
innateness, which is a concern of empirical psychology, have
any bearing on the philosophical issue of metaphysics?3 In
order to put the reader in the proper frame of mind, I will
present an introductory overview of the argument I will
develop.
A standard view of our epistemic and metaphysical
situation is that we are cognitive beings who live in a mind-
independent world and attempt to learn about this world.
Specifically, we tend to conceive of ourselves as getting
samples of certain aspects of the world in the form of
perceptual data, and attempting to produce theories that
correspond to the (unobserved and unobservable) world on the
basis of these samples. But suppose that this perceptual data
depends substantially on innate concepts, and that there is no
guarantee that the content of these concepts corresponds to
the mind-independent world. This is to say that the data may
3. A possible worry that I shall not address at length is
that while nativist doctrines are empirical hypotheses,
metaphysical doctrines are a priori. In keeping with
naturalism, I reject this latter claim, but not on conceptual
or a priori grounds. Instead, I can only hope to demonstrate
the empirical status of metaphysics by showing how empirical
results can have a bearing on metaphysical issues.
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not be accurate at all--it may not constitute a sample of
aspects of the mind-independent world. Then it is no longer
clear that what we are doing when we theorize, and, more
generally, when we seek justification for our beliefs, is
seeking to learn about the mind-independent world. For if
enough of the innate perceptual concepts are inaccurate, then
since justification is dependent on perceptions, increasing
justification will take us no nearer to an accurate depiction
of the mind-independent world, and may even lead us away from
it. Nor is there any means of determining if our concepts
correspond to this mind-independent world, since our methods
of investigation rely on the very concepts in question.
Thus, however appealing the original picture, we find
that substantial perceptual innateness Aequires us to be
completely skeptical about ever having knowledge of the mind-
independent world, and prevents us from being able to view the
search for justification as the search for correspondence to
the mind-independent world. Rather, our justificatory
practices are more accurately viewed as attempts at producing
an epistemically idealized development of our perceptions,
which, given the innate contribution of the mind to
perceptions, can be regarded as a mind-dependent world. This
is the world we are seeking knowledge of, and have reasonable
hope of gaining knowledge of.
It may also be useful to contrast this form of anti-
realism with traditional opposition to realism. The old brand
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of skepticism about the existence of external objects was
based on the ideational view of the mind: having knowledge of
something, e.g. perceiving an external object, was explained
in terms of the mind's entertaining (conscious) ideas. The
primary knowledge relation was understood as a relation
between the self and its conscious states. Knowledge of
external objects was understood as a secondary, mediate
relation, between the mind and the causes of the (perceptual)
ideas. But this view left no grounds for the justification of
the inference from phenomenal to external claims. How could
assertions about the external world be justified on the basis
of the primary knowledge relation? It seemed that we were
epistemically trapped within a veil of ideas, unable to
determine the nature or even the existence of an external
world.4
We no longer are subject to such worries, not beca,.se we
have solved them from within the ideational view, i.e. by
providing justification for claims about the external world on
the basis of our knowledge of the internal world, but rather
because we have abandoned the introspective, ideational view
of the mind. We no longer explain perceptual knowledge--e.g.
the fixation of perceptual belief--in terms of a presentation
of phenomenal ideas to the self. And in giving up this view of
4. See Hume (1739-40), p. 212.
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the mind, we happily leave behind the problem of the veil of
ideas.
However, as I shall argue, the new picture of perception
presents an equally difficult problem for mind-independent
("metaphysical") realism. We find that we are epistemically
trapped, not in a phenomenal world, but in a world of innate
concepts that are contributed to our perceptions by sub-
personal (non-conscious) processes. To support realism, we
must show either that these concepts correspond to the mind-
independent world or that, whether they correspond or not, we
have some hope of moving from perceptions which rely on these
concepts to accurate depictions of the mind-independent world.
But if we cannot do so, then we must admit that the world we
live in, that matters to us, is a mind-dependent world whose
nature is partially dependent on these innate concepts.
II. Perception and Nativisa
My initial task is to show that current psychological
research supports the hypothesis that a large number of
abstract perceptual concepts are innate. First, a general word
about cognitive psychology is in order. Cognitivism, as I
understand it, involves the application of the computer
metaphor to human psychology. The mind/brain is conceived as
an information processor--a set of representational states and
processes that are transformations of representations. Such
states and processes need not be conscious. In fact, many of
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the representations and processes currently postulated are
"sub-personal"--i.e. they are neither conscious nor
potentially conscious and they are typically not states that
would be attributed reflectively or introspectively (i.e. as
part of common sense psychology.)
The innateness of most abstract perceptual concepts,
given the representational approach, is supported by three
considerations. First, there is a substantial amount of
evidence indicating that many abstract perceptual concepts are
present within the first few months of life. I shall summarize
this evidence shortly. The other support for the innateness of
perceptual concepts comes from two versions of the poverty of
the stimulus argument.5 The first concerns the poverty of the
input: Cognitive theories explain perceptions as resulting
from transitions through informational stages from an initial
input to a final perception.6 When we examine the information
5. Chomsky has used this type of argument as a basis for
postulating a substantial innate knowledge of (the formal
structure of) language. See Chomsky (1965), pp. 47 ff. and
Chomsky (1980), pp. 34 ff. As he notes, this general form of
argument dates back to Plato's Meno.
6. It is not clear whether we should think of the final
stage as a perceptual belief, or as something else, e.g. an
input to the belief-system. For one version of the latter
view, see Fodor (1984). Actually, I suspect that the answer is
a complicated combination of these alternatives--something
along the lines that common sense attitude states supervene orn
but do not always type-reduce to the states that perceptual
theory characterizes, so that the outcome of perceptual
processes can sometimes be regarded as a belief and sometimes
not. In any case, all that matters for the present
investigation is that the conceptual content is added to those
representations as a result of innate concepts or processes,
and that this content somehow turns up in perceptual beliefs
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that is regarded as the initial input for percepticv, we find
that it is greatly impoverished relative to the final
perception. Thus, explanations must postulate that content is
added at various transitional stages.7 And since--as we shall
see in consideration of sample theories--there is no basis for
claiming that the input in any way determines or specifies
what content is to be added,6 the only explanation for the
addition of the content is that it, along with the processes
which add it, are innate. Specifically, examination of the
information on the retina, the eardrum, etc. as well as
information about the states of the body and sense organs,
suggests that the innate, added content must include most of
the abstract notions found in perceptions, viz. the notion of
an object, and most "primary" spatio-temporal concepts
including ideas of surfaces, rigidity, forms, depth, motion
and the like.
as a result of these states. With this understood, I shall use
the term 'perception' for states at this final stage.
7. There is a long tradition--dating back at least to
Berkeley in philosophy and Helmholtz in psychology--of
postulating inferences in the production of perceptions. What
I suggest is that the important aspect of multi-stage theories
is that information is added in the process. I suspect that
the question of whether or not this is a genuine case of
inference depends on the complicated issue of whether or not
the stages in such transitions can be regarded as beliefs or
not--see the previous note.
8. Unlike, e.g., most computer programs, whose initial
segments typically dictate how later portions or further input
is to be processed.
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The other form of the poverty of the stimulus argument
for perceptual innateness concerns what might be called
poverty of training: There appears to be extreme uniformity in
how most (physiologically normal) humans perceive the world--
we not only all appear to perceive a world of medium-sized
spatio-temporal objects, but also agroe on most observable
qualities of those objects. However, we do this without a
substantial amount of training, and very non-uniform training,
in perceptual concepts. This strongly suggests that few
(abstract) perceptual concepts are acquired through learning,
which is to say that the rest are innate.
I will now elaborate on each of these points. First,
consider the direct evidence for perceptual innateness.
Studies by Spelke and her colleagues indicate that infants
aged 3-5 months perceive a world of physical objects. Since
infants this young do not have sufficient motor skills to
enable testing of perceptual competencies through performance,
researchers must instead observe infants' reactions to various
stimulus arrays. A methodology frequently utilized involves
the measure of looking time after habituation. Infants are
shown a display until they cease to look at it. Presentations
are repeated until habituation--i.e. until looking time on
each trial declines substantially. Then a new display is
presented. If the looking time is the same as on the last few
trials, then it is assumed that the infant perceives the new
display as being the same as the previous display. And if
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infant spends a significantly longer time looking at the new
display, then it is assumed that the new display is perceived
as different. 9
Using this methodology, 4-month-old infants were
habituated to a display of an object, e.g. a rod, whose top
and bottom was visible, but whose center was occluded by
another object, e.g. a box. The infants were then separately
presented with two other stimuli, one display of the non-
occluded object, and one display of two objects whose
fragments corresponded to the visible portions of the object
in the original display. It was found that if the visible
portions of the occluded objects were moved together, in any
direction, infants looked longer at the fragmented object in
the subsequent display, but not at the whole object,
indicating that they had originally perceived a complete but
only partially visible object. However, when the displays were
completely stationary, preferential looking occurred for both
subsequent displays. This suggests that infants at thie age
represent a world of three-dimensional, mobile objects, and
use motions as cues to determine objects' boundaries and
9. See Spelke (1985), Kellman and Spelke (1983).
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unity, but, unlike adults do not use configurational
properties of objects to determine boundaries and unity.10
Another set of studies provides evidence that four-month-
old infants infer the continued existence of objects when they
are hidden from view. The apparatus involved a block with a
rotating screen in front of it. The screen, initially lying
flat, was rotated upward 90* to hide the block. In one
sequence, the screen was rotated until it reached the place
where the block had been, stopped (as though it had hit the
hidden block) and then was rotated back again revealing the
block once more. In the other sequence, the screen was rotated
180* through the place where the block had been, (thus making
it appear as though the block has vanished) and then back
again re-revealing the block. Measures of looking times
revealed that infants, like adults, showed a (statistically)
significant greater interest in the second, "impossible"
sequence, thus supporting the hypothesis that infants infer
the continued existence of objects that become hidden from
view. 11
In general, these and similar studies reveal that 3 to 5-
month-old infants perceive a world of cohesive, bounded,
10. See Kellman and Spejke (1983). Note that the fact
that infants do not appear to use certain cues or represent
certain properties at a given age does not show that such
methods or representations are not innate. They may be innate
but not programmed to emerge until a later age.
11. Baillargeon, Spelke and Wasserman (1985).
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potentially rovable three-dimensional objects that have
spatio-temporal continuity.12 And these results are
corroborated by abilities that are observed when motor
abilities begin to emerge. When reaching behavior emerges at
4-5 months of age, infants reach out for more distant objects,
showing an apparent representation of depth, and reach ahead
of moving objects (in order to catch them), showing a
perception of the position and motion of objects.13 And when
infants begin to crawl, they are (fortunately!) able to
successfully avoid a visual cliff, as a famous set of studies
showed.14
This evidence strongly suggests that perceptual concepts
sufficient for representing a three-dimensional world of
temporally enduring, movable objects are innate. While only
the detection of concepts at birth can conclusively establish
innateness, three to five months leaves little time for
acquisition. Certainly, no training is received in these
concepts nor has any obvious trial and error learning of these
concepts been observed in the first few months of life.
The second part of the case for perceptual nativism is
the argument that, given the apparent poverty of the
informational input, cognitive approaches to perception
12. See Spelke (1987), (1990) for summary and discussion
of this research.
13. von Hofsten (1986).
14. Gibson and Walk (1960).
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require the postulation of substantial innate contributions of
content to perception. To illustrate, I will briefly examine
Marr's computational explanation of vision.15 His theoretical
framework, which incorporates the results of a number of
researchers, provides an explanation of how the visual system
produces representations of the shape and spatial arrangements
of perceived objects from the retinal image. The theory
postulates various representational stages, each of which is
computed from the information available at the previous stage.
There aLe four primary stages: the first is the image, the
information available immediately from the retina, which
consists of a two dimensional array of intensity values for
each point in the array--a "gray array." The next stage is
the primal sketch, which is a representation of geometrical
information about the image, i.e. where various sorts of
patterns can be found on the image, including zero crossings,
blobs, edge segments, virtual lines and boundaries. The
folloi;ng stage is the 2k dimensional sketch that represents
visible surfaces from a viewer-centered perspective.
Represented features include the local surface orientation,
relative distance, depth and surface orientation
discontinuities of objects. The final stage is the 3
dimensional model representation that consists of
15. Marr (1982). Page numbers in the text in this section
refer to this work.
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hierarchically arranged models of the shapes and spatial
arrangements of objects.
The two points I wish to make about this theory are that
content is added in the transitions between stages and that
this content is innate. Marr does not explicitly endorse
either claim--nor does he discuss either one--but as I shall
now show, the theory readily supports both assertions.
Consider first the point that content is added in
processing. This is most easy to see from the fact that not
all information in a given stage is present in the initial
stages. Marr typically characterizes this content enrichment
in terms of the assumptions the theorist must make about the
physical world:
the [structure of surfaces] is strictly
underdetermined from the information in images
alone, and the secret [for the theorist] of
formulating the process accurately lies in
discovering precisely what additional information
can safely be assumed about the world that provides
powerful enough constrains for the process to
run.(p. 266)
These assumptions include the rigidity of surfaces, spatial
coincidence, and that there is a uniform light source. But,
the later stages havo content that represents the world--as
Marr puts it:
... the true heart of visual perception is the
inference from the structure of an image about the
structure of the real world outside. The theory of
vision is exactly the theory of how to do this, and
its central concern is with the physical constraints
and assumptions that make this inference possible.
(P. 68)
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So the theorists' assumptions become equivalent to content
being added in processing--in effect the visual system gets
characterized as making those assumptions.1 6 However, we should
probably not think of such assumptions as being explicitly
represented in visual processes--the content is typically
added in virtue of certain input as being treated as an
indication of certain external states.
The second point I wish to make here is that the added
content is not present because it is determined or dictated by
experience/prior input. Rather, such content is added as a
result of innate features of the perceptual system. Put
another way, we don't choose to perceive things the way we do,
we're designed to see them that way. The visual system does
not produce visual descriptions of objects from the gray array
input because it, or some other system, has determined that
there really are objects. It's just built to produce these
sorts of descriptions. While Marr's theory does not require
that the computations in question are innate, it is difficult
to see how we could acquire processes and computations of such
unbelievable complexity, particularly given that we have
absolutely no explicit training in such matters.
16. Compare Chomsky, op. cit., who equates the theorist's
assumptions about a universal grammar with the innate
knowledge of language that the child possesses.
As noted above, I do not mean to apply that the
perceptual system's "assumptions" are to be equated with
ordinary propositional attitudes, particularly not in terms of
functional role.
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To illustrate these two points, consider the first stage
of stereopsis. Stereopsis is the process of comparing the
information from images from the two eyes to determine the
disparity between the two representations of an object, in
order to determine, among other things, the depth of the
objects in the visual field. The initial task is to measure
disparity by selecting a particular location on one image,
comparing it with the same location on the other image, and
measure the discrepancy. The problem, however, is to determine
what is to count as the same location on each image--i.e.
which portions of a given image pairs can reasonably be
assumed to represent the same object? Marr cites two apparent
facts ("ptAysical constraints") about the visual world: "1) a
given point on a surface has a unique position in space at any
one time and 2) matter is cohesive, it is separated into
objects, and the surfaces of objects are generally smooth in
the sense that the surface variations...are small compared
with the overall distance from the viewer."(p. 113) This leads
to three specific rules that it is assumed the stereopsis
module follows in determining the areas to compare for
disparity: i) black dots can only match black dots, since it
is assumed that there can be matches just in case the images
have arisen from the same physical situation.
ii) Almost always, a black dot from one image can match no
more than one black dot from the other image, by physical
constraint (1) and iii) the disparity of the matches varies
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smoothly almost everywhere over the image, by physical
constraint (2).
It is assumed that if a correspondence is established
between the two images in accord with these rules, then that
correspondence is "physically correct" (114-5), i.e. that it
yields a (partially) veridical representation of the
environment. In effect, this is to say that this process
assumes that there are external (at a spatial distance)
stimuli of shapes and surfaces giving rise to the information
in the two images. It is clear that the input, the images
themselves (and information about eye movements) hardly
dictate the specific matching assumptions. And it is difficult
to imagine acquiring such rules and assumptions on a trial and
error basis--if this were required, then surely many, perhaps
the majority of us would never learn to see.17 Thus, it appears
that if the computational theory of vision is correct, then
substantial innate content is added in the course of the
derivation of perceptions from retinal inputs.
The third consideration that supports the innateness of
many perceptual conceptions, and thus, as we have just seen,
of the addition of innate content to perception, given the
cognitive approach, is simply that there is virtually no
evidence that any of a basic core abstract perceptual concepts
17. Stereopsis appears to emerge in approximately the
fourth month of life. Held (1985) suggests that this is the
result of cortical maturation.
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are learned. Specifically, there is a basic set of perceptual
notions that characterize the features of objects existing in
space and time, e.g. surface, boundary, shape concepts,
texture concepts, solidity, etc.--concepts representing what
were traditionally known as the "primary qualities," and
perhaps the "secondary qualities" as well.1 These notions
appear to be uniformly present in humans. That is, we do not
encounter groups of people that, e.g., fail to conceive of
spatially bounded objects, or fail to conceive of the texture
of surfaces, or fail to conceive of surfaces. Moreover, there
is no evidence to indicate that any of these notions are
acquired through trial and error training. Nor is there any
uniform instruction throughout the world's diverse social
environments that could account for this uniform presence. But
this is to say that there is virtually no positive case for
the view that some or all of these concepts are acquired.19
I do not mean to enter into the much discussed issue from
the philosophy of science of the theory-ladenness of
observation concepts. Critics of positivist views of science
have argued that what someone observes is relative to what
18. I leave it as an open question as to what exactly
this set includes.
19. Note that even non-uniform perceptual competence
which mirrors non-uniform environments and training is not
decisive evidence for acquisition--as Fodor (1981) points out,
the relevant concepts could be innate but dormant, waiting to
be triggered in appropriate environments.
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theoretical concepts that individual has. 20 For instance,
scientists observe electro-magnetic fields while Eskimos
observe dozens of varieties of snow, but most of us observe
neither. While such critics may have shown that there is no
theory-neutral notion of observation that will provide an
epistemological foundation for the testing of theories, they
have not provided any evidence against the view that theory-
laden observation concepts are ways of re-categorizing or re-
conceiving states that are produced using some basic set of
(mostly innate) perceptual concepts.2'
I conclude that the claim that a substantial amount of
innate content is added in perception is quite plausible. This
is not, however, to say that it must be true. The theories
just presented are just in their infancy, and there is
certainly no definitive data concerning the absence of
acquisition for perceptual processes (although the lack of
training in observation should be fairly evident from ordinary
social facts.) Yet, it is certainly a tenable enough account
to warrant an investigation of the consequences of this view
for philosophical doctrines--as I proceed to do.
20. See Hanson (1961), Kuhn (1962/70).
21. See Fodor (1983) for some development and defense of
this point.
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III. Realise and Anti-Realism
I will now argue that the existence of a substantial
innate contribution to perception can be shown to support a
neo-kantian/anti-realist view of knowledge and the world
against a metaphysical realist view. In this section I will
present these two opposing views and make some introductory
remarks about them.
First a caveat. I am not claiming that the position that
I will present captures all of the important issues in the
various realist/anti-realist disputes. However, I do claim to
have found a substantial and important point of contention,
one that I believe most of those who have labeled themselves
realists would not want to accept. And, moreover, I claim that
this issue should be a main consideration when framing a
metaphysical and epistemological point of view.
My formulation of the issues owes much to Putnam's recent
work,2 although as I shall discuss below, I believe that I am
defending a position that differs substantially from his.
Throughout I will also attempt to provide some indication of
how the position I favor contrasts with those of other notable
anti-realists.
Both positions that I will describe maintain that there
is world that exists that is mind-independent and evidence-
independent. That is, there is an existence that has the
22. See Putnam (1978), (1980) and (1983).
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attributes (or whatever) it has independently of our
representations or knowledge of it. The dispute arises over
the role this world plays in our knowledge. The position that
I shall call metaphysical realism maintains that what we are
seeking when we are seeking knowledge (whether we actually
ever get it or not, by perception or science or any other
means) is a correct representation of this completely mind-
independent existence. Assuming that a "correct
representation" involves, among other things, truth, then
metaphysical realism will amount to a correspondence theory of
truth:23
Correspondence theory of truth: A belief or
proposition (etc.) is true if the state of the mind-
independent world it represents actually obtains,
whether or not anyone could ever have knowledge of
its obtaining.
Note that this might be understood as the conjunction of two
doctrines--what Putnam has called the non-epistemic theory of
truth, namely that a statement's truth is independent of any
knowledge that we might have, and second that the world we
represent is the mind-independent world. However, I shall
consider these two doctrines together until it is time to
reject them, since together they form a tenable position about
truth and reality. I.e. maintaining the non-epistemic view but
23. When I speak here and throughout of "theories of
truth" I mean only partial theories of troth--thus, the
theories listed here should be understood as supplementing
whatever else will be required of a theory of truth, e.g. the
satisfaction of certain formal constraints.
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granting mind-dependence is highly problematic, since it would
seem that correspondence to a mind-dependent world must in
some sense be epistemic. And, as I shall show below, the
conjunction of a verificationist view of truth and the claim
of mind-independent correspondence is inconsistent given
perceptual nativism, for then there is no guarantee that true-
-i.e. ideally verified--statements will correspond.
Now, the metaphysical realist need not claim that all
predicates represent a mind-independent reality. For instance,
it could be maintained that while predicates that reflect
ordinary perceptual concepts have mind-dependent truth-
conditions, predicates of (true) science have mind-independent
truth-conditions. Nonetheless, I assume that on the
metaphysical realist view, at the very least some key, core
set of predicates is thought to represent a mind-independent
reality.
What I shall call the anti-realist, or neo-kantian view
also grants the existence of a mind-independent world, but
denies that we can have any knowledge of it, beyond
acknowledging its existence. Instead, it is claimed that the
objects and properties that we perceive and theorize about
make up a mind-dependent world, one whose ultimate nature is
in part determined by (some) of the ways in which we represent
the world.
The neo-kantian view can be understood as a combination
of two general types of claims, first that we make a
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substantial contribution to our knowledge of the world, and
second that truth or rightness is relative to our knowledge,
conceptual schemes or theories. The second thus amounts to an
ideal verificationist, or Peircean theory of truth:
Ideal verificatlonist theory of truth: A belief or
proposition (etc.) is true if would be accepted
under ideal evidential conditions.L
24. A verificationist theory of truth need not, in and of
itself, lead to neo-kantianism. One could maintain
verificationism while denying that we make any substantial
contribution to our representations of the world. For
instance, I believe this is the position of Dummett.
Also note that it is possible to hold an non-ideal
verificationist theory of truth--both traditional positivists
and, again, Dummett appear to present such a view. While I
think that this account is shown to be wildly implausible when
we consider our actual practices of Justification, I will not
argue this point here, so those that accept a non-ideal
verificationist view of truth may read my argument as
supporting a slightly different form of neo-kantianism from
the one I describe below.
Finally, it is also possible to develop an ideal
verificationist view in several different ways. One
development equates truth with those beliefs that we humans
would be left with after actually contemplating all evidence
that we are able to get our hands on. On the other hand, truth
might be identified with those beliefs that an ideal reasoner
would achieve after considering all evidence that is
potentially available to beings in our world with our sense
faculties. This latter view treats truth as a sort of
normative ideal, something that we might never quite reach
because of inherent irrationality, failure to pay attention or
seek data diligently, lack of storage capacity, or failure to
develop or contemplate the most explanatory theories. Such a
view, while still verificationist, allows for something like
what the realist wants to maintain--i.e. that there is no
guarantee that inquiry must ultimately lead to the truth. I
suspect that the former view is closer to the way we think of
truth in everyday contexts, while the latter is more fitting
for our conception of scientific truth. In any case, the
discussion will be neutral between these (or any other)
further developments of the ideal verification theory.
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The general moral of these theses is that metaphysics must be
replaced by epistemology. While we can conceive of the world's
existing independently of our particular representations, we
also, in acknowledging that we make a contribution to our
representations, limit our ability to make claims about the
contribution-independent nature of the world. If the
contribution is substantial enough, the questions "what exists
mind-independently and what is it like?" cannot be answered.
Instead, the neo-kantian urges the relativization of
metaphysical claims to our representations, so that
metaphysical inquiries become inquiries about our best-
justified theories. That is, the question "what really
exists?" can only be answered by presenting the best (e.g.
scientific) theory we have to date. Thus, the neo-kantian
holds both (1) a very pragmatic, "internal" realism, which is
mind-dependent in that it includes an explicit relativization
to the contribution we make to our knowledge and also
(2) acknowledges the intelligibility of contribution-
independent existence but (3) maintains a complete and total
skepticism about the possibility of knowledge about this
existence, i.e. complete skepticism about ever knowing that we
are right or wrong in any claims we might make about the
contribution-independent world.
The nativist view of perception does not in and of itself
conflict with the supposed metaphysical reality of represented
objects and properties. However, it does naturally lend itself
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to the neo-kantian view, since it provides an obvious basis
for one of the two crucial neo-kantian claims, namely that we
make a substantial contribution to our representations of the
world, a contribution that is not determined by the states of
the world that cause those representations.25 The crucial
question, however, is whether or not this innate, added
content can (potentially) be shown to correspond to a mind-
independent world. If so, then the existence of this
contribution to our knowledge is consistent with metaphysical
realism. If not, then we should instead adopt the neo-kantian
view. What I will argue in the next section is that when we
consider any of the standard accounts of justification, we
find that a substantial innate contribution cannot be shown to
correspond to a mind-independent reality. Put another way,
what I will be arguing is that the conjunctior of the
existence of this innate contribution and any standard theory
of justification is not compatible with metaphysical realism--
the correspondence theory of truth--but is compatible with an
ideal verificationist theory of truth. Thus, I will argue that
perceptual innc.teness supports the neo-kantian view.
25. The neo-kantian positional might eventually be
substantially bolstered by the additional empirical finding
that our theory-forming and belief-fixating processes also
involve a substantial innate conceptual contribution. However,
I do not think that there is much evidence at present about
what such processes are like, let alone about whether they
depend on substantial innate conceptual contributions or not.
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A. Putaam's Internal Realisa
Before turning to this line of argument, it will be
useful to briefly consider Putnam's view of these matters. He
sees the realist/anti-realist dispute as turning solely on the
correspondence vs. verificationist theories of truth. Thus, he
would deny that it is reasonable to conceive of a mind-
independent reality. And he also gives no indication of
thinking that there is any sort of contribution to our
knowledge on the part of the mind. On the other hand, he has
provided no notable criticisms of either of these additional
doctrines.26
If Putnam's arguments for an ideal-verificationist theory
of truth are successful, then the anti-realist position I have
presented above could rest on the plausibility of perceptual
nativism together with his conclusion. I.e. given perceptual
innateness, it is reasonable to conceive of a world that is
26. See, for instance, Putnam (1989), pp. 221-2 where he
accuses Quine of suggesting the idea of a noumenal reality,
and rejects it because this eort of Kantianism and
metaphysical realism are "made for each other." However, it is
ono thing to suppose that a mind-independent reality exists,
as the basis for our perceptions for instance, and quite
another to suppose that it is this mind-independent world that
we represent or know. If Putnam has, as he claims, shown
metaphysical realism to be incoherent, it does not follow that
the idea of a mind-independent world is incoherent in and of
itself.
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independent of these concepts--knowledge independent. But
given truth as ideal verification, we also see that this
cannot be the world we represent and claim to sometimes
possess knowledge of.2 However, as I shall now discuss,
Putnam's main argument appears to rest on a questionable
assumption, one that I shall attempt to avoid in my subsequent
defense of an ideal-verificationist theory of truth.
The argument is designed to show that the metaphysical
realist idea that truth involves correspondence to a theory-
independent reality is, at bottom, incoherent. We are asked to
consider an ideally verified theory of the world, one which
satisfies all operational constraints on evidence and
verification conditions. The metaphysical realist, argues
Putnam, must claim that in such a situation, there is still a
question of whether or not the theory corresponds to reality.
And this is precisely what distinguishes the realist from the
anti-realist, who identifies truth with ideal confirmation.
However, Putnam argues, there is no way for the realist to
make this view of correspondence intelligible:
I assume that THE WORLD has (or can be broken into)
infinitely many pieces...Pick a model M of the same
cardinality as THE WORLD. Map the individuals of M
one-to-one into pieces of THE WORLD, and use the
mapping to define relations of M directly in THE
WORLD. The result is a satisfaction relation SAT--a
'corresponder.ce' between the terms of (the language]
and set of pieces of THE WORLD--such that the theory
Tlcomes c"ut true--true of THE voRLD--provided we justinterpret 'true' as TRUE(BAT). So what becomes of the
27. I shall enlarge on this claim when I examine each of
the standard accounts of justification.
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claim that even the ideal theory T1 might really be
false?2
The idea is that such an interpretation meets all operational
and theoretical demands on the notion of reference. So, claims
Putnam, there is no sense to the view that something more
could be required for a theory to be true. Hence, we are left
with a(n ideal) verificationist theory of truth.
However, it looks as though the metaphysical realist who
is not also a semantic verificationist will be unmoved by this
line of argument. Why, we might ask, should the distinction
between the meaning of 'true' and 'ideally verified' be
accessible to us, even ultimately? As Fodor points out, in a
slightly different context, we are more than willing to admit
that other creatures with concepts, e.g. all other species
with concepts, cannot have access to the one true theory 29 (if
there is such a thing), which is to say that they cannot have
complete knowledge of what their concepts concern, so why
should we be exempt from such worries? That is, it does seem
intelligible to maintain that there is a difference between
"ideal-by-our-lights" and "true," even if we shall never be
able to gain knowledge of what this difference consists in.
If we grant an ideal verificationistic semantic
principle, to the effect that:
28. Putnam (1978), p. 126.
29. Fodor (1983), pp. 125-6.
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if two terms differ in meaning then their
applications must be distinguishable under ideal
evidential conditions.
then the argument is shown to be sound, by applying this
principle to 'true' and 'ideally verified.' But it is not
obvious why the metaphysical realist, or anyone for that
matter, should be required to accept this principle. In fact,
this would seem to be precisely what the externalist movement
in semantics--which is based in part on Putnam's own views30--
has rejected. If, for instance, you grant that "meaning ain't
in the head," it's difficult to see why ideal evidential
conditions must reveal differences in meaning.
Thus, Putnam's argument appears to fail.S1 One could
attempt to support it by defending a verificationist theory of
meaning, but it is extremely difficult to find convincing, let
alone decisive reasons in favor of this doctrine. What I shall
now argue is that various considerations concerning
justification, when joined with the hypothesis of perceptual
nativism that we have examined in the previous section, lead
us to the ideal verificationist theory of truth--a line of
30. E.g. Putnam (1975).
31. Putnam offers what may be an independent argument (or
arguments) against a non-epistemic theory of truth that is
based on the indeterminacy of reference--see Putnam (1980),
chapter 2. See also chapter 1 and "Models and Reality" in
Putnam (1983). However, this line seems to assume a
verificationist semantics too. If not, or if semantic
verificationism is ultimately tenable, then the case for an
ideal verificationist theory of truth is over-determined.
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argument th&t avoids appeal to a verificationist view of
meaning.
IV. Justification
In this section I will argue that the doctrine of a
substantial innate contribution to perception, when conjoined
with any of the standard accounts of justification, implies
that we should reject the correspondence theory of truth in
favor of the ideal verificationist theory of truth. This will
complete my argument for neo-kantianism.
A theory of justification is an account of how it is we
go about justifying our beliefs--i.e. deciding what is true.
Such an account is traditionally thought of as not just a
descriptive view, but as a normative set of rules which
legislate justification.32 In what follows, I will consider in
turn foundationalist, coherentist and reliabilist/externalist
accounts of justification, arguing that in each case, if the
account of justification is to be maintained in the face of
percept.A•l nativism, we must abandon a correspondence theory
of truth in favor of an ideal-verificationist theory.
32. Two things that will not matter to the argument below
are 1) whether or not a theory of justification is normative
or simply descriptive and 2) whether or not a theory of
justification will be a substantial criterion for knowledge,
e.g. if knowledge is justified true belief. I take it that
even if one's account of knowledge does not mention
justification at all, we still need a theory of justification,
either to describe how we seek truth or to tell how to do so.
244
While the arguments for each case will vary a bit, it is
worth noting the general strategy. I will claim that
(increasing) justification must yield or approach truth.3
Further, an account of justification must rely on some large
subset of perceptions to link our beliefs to the world. Now,
once we acknowledge a substantial innate conceptual
contribution to perceptions, and if we take truth to be a
correspondence to a mind-independent world, then we face the
possibility that the innate concepts do not correspond at all.
Given this, an examination of the role of perceptions in the
theory of justification reveals that justification may not
yield or even approach truth. Assuming that some account of
justification must be correct, the culprit must be the theory
of truth. Since on an ideal verificationist theory of truth,
we do not face the same possibility of error for our innate
perceptual concepts, a theory of justification together with
33. This is not to insist that our beliefs must be
justified--i.e. that we must be able to reach the truth.
Justification could turn out to be something that we can't
actually get for our beliefs. To put the issue a slightly
different way, I am not insisting that a theory of
justification must defeat the skeptic, although this is
something that those offering theories of justification
usually are seeking. Thus, it is a mistake to think that in
response to my position someone could maintain metaphysical
realism while simply allowing that skepticism can never be
ruled out. The available move in this regard is to reject the
possibility of an account of justification, but this is to
embrace complete skepticism about our ordinary justificatory
practices, a highly implausible view. I shall discuss this
option below, after having considered each of the candidate
views of justification.
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(substantial) perceptual nativism supports a verificationist
rather than a correspondence theory of truth.
A. Foundationalisa
A foundationalist account of justification seeks to
identify a set of core beliefs--the basic beliefs--which can
be regarded as self-justifying." Other beliefs are justified
if they are related appropriately to the basic beliefs, e.g.
by deduction, induction, etc. Relative to our purposes, two
important questions face the foundationalist. One is what
degree of self-justification the basic beliefs receive. We can
simply note two apparent extremes. On the one hand, it might
be claimed that the basic beliefs must carry with them a
guarantee of their truth. On the other hand, such beliefs
might simply be viewed as carrying some substantial initial
likelihood of truth--at least more so than most other beliefs.
The other important question concerns what type of beliefs,
psychologically speaking, are to be in the set of basic
beliefs. Assuming that we must at some point have
justification for beliefs about the world, and since we learn
about the world through perception, there are two prominent
classes that would appear to be candidates for basic beliefs
about the world, namely ordinary perceptual beliefs and
34. For a recent version of a foundationalist view of
knowledge, and thus Justification, since knowledge is viewed
as justified true belief, see Chisholm (1980).
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phenomenal beliefs. I will begin by evaluating the position of
the foundationalist who holds that the basic beliefs include
some (large) subset of ordinary perceptual beliefs. Later, I
shall consider the possibility of a foundationalism based on
phenomenal beliefs.
Now, the obvious difficulty that arises when we conjoin
the foundationalism just characterized with the correspondence
theory of truth and the fact that there is a substantial
innate contribution to our perceptions is that it seems
possible that the innate concepts added in perception fail to
correspond to the actual (mind-independent) state of the
world. Suppose that C is some concept that is added in
perception, in that some informational transitions in the
course of perception are such that the presence of certain
information at earlier stages leads to representations which
represent the world as being Cish. Why should we think that
there actually is a property or attribute in the (mind-
independent) world that corresponds to C? That is, is seems
perfectly possible--logically and physically--that any of the
innate concepts applied in perception could turn out not to
correspond to actual properties of the world. For instance, we
could imagine building (assuming the cognitive approach to
psychology is basically correct) an information processing
device that added incorrect concepts in the course of
producing representations from impoverished initial input. And
we sometimes consciously mis-apply concepts to the world--e.g.
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we believe in unicorns or phlogiston. So It would seem that it
is possible that we have been built with inaccurate concepts
too.
And what if they fail to correspond? It seems, then, that
the foundationalist is in trouble, for the correspondence
theory of truth suggests that then perceptual beliefs
involving these concepts are false, as they do not correspond
to any external properties, any more than do beliefs about the
existence of unicorns or phlogiston. Thus, it seems that the
possibility of non-correspondence undermines claims about
guaranteed truth for perceptual beliefs. And it also appears
to undermine a weaker foundationalist view, which holds only
that such beliefs are very likely to be true. For, while there
may be arguments for the likely truth of perceptual beliefs,
such arguments would not appear to satisfy the
foundationalist's concept of self-justification. For instance,
it might be suggested that the best hypothesis based on our
best confirmed theories is that most such concepts correspond,
or that evolutionary theory shows us that it is likely that
most of our perceptual concepts correspond to external
properties, since otherwise nature would not have selected for
perceptual mechanisms that make use of such concepts. But such
explanations, if successful,3 would be of no help to the
foundationalist. The perceptual foundation is supposed to
35. I will return to these suggestions in relation to a
coherence theory of justification in the next section.
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provide justification, not receive it from the statements
which it supposed to (potentially) justify. And, it should be
apparent that such theories or explanations would not
themselves be self-justified beliefs, but would instead depend
on a host of other beliefs, including countless perceptual
beliefs. So rather than serving as the foundation of all
knowledge, perceptual beliefs with substantial innate content
would seem to themselves be in need of justification, which is
to say that the beliefs which the foundations claimed were
self-justifying, on whatever grounds, are not self-justifying.
So the suggested version of foundationalism, when conjoined
with a correspondence theory of truth, will fail in the face
of nativism.
On the other hand, if truth is ideal justification, then
perceptual nativism need not constitute a threat to the claim
that some subset of perceptual beliefs are self-justifying.
For these beliefs will either be fully justified, and thus
true, or, more plausibly, very likely to be true, i.e. very
likely to remain acceptable as more evidence comes in,'with
exceptions in cases of the detection of error and the
development of scientific theories that undermine the beliefs.
The foundationalist who wants to cling to metaphysical
realism might seek to identify something other than ordinary
perceptual beliefs as those that form the basic self-
justifying set. The only obvious candidate is the set of
phenomenal beliefs. But this is not much of an option.
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Phenomenaliit foundationalism is the traditional cornerstone
of idealist or skeptical views, which reject belief in a mind-
independent world. Thus, there is no apparent means of
justifying beliefs about the non-phenomenal world on the basis
of phenomenal beliefs. Moreover, perceptual nativism would
seem to undermine any alleged connection between phenomenal
appearances and external attributes. E.g., the fact that it
appears that there is an object in front of me, and no other
appearance conflicts with this does not support the claim that
there really is a mind-independent object there unless the
(apparently) innate notion of an object actually corresponds
to mind-independent objects. Since it appears that phenomenal
beliefs could not themselves justify a belief in this
correspondence, a phenomenalistic foundationalism will not
support metaphysical realism.
Nor is a phenomenalistic foundationalism particularly
plausible in and of itself. A theory of justification, it
would seem, must at least provide some hope of showing how to
justify many of those beliefs that we think are justified,
pre-theor ,.ically. For instance, it is not clear how we could
function on a daily basis if we did not actually accept
countless beliefs about the external environment. A
foundationa] theory of empirical knowledge based solely on
phenomenal states would not appear to justify sufficient
beliefs to enable this. I.e. attempts to reduce either
ordinary perceptual beliefs or scientific beliefs to
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phenomenal beliefs have ended in failure. Nor is it
particularly plausible to think that ordinary and scientific
non-phenomenal beliefs can be induced or otherwise
epistemically based on phenomenal beliefs. Thus, we rarely
cite phenomenal beliefs in ordinary contexts of justification,
or in scientific methodology. Therefore, it would seem that a
tenable foundationalism must identify at least some non-
phenomenal perceptual beliefs as basic, and if there is a
substantial innate conceptual contribution to perceptual
beliefs, then as we have seen, these views are incompatible
with the correspondence theory of truth, but are highly
compatible with the ideal verification theory.
B. Cobheren tism
The basic idea of the coherentist view is to make
justification system-wide instead of basing it on a privileged
set of statements. Thus, the coherentist can allow that
everything is potentially up for revision, while at the same
time maintaining that each element in the system supports and
is supported by the other elements, in that they exhibit a
mutual coherence. While there have been several extensive
developments of the general form of a coherentist picture as a
replacement for foundationalism, e.g. by Lehrer and by
BonJourN, it has been somewhat difficult to develop a precise
36. Lehrer (1974), BonJour (1985).
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specification of what coherence is. E.g. it is certainly at
least consistency, but probably a lot more as well. But for
our purposes, the intuitive idea of coherence should suffice.
Initially, the combination of a coherence theory of
justification, a correspondence theory of truth and the
doctrine of perceptual nativism appears quite compatible.
Indeed, the coherence view may seem just the solution for the
troubles which plague the foundationalist, since the
coherentist does not grant a self-Justifying status to
perceptual beliefs, so the fact that our innate perceptual
concepts may fail to correspond to external attributes need
not be bothersome. The metaphysical realist may maintain that
truth is external correspondence, and that perceptions are
justified if they cohere with the rest of our beliefs,
particularly our scientific beliefs. So everything appears in
order, prima facie.
The difficultly is that the coherentist must ultimately
accept something similar to the foundationalist view of
perception. The reason is that there are various different
conceivable sets of statements that exhibit a high degree of
coherence. Think of sets of statements describing various
possible worlds, for instance, especially if you think that
there are possible worlds where our science isn't true. What
is to keep someone from adopting any such set he pleases, and
receiving the stamp of approval, in terms of justification,
from the coherentist? Take for instance, the flat-earth
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theory. It is consistent with some evidence, and there appear
to be cosmological hypotheses that cohere with it. Suppose
that someone were to adopt this view, or any other "crazy" yet
coherent set of statements, and simply reject outright all
evidence to the contrary. We do not want to say that such an
individual is justified in his beliefs. He is, we assume,
refusing to look at obvious evidence that would show the
falsity of his presumptions. Clearly, the coherentist must
make some move to rule out allowing that such cabes exhibit
genuine justification. Indeed, almost any statement appears to
cohere with at least some others. So if we allow the blatant
rejection of negative evidence, we must admit that virtually
any claim is justifiable and this is simply too counter-
intuitive for an account of jue~ification.
The solution is to adopt a nor-foundationalist dependence
on observation. BonJour, who sees this problem clearly,
provides the following resolution:
as a straightforward consequence of the idea that
epistemic justi1.'cation must be truth-conductive, a
coherence theory of empirical Justification must
require that in order for the beliefs of a cognit.ve
system to be even candidates for empirical
justification, that system must contain laws
attributing a high degree of reliability to a
reasonable variety of cognitively spontaneous (e.g.
perceptual] beliefs.
This requirement, which I will refer to as the
Observation Requirement, is obviously quite vague,
and I can see no way to make it very much more
precise...The ,underlying idea is that any claim in
the system which is not a priori should in principle
be capable of being observationally checked, either
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directly or indirectly, and thereby either confirmed
or refuted.1
As Bonjour makes clear, the requirement is not that
observations must be accepted as true or correct, but only
that they must be seriously considered in relaticn to one's
prior theory. So this is not an endorsement of
foundationalism, but merely a means of insuring that
justification is "truth-conductive." And our current system of
beliefs, including science, does attribute a fairly high
degree of reliability to our perceptual beliefs, so again,
everything would appear to be fine for the realist-
coherentist.
But now consider what happens if it is the case that most
of our innate perceptual concepts do not correspond to
external objects and properties. The metaphysical realist
supposes that there is a true theory--i.e. a set of beliefs
that correspond to reality. Let us suppose that it is
accessible to us. In the unfortunate situation wo now
consider, it looks like we must reject the true theory based
either on lack of general coherence, or on BonJour's
observation requirement. Thus, the true theory would appear to
be largely inconsistent (and thus not coherent) with
substantially inaccurate innate concepts--at least we can
imagine possessing perceptual concepts that were inconsistent
with the true theory in this way. In such a case, we would be
37. BonJour (1985), p. 141.
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led to reject the true theory, even if we encounter it, since
we can maintain it only by rejecting most, or all of our
perceptual beliefs. Here, rejection of our perceptual beliefs
is the right thing to do, from the external point of view, but
from within our web on belief we could never distinguish such
a case from a case such as the flat-earther who deliberately
ignores contrary evidence.
Might increasing coherence lead us to the one true theory
regardless of which set of perceptual concepts we begin with?
It is difficult to see how this could be guaranteed.
Specifically, it is difficult to see what could lead us to
abandon all of our innate perceptual concepts (as far as
theory is concerned.) After all, theories must explain
observations--this is the point of the observation
requirement. Even if we stumbled onto the ideal theory and
even if it, internally, was ideally coherent, it is not clear
how mere possession of the theory would lead us to accept it.
Justificatory coherence must be system-wide, and given that
perceptions make up a substantial proportion of our belief-
set, and given that innate concepts contribute substantially
to perceptions, it is difficult to see how the ideally
internally coherent theory--which conflicted with inaccurate
perceptual concepts--would lead to a greater total coherence
than would the perceptions in conjunction with a highly
coherent theory which included them.
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This is the real problem witt, the set of views under
consideration, i.e. it is quite conceivable that we could
build alternative theories based on these inaccurate, innate
concepts, theories which in and of themselves were quite
coherent, and coherent in relation to our perceptual beliefs.
Yet, the realist must maintain, we would actually be moving
away from the truth by adopting such theories, or at least
their justification would bring us no closer to the truth. But
this is unacceptable, for it follows that on the coherentist's
view, justification is not always truth-conductive, it does
not always move us towards the truth even in the ideal. But
then the account of justification cannot be correct, since
even if ideal justification does not yield the truth, still,
it would seem that ideal justification must at least approach
the truth--i.e. the difference between completely unjustified
and ideally justified beliefs must at least be that the latter
have a better chance of being true than do the former. As
BonJour writes:
What then is the differentia which distinguishes
epistemic justification, the species of
justification appropriate to knowledge, from other
species of justification?...The basic role of
justification is that of a means to truth, a more
directly attainable mediating link between our
subjective starLing point and our objective goal.
... it seems to follow as an unavoidable corollary
that one can finally know that a given set of
standards for epistemic justification is correct or
reasonable only by knowing that the standards in
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question are genuinely conductive to the cognitive
goal of truth.
We have, however, just shown that this requirement is not
satisfied for a coherence theory of justification. Basically,
the problem is that the contribution of innate perceptual
concepts to our webs of belief is substantial enough to allow
that the pursuit of coherence will lead us away from the
truth, if truth is correspondence with a mind independent
reality.
On the other hand, if we reject the correspondence theory
of truth in favor of the ideal verificationist view, then we
find a solution. For on the verificationist view, there will
be no set of "false" innate perceptual concepts. As long as an
innate concept set is capable of sustaining a coherent
development of some theory, then the ideal theory will at
least partially vindicate those concepts, since it will
partially depend on them through the observation requirement.
So our innate, unjustified perceptual concepts, assuming there
are a substantial number of them, cannot all be wrong!'
38. BonJour (1985), pp. 7,9.
39. In accepting a verificationist theory of truth, there
is room for some of our innate perceptual concepts to be
mistaken. The observation requirement doesn't require that we
accept all observations, and so maintaining that some innate
concepts are mistaken, e.g. because they appear inconsistent
with our best-justified scientific theories, does not threaten
this constraint. While a substantial part of the totality of
our innate perceptual concepts must cohere with our theories,
any individual perceptual concept need not cohere.
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1. The Case for Correspondence
The metaphysical realist could resist this move by
showing that most of the innate concepts in perception do
indeed correspond to a mind-independent world. If this can be
shown, then, it might be argued, coherence does lead to truth
after all, for us at least, and therefore there is no problem
with the conjunction of a coherence view of justification and
a correspondence theory of truth. 40
First, consider the argument from natural selection. The
coherentist/realist might argue that we have the innate
perceptual concepts that we do because they have been selected
for their survival value. But this, it might be argued, means
that they must be roughly correct. That is, if we had a large
number of incorrect innate perceptual concepts, then we would
never have survived, But we have done quite well in terms of
general survival, and in terms of moving around the
environment and exploiting aspects of the environment. So, it
might seem, natural selection guarantees that most of our
innate perceptual concepts are correct.
The difficulty with this line of argument is that it
drastically overstates what selection can guarantee. The most
40. Someone taking this position would probably have to
concede that for other creatures with different innate
concepts than ours, and incorrect ones, coherence wouldn't
constitute justification. The trouble with this is that it
seems that justification should be the same, wherever there
are beliefs. However, I shall not worry about such issues
since the arguments for our concepts' corresponding fail.
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we can say from evolutionary considerations is that our
concepts are good enough to have enabled us to survive this
long. However, we have absolutely no idea how good they are,
e.g. we don't that any of them pick out actual properties of
(mind-independent) objects, and we certainly can't say by
considering natural selection, which are correct and which are
not.41 What must also be shown is that being good for survival
is the same as corresponding to mind-independent features. Of
course, if such concepts did correspond, then we could explain
their survival value, but this is not what we are looking for.
What we need to show is how the fact that these concepts
(Jointly) have survival value supports correspondence.
It seems that there could be ways of representing the
world that had survival value but did not actually correspond
to mind-independent features of the world. In fact, we may
already have discovered an instance of this situation in the
case of color. Consider Hardin's recent presentation of the
scientific evidence against the claim that color is a mind-
independent property. He summarizes his case as follows:
there is nothing in the world as described by the
physicist which corresponds to the division of
colors into hues. If we suppose hues to be physical
properties that are neither on the physicist's list
nor derivable from anything on the list, our
knowledge of object color becomes totally
mysterious. If, on the other hand, we identify
colors with bone fide physical properties such as
spectral reflectance or emitance profiles, we shall
indeed have object characteristics that are
41. There are also methodological problems with
adaptationist explanation. See Gould and Lewontin (1978).
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typically essential ingredients of explanations of
why we have the color experiences we do. Distinct
reflectance profiles then become distinct colors
regardless of whether they are distinguishable by
any human observers, and indefinitely many objects
will be taken by us to be qualified by the same hue
family despite marked dissimilarities in their
reflectance properties. Colors will thus be
properties of objects, but red, green and yellow
will not. This does not seem to be a satisfactory
solution to the problem of the ontological status of
colors.
An appeal to the color experiences of normal
observers under standard conditions will assign
colors to objects only approximately and relatively
to particular interest and purposes. It is not just
that colors turn out to be, as J.J.C. Smart
supposes, disjunctive, gerrymandered physical
properties when assigned according to the normal
observer/standard condition procedure; it is,
rather, that there is no such single, ptrpose-free
procedure. In consequence, we are not entitled to
say that physical properties have determinate colors
simpliciter. Given a particular observer in a
particular adaptational state and particular
standard conditions, a color can be assigned to an
object as precisely as the observer's perceptual
condition warrants, but we cannot expect the
assignment to remain the same when the set of
conditions or the observer's adaptation state is
changed. Assignments of colors to physical
dispositions would thus not be just homocentric, o2
even ideocentric, but ideocentric and situational.
While the case is far from settled, at the very least Hardin's
considerations show that it is conceivable that our color
concepts could fail to correspond to any sort of physical
properties. Let us suppose that his view is correct--what can
we say about the survival value of colors? Specifically, could
color concepts have survival value in spite of failing to
42. In Hardin (1988), pp. 80-81. Also see Boghossian and
Velleman (1989), who argue that "the best interpretation of
colour experience ends up convicting it of widespread and
systematic error" (p. 81.)
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correspond? It seems that the answer is "yes", if for no other
reason than because color concepts have great utility in our
daily lives. And this utility is not, apparently, decreased by
the discovery that color concepts do not correspond to
physical properties.
While it is difficult to say exactly what this utility
amounts to, we can consider a simple example that will provide
a rough initial indication that will be sufficient for our
purposes. Suppose that we discover that berries of a certain
shade of red are poisonous, and from that point on avoid
eating these berries. Our concept of redness need not
correspond to any actual property of the berries. But what is
important, in this case, is that this non-actual property is
approximately co-extensive with (what we may suppose for the
sake of example is) an actual property, i.e. being poisonous.
We manage to do what it takes to survive--avoiding certain
berries in this case--by following certain rules--e.g. rules
for attributing colors, and, in this case, avoiding berries of
a certain color. In this case, the predicates that the rules
are formulated in do not correspond to actual, mind-
independent features of the rules. But, nonetheless these
rules do allow us to act in a way that achieves positive
results. Roughly, what we do is associate negative affects--
e.g. getting sick from eating the berries--wlth our non-
corresponding predicate--"such-and-such a shade of red" and
thereby manage to produce an appropriate generality in our
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behavior--i.e. avoiding the "noumenal situations" that appear
to us as red-berryhood, all without having any actual
knowledge or representations of the real attributes of these
situations.
Thus, the case of color shows that it is false that a
concept will have survival value only if it actually
corresponds to features of the mind-independent world. Yet,
the argument from natural selection may still seem seductively
plausible. I suspect that what has happened is that those
tempted by it have mistaken explanation for justification in
this case. We might explain our successful survival (to date)
by claiming that as innate perceptual concepts go, ours are
pretty good--i.e. they allow us to act so as to avoid a lot of
harm and achieve a lot of survival-enabling benefits. However,
what is required to support the correspondence hypothesis is
something different, namely evidence which will justify the
claim that our concepts (individually or jointly) are not just
"good", but metaphysically correct--that they correspond to
actual properties. And to do this, it would seem that we must
show that there are no other concepts that would not provide
information that would allow us to achieve equal or better
survival. I.e. a successful argument, for correspondence from
natural selection would need to show something incredibly
stronger, namely, that we have ideal survival information, but
the facts of our success and survival don't show this.
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To see this last point more clearly, consider an apparent
case of inaccurate representation in a lower species. Most
readers are probably familiar with the depictions of how
certain insects' vision is supposed to work--we are shown a
field of vision that has dozens of separate images for each
eye, apparently implying that these insects do not form a
single representation of external objects, but rather form
many separate representations (let us suppose that this
describes actual insect vision.) When we encounter such
representations, we judge them wrong--the insects have failed
to represent what we regard as the correct representation,
that of a single, uniform world of objects. At the same time,
though, we can imagine how such a multi-image visual field
could be extremely useful, enabling the insects to avoid
danger, determine directions and identify food sources. As
long as actions are coordinated with appropriate totals of
features or distributions of features of the sub-images, then
the failure to have a representation of a single world of
objects does not undermine survival. The point of this example
is that to support the argument from selection to
correspondence, the metaphysical realist must apparently show
that there is little or no chance of some superior beings
standing in the same sort of relation to our perceptual
capacities that we (apparently) stand in to insect capacities.
That is, we must be able to rule out the possibility of there
being beings much more complicated than us who view our
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"primitive" perceptual capacities as inaccurate, yet good
enough to enable a substantial survival success. But there
would seem to be no forthcoming evidence for such a claim,
particularly not from evolutionary theory. And this is to say
that the argument from selection to correspondence of innate
perceptual concepts fails.
These same considerations undermine several similar
attempts at supporting the claim that most of our innate
perceptual concepts correspond to mind-independent features of
the world. One of these arguments is that our perceptual
concepts succeed relative to certain standards, e.g. we don't
bump into things too much. We manage to get around in the
world pretty well. This, it might be argued, shows that our
perceptual concepts must generally correspond to external,
mind-independent features of the world, otherwise we would
encounter problems, such as waking into walls. However, these
criteria for success are internal to the (apparently) innate
set of perceptual concepts. I.e. bumping into things
presupposes objects and spatial location, that are, by
hypothesis, part of the innate, unjustified perceptual concept
set. Someone advancing such an argument might imagine
alternative possibilities that either falsely indicate the
presence of objects when some are present (by our standards)
or which give no indication of the external situation at all.
It is clear that such alternatives are inferior. But what must
also be shown is that there are no alternative possibilities
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which, by standards internal to those concepts, could allow us
to do as well or better in terms of getting about and
generally coping with our environment than we do relative to
our standards. Since there is no apparent way of sketching out
such a possible concept-space, let alone evaluating our
position in it, it seems that there is no hope for this sort
of defense of innate concept correspondence.
As a final possibility for a defense of innate perceptual
concept correspondence, consider the claim that the best
hypothesis, given everything that we know--all the evidence
that we have--is that most of our perceptual concepts (e.g.
color aside) do in fact correspond to mind-independent
features of the world. But what would justify such an
explanation? To put it a slightly different way, what would
there be to stop creatures with the sort of insect vision that
we considered above from advancing the same argument--what
would justify us and not them in accepting the correspondence
hypothesis? It cannot be that we can achieve a better science
than such creatures, for then we would need to demonstrate
that no creatures with different concepts could achieve a
science better than ours, and this we surely can't do.
Moreover, it is perfectly possible for the anti-realist to
accept the hypothesis that most of our innate concepts are
correct. Given the ideal verificationist theory of truth, this
is to say that under ideal justificatory conditions, we would
still accept beliefs involving those concepts--i.e. we would
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never develop theories which are inconsistent with most of our
ordinary perceptual beliefs. In a manner of speaking, it could
even be granted that such concepts "correspond" to a mind-
dependent world. But it is not apparent that anyone seeking an
explanation of the status of innate perceptual concepts vis- a-
vis the world would require anything more than this. Which is
to say that there is no support here for the metaphysical
realist.
But without support for the claim that most of our innate
perceptual concepts correspond to features of mind.-independent
reality, the presence of such concepts in perceptions implies
that if justification is coherence, then there is no guarantee
that increasing coherence wili approach truth unless truth is
ideal justification.
C. Rellabilism
The final view of justification that I will consider is a
reliabilist, or, more generally an externalist account of
justification. What is notable about externalist accounts is
that they propose that a belief is justified just in case
certain conditions in the external environment are satisfied,
whether or not the believer knows of their satisfaction. This
approach may seem highly favorable to metaphysical realism,
since the externalist account seems to resemble the
metaphysical realists' account of representation and truth.
However, as I shall now argue, an externalist account,
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considered in light of perceptual nativism, is as incompatible
with metaphysical realism as foundationalism and coherentism.
I will examine Goldman's reliabilist view of
justification, since this is the most well-developed
externalist account. Goldman stresses that justification
should be something that leads to true beliefs. And not just
true beliefs (think of a theory of justification that
sanctioned countless true beliefs by sanctioning ten times as
many falke beliefs), but a high percentage of true beliefs.
Specifically, what Goldman suggests is that a theory of
justification, or set of justifying rules, would evaluate
belief processes and sanction only those that produced an
acceptable ratio of true beliefs, some unspecified ratio
greater than 50%.43 A belief will thus be justified on this
view if it is produced by a process that generally produces
true beliefs--a reliable process.
A reliabilist v.ew of justification would seem to
harmonize well with metaphysical realism, even in the face of
perceptual nativism. Thus, on a metaphysical realist view,
beliefs will be justified just in case they are produced by
processes which reliably produce beliefs that accurately
represent the mind-independent world. If most of our innate
perceptual concepts do not correspond, then few is any of our
beliefs are justified, whether we know it or not--in fact we
43. See Goldman (1986); p. 106.
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probably would not know it in such circumstances. But, it
would appear, there is no inconsistency here.
However, there is an unacceptable result in the imagined
situation where most innate concepts fail to correspond. The
reliabilist account implies that few, if any of our perceptual
beliefs would be justified. But this is surely quite
implausible. Suppose someone in the imagined situation had
come to an inconsistt(it pair of beliefs by two difference
perceptual means. On the reliabilist view we are considering,
that person would be no less justified in believing the
contradiction than in believing only one or the other of the
beliefs. But it seems reasonable to think that we are always
less justified in believing an explicitly contradictory set of
beliefs than we are in believing a non-contradictory set.
Or consider someone who came to some perceptual belief p
in the imagined situation, and then discovered by some
ordinary means that p was in error--e.g. an illusion. Again,
the reliabilist would maintain that the individual would be no
more jastified in believing not p than in believing p. But
this seems unacceptable. For all we know, we are indeed in
this situation, however, it seems, we are justified in
rejecting those beliefs that we find, by ordinary evidential
means, to be mistaken. Ultimately, the suggested reliabilist
account implies that unless our perceptual processes are mind-
independently reliable, any appearance-reality distinction we
draw will be unjustified. But surely we are at least partially
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justified in distinguishing appearance and reality, even if
what we think is reality turns out to be incorrect.
Finally, note that people in the imagined case could
develop rudimentary, and even sophisticated theories that were
based largely on perceptual observations. But processes which
based their theory-production on non-corresponding observation
concepts would be ruled unreliable by the proposed account.
This is to say that, for two theories and some set of
observations, even though theory A provided a full and
complete explanation of the data, accurate predictions, etc.,
while theory B failed on all these scored, individuals in this
situation would be no more justified in believing theory A
than in believing theory B. But this is surely unacceptable--
individuals in this circumstance are more justified in
believing A than B.
This illustrates a more general point, which is
problematic for reliabilist views as far as science is
concerned, namely that not all false theories are equally
unjustified. Some false theories are better than others, and
it is by rejecting the less justified theories that we produce
a better science. Thus, it is likely that most of the
scientific theories we now hold are false, whether our innate
concepts are "veridical" or not. The search for better
theories is a progress through more and more highly justified
false theories, in pursuit of the truth.
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The suggested combination of reliabilism and metaphysical
realism is therefore unacceptable. Goldman appears to
recognize the problem through consideration of Cartesian-demon
examples." His solution is to tie justification to the
evaluation of belief-forming processes in a certain range of
possible worlds:
We have a large set of common beliefs about the
actual world: general beliefs about the sorts of
objects, events, and changes that occur in it. We
have beliefs about the kinds of things that,
realistically, do and can happen. Our beliefs on
this score generate what I shall call the set of
normal worlds. These are worlds consistent with our
general beliefs about the actual world. Our
conception of justification is constructed against
the backdrop of such a set of normal worlds. My
proposal is that, according to our ordinary
conception of justifiedness, a rule system (for
justification] is [acceptable] in any world W just
in case it has a sufficiently high truth ration in
normal worlds.
Clearly, normal worlds are those, that, among other things,
have properties that correspond to most of our innate
perceptual concepts. The suggestion is that we decide on
reliability for belief-forming processes in worlds where the
concepts do correspond, so that there will be some beliefs
that are justified even in worlds where the innate perceptual
concepts do not correspond to mind-independent properties at
all.
44. See Goldman (1986), p. 113.
45. Goldman (1986), p. 107.
270
However, the revised account no longer connects
justification with truth. To see this, simply consider that if
we are not in a normal world, then none of the beliefs yielded
by acceptable processes will be true. Therefore, sets of
increasingly justified beliefs will approach the truth just in
case the world is normal. But this is to say that normal world
reliabilism in conjunction with metaphysical realism faces
precisely the problem that we have seen for coherence theories
and metaphysical realism: the rules for justification that are
sanctioned on the reliabilist view will not generally promote
true belief, even under ideal application, if most innate
perceptual concepts are mistaken. Thus, justification will be
"verific" only if most of our innate perceptual concepts are
correct. But this is unacceptable. Justification should be
lead us towards the truth whether or not we start with true
beliefs.
Goldman notes that this is a problem, but he doesn't take
it too seriously. He merely suggests that by "epistemic
bootstrapping" we can escape false initial beliefs.
We start with a set of available processes with
varying degrees of reliability. We use the more
reliable processes to identify good methods. We then
use the more reliable processes, together with some
of the good methods, to identify the various
processes and their respective degrees of
reliability. The superior specimens are identified,
and their use is said to be justification-
conferring. The inferior specimens are so
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identified, and their use is said to be non-
justification-conferring., 6
How, though, are we to tell initially which processes are
reliable and which are not reliable? If reliability is mind-
independent coirespondence, then there is no apparent way to
initially identify "pgod" methods and get the bootstrapping
started. On the other hand, if reliability is normal world
correspondence, then the problem has not been qolved. For
identification of good methods and the subsequent selection of
reliable processes will in fact move towards true beliefs only
if the world really is normal. So again, the account implies
that we can approach truth through justification just in case
we are lucky enough to start with substantially true beliefs.
But this is unacceptable, since justification should be a
means toward truth regardless of the starting point.
Unlike the cases of foundationalism and coherentism, it
is not apparent that an ideal verificationist theory of truth
will solve the difficulty. This is because the substitution of
ideal verificationism for truth in the reliabilist formula
appears to yield a circular account:
the belief that p is justified iff it is the result
of processes that yield a suitable ratio (i.e. >
50%) of ideally justified beliefs.
This apparent circularity leads Goldman to endorse a
correspondence theory of truth.41 However, as I shall now
46. Goldman (1986), p. 120.
47. See Goldman (1986), pp. 116-7 and chapter 7.
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argue, an ideal verificationist theory of truth is strictly
speaking compatible with reliabilism, although the former
shows the latter to be an somewhat limited account of
justification.
The proposed account is clearly circular as a criteria of
justification--we cannot apply it to a given belief to tell if
it is justified or not. Let us consider, though, how it would
be improved with a correspondence theory of truth. With such a
theory, the reliabilist dictum might be read as telling us to
accept a belief just in case it is produced by a means that
yields a suitably high ratio of beliefs that correspond to the
mind-independent world. But this does nothing towards telling
us how to determine if a given belief correspond or not. And
in fact, it might be argued, that is precisely the task facing
the justification theorist, viz., provide a set of rules that
will enable us as much as possible to believe the true and
reject the false. Noting this, and taking a clue from the
passage quoted above on bootstrapping, we might suppose that
the reliabilist presupposes a range of ordinary methods and
belief-forming processes which will allow us to distinguith
apparent truth from apparent falsehoods. Ideally justified--
i.e. true--beliefs will thus be those that those that are
produce by processes or methods that have withstood the test
of evaluation by all other reliable methods, original or
derived. If we term such methods "acceptable", we get the
following criteria:
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the belief that p is justified iff it is the result
of processes that do not yield an unacceptable ratio
(i.e. > 50%) of beliefs that are undermined by
acceptable methods.
which is no longer circular. In effect, this is to naturalize
justification to our original, common sense methods. Here, the
reliabilist rule serves not as a criteria applicable in
isolation from all other methods of justification, but rather
as a constraint on what sort of methods and processes of
justification are acceptable.48
This sclves one of our difficulties, in that it enables
reliabilist justification to approach the truth, even given
perceptual nativism, since whatever innate processes and
methods we begin with, for such processes and methods will
either be truth-conducive, on the ideal verificationist
theory, or they will enable bootstrapping to, again by
definition, truth conducive processes and methods. However, we
have not as yet met the other challenge that I raised above,
namely that it seems that some false beliefs may still be at
least partially juetified. This is a problem, I suggest, for
externalism generally, since by linking justification too
closely with truth, the reliabilist fails to allow for false
yet (paru.ially) Justified belief. The remedy, it would appear,
48. This is how Goldman (1980) sees an externalist view
of justification.
Also note that the account is still externalist, or as
Goldman (1986) puts it objectivist, in that whether or not a
given belief is justified is independent of any belief anyone
ever actually holds.
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is to make justification depend on the available evidence.
This seems appropriate if we consider scientific theories--
often, a theory can be justified relative to a certain amount
of evidence, even though it is shown false, and thus not
justified, when more evidence comes in. The revised criteria
would be:
the belief that p is justified iff it is the result
of processes that do not yield an unacceptable ratio
(i.e. > 50%) of beliefs that are undermined by
presently acceptable methods.
While this constitutes a move away from externalism to
internalism, it nonetheless appears to be the most plausible
form of a reliabilist account.
D. Conclusgion
We thus have the following argument for an ideal
verificationist theory of truth, and more generally, for neo-
ktntianism: psychological theories of perception suggest that
it is likely that most of our very abstract perceptual
concepts are innate. We add them to our perceptual inputs
because we are genetically programmed to do so, not because we
have learned to do so from experience. But such nativism
renders metaphysical realism--a correspondence theory of
truth--untenable in conjunction with either a foundationalist,
coherentist or reliabilist theory of justification. In the
case of foundationaliesm, we see that nativism allows an
unacceptable potential for falsity in the perceptual
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foundation. In the case of coherentism, the possibility of
such falsity allows that justification will not always
approach truth, even in the long run. And in the case of
reliabilism, there will be justification only if the
perceptual concepts correspond to begin with. But none of
these outcomes is acceptable by the standards of what an
account of justification should give us. Since
foundationalism, coherentism and reliabilism exhaust the
available alternatives for an account of justification, this
line of reasoning constitutes an argument from elimination
against metaphysical realism (i.e. it isn't compatible with
any of the alternatives.) Moreover, replacing a realist theory
of truth with an ideal verificationist theory overcomes these
difficulties, thus supporting the ideal verificationist view.
We can also consider the possibility of accepting the
ideal verificationist theory of truth, but maintaining that
truth is correspondence to the mind-independent world. This is
not acceptable, since, as we have seen, each account of
justification impl .es that, given a substantial innate
contribution to perception and the possibility of a failure of
mind-independent correspondence for these concepts, ideal
justification will not guarantee correspondence. Thus, if the
concepts in the perceptions in the foundationalist's basic
beliefs do not correspond, then they will still fail to
correspond no matter what, i.e. when all evidence is in. And
we have also seen that there is no reason to think that an
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ideally coherent set of beliefs which began from non-
corresponding innate perceptual concepts would converge on
beliefs which corresponded to the mind-independent world.
Finally, we have seen that ideally reliable beliefs will
correspond to the mind-independent world Just in case the
initial processes which form the basis for reliabilist
bootstrapping themselves correspond. So none of these views
support the claim that ideally justified beliefs will
correspond to the mind-independent world. And any of them thus
supports neo-kantianism.
The metaphysical realist might argue that this only shows
that there is no acceptable account of justification. If this
is merely to suggest that there could be some other account of
justification which is consistent with metaphysical realism
and perceptual innateness, then the burden of proof is clearly
on the metaphysical realist to produce a compatible view. And
not just any compatible view, but one that is at least as
independently plausible as competing accounts of
justification.
However, the argument might be, not that there is some
alternative account of justification, but rather that no such
account is possible. Specifically, the metaphysical realist
might object that I have maintained that an account of
justification will show us how increasing justification yields
or approaches truth. But, it might be argued, this is too
strong a demand--it is reasonable to allow that skepticism
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might be true, that no account of justification in this sense
is possible.
Note, though, that I have not insisted that any of our
beliefs must be justified, but only that we have an account of
what it takes to justify them. Given that justification will
point towards truth, skepticism says that none of the beliefs
we now hold are, as a matter of fact, justified. So I am not
assuming that the metaphysical realist must provide an answer
to (the standard, global form of) skepticism.
The position implied by this line of reply thus amounts
to the suggestion that, while maintaining belief in a mind-
independent reality, we give up hope of ever knowing that we
have any true or nearly true beliefs about it--for this is the
result of giving up on ever having an account of
justification. I.e. if we can never know if or when any of our
epistemic practices are truth-conductive, then we cannot claim
to have any basis for holding that we have or ever can have
any true beliefs. This is, in effect, to grant part of the
neo-kantian position that I have characterized above--i.e.
cumplete skepticism about the possibility of knowledge of the
mind-independent world. However, the suggested position also
leaves us without any understanding or support for our
justificatory practices, e.g. detection of perceptual errors,
or scientific methodology. That is, giving up on an account of
justification means that we will not have any explanation of
why we should reject the beliefs we decide are false while
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continuing to believe those that we do not find to be
mistaken. If we have no possible grounding, either explanatory
or normative, for our ordinary justificatory practices, then
why should we engage in them at all? Here, it seems to me that
the most plausible move is to adopt the other half of the neo-
kantian position too, namely that truth is idealized
justification, where justification is understood according to
one or another of the standard accounts. Such an account
grounds at least some of these practices, or offers nes ones,
and thus provides an acceptable account of the notion of truth
that plays a role in our lives.
Thus, the rejection of the possibility of an account of
justification is no real option for the metaphysical realist.
Confusion on this point may come over mistaking a fallibilist
response for the rejection of an account of justification. If
the view in that we have certain well-confirmed theories, but
we shall perhaps never know if they are true or not, then an
account of justification is still required, i.e. an account
which describes or prescribes what we can or should count as a
well-confirmed theory. This is probably not going to be a
traditional, foundationalist view, that offers certainty for
some beliefs, but it will be an account of justification all
the same (probably a coherentist account.) On the other hand,
the rejection of the possibility of an account of
justification, as we have just seen, involves complete
skepticism about our justificatory practices, leaving us in
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the implausible and uapalatable position of having no grounds
for endorsing some theories while rejecting others.
Since there are no other options left for the
metaphysical realist, I conclude that we should abandon the
correspondence theory of truth and metaphysical realism in
favor of the ideal verificationist theory of truth and neo-
kantianism.
V. Anti-Realsm
Therte are several aspects of the present view that
separate it from other forms of neo-kantianism or anti-
realism, as well as from metaphysical realist views, and I
will examine these in this and the final section.49 A crucial
issue concerns the distinction between the mind-dependent and
the mind-independent. If the neo-kantian is unable to
convincingly draw this distinction, then the view becomes
idealism or perhaps transcendental realism. The former type of
account claims that all existence is mind-dependent, while the
latter view holds that metaphysics is altogether impossible--
thus there is no saying that the world in mind-dependent or
mind-independent, it is simply what we theorize about--and all
we can do is examine (e.g. the ontology of) our beliefs rnd
theories.
49. I shall not discuss anti-realist views such as
Dummett's which are verificationist as far as truth is
concerned but which reject the idea of there being a
contribution to knowledge on the part of the mind.
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The present view draws this distinction in terms of the
fact that we are cognitive being' that have input to our
perceptual systems, the fact that we add content to our
perceptions, and the fact that these perceptions form the
basis for our knowledge, in one of the ways discussed above.
We can uInderstand the possibility of having different innate
concepts--or processing the same input differently. And we
must acknowledge that the same input, together with different
innate concepts, coulC yield a different ideally confirmed,
i.e. true, theory of the world. And we can also conceive of
our innate concepts cfrresponding or failing to correspond to
the mind-independent world, although we could never know of
this, since our inquiry '.s rooted in the (conceptual) world
which is constituted by the perc4ptual categories that we
possess. Thus, we must acknowledge limits to our ability to
make metaphysical claims--all our metaphysical claims must be
relativizec to the innate basis from which we build our
theories. And, while we can conceive of a mind-independent
metaphysics, we also see that we cannot conduct an
investigation I* its nature.
Kant himself held that the way to answer mind-dependent
metaphysical or ontological questions (about a priori
concepts), such as, "do objects exist?" was through a priori
analysis. I would suggest instead that such questions can only
be e.siwered by evaluating out best confirmed theories and
beliefM (to date.) Thus, this brand of neo-kantianism turns
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out to be quite close to a very moderate, pragmatic realism,
which answers all metaphysical questions by pointing to our
best justified scientific (and common sense) theories.
However, the neo-kantian adds to this moderate realism a
qualification that our knowledge is mind-dependent.
A second important dimension of neo-kantianism concerns
the question of how we are to think of alternative conceptual
contributions. Pluralistu;, such as Goodman or Kuhn, urge that
there are many alternatives--many different mind-dependent
"worlds" which are actually accessible in human history.
Goodman suggests that we are free to move from "world" to
"world"A while Kuhln holds that different eras of science
constitute different "worlds."5 1 Such pluralists also endorb3
the claim that there is no single, best, "right" world. On the
other hand, there are the "absolutists" such as Sellars or
(maybe) Putnam who hold that we are progressing through
various "worlds" or conceptual systems toward a single, ideal
theory.52
While I cannot discuss these views in detail here, I
suggest that we reject both alternatives on the grounds that
it appears that nativistic perceptual theories tell us that
50. See Goodman (1978).
51. See Kuhn (1962/70) and especially Kuhn (1989).
52. See Sellars (1968) and Putnam (1980), especially p.
216.
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our observational concepts are not very plastic.Y Moreover, it
also seems plausible to claim that we have a set of relatively
stable, perhaps largely innate, justification methods. It may
be the relative invariance in these partial sets of
observation concepts and justification methods that allows us
to see our history as a more or less unbroken line of
investigation into a single world, despite radical differences
in theories and high-level observation concepts from different
eras. Thus, nativist neo-kantianism fails to support the view
that we ever move from "world" to "world." Instead, I
recommend a "monistic" version of neo-kantianism in which
there is only one world (barring such things as encounters
with beings with radically different innate concepts than
ours, if indeed we could communicate with such beings at all.)
So, again, the present account comes very close to a moderate,
extremely pragmatic realism.
VI. The Synthetic A Prforf
A distinct feature of the preaent view is the implication
that there is (non-trivial) synthetic a priori knowledge. The
following is a recipe for determining what is synthetic a
priori in perception, and perhaps in all of knowledge as well.
Take the innate concepts that the perceptual system
contributes to perceptions and subtract the elements not
53. See Fodor (1984).
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vindicated by our ideally confirmed theories. The remaining
concepts, when formulated in terms of truths concerning their
instantiation, e.g. there are material objects, constitute
statements that are true in the face of no, any or all
evidence, yet that are not made true through their logical
form or meanings alone, but rather, by their dependence on our
perceptual systems.
Our considerations suggest that there must be at least
some such truths, assuming that there are substantial innate
contributions to perception, since either the perceptual
foundation, the observation condition of a coherentist or the
common sense perceptual methods of the reliabilist insures
that not all of this substantial set can be rejected. On way
to think of our result is the following. Our perceptions serve
to fix the context of inquiry--we must use them to insure that
we are inquiring about the actual world, rather than some
fictional world. Now, Kripke-style causal reference examples
suggest that reference fixers may sometimes succeed even when
the attributed properties do not actually apply. Thus, it
seems possible to ostend a certain substance that appears to
be hard and blue as 'gold', and do it successfully, even
though gold turns out to be yellow and malleable. However, our
present considerations also suggest that such error can only
go so far. Ostensione typically proceed against a relatively
fixed background of perceived material objects. Thus, if there
not only turns out to be no hard, blue substance present, but
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no material substances at all, or if our spatio-temporal
framework proves unworkable, such ostensions appear to fail.
For then, anything at all could be the actual referent of the
ostension. Likewise, it seems that we can't give up all of the
perceptual qualities and concepts that our perceptual systems
supply us with, for then, as far as justification and
ultimately truth is concerned, the world could be anything at
all.
However, it seemp there is little reason at present to
expect that we will ever have a clear formulation of exactly
what the synthetic a priori in perception comes to. For it is
not obvious that we will ever have a definitive and complete
specification of what is innate and unjustified in perception-
-this is a monstrously complicated task, to say the least. Nor
can we ever expect to actually have anything approaching the
ideally justified belief-set. Even those more optimistic that
I about accessing these items must surely agree that there is
no hope for such a specification at present. 4
Thus, we have a position that. though very Kantian in the
final result, is directly opposite in methodology. We do not
start with a neat, clearly defined set of synthetic a priori
truths and proceed, a priori, to conclusions concerning the
mind's contribution to knowledge and an advocation of mind-
54. It is also possible that what remains as the
synthetic a priori is relative to our choices concerning which
facts we want to explain. Such considerations might be a way
of making the present view more pluralist.
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dependent realism and transcendental idealism. Instead, we
must begin with the messy psychological facts and inquire as
to what this shows us about truth and reality.
Perhaps it will be objected that it is outrageous that
such an important matter as the decision between metaphysical
realism and neo-kantianism should rest on contingent
psychological facts. But this is exactly what we should allow
for if we are going to genuinely naturalize epistemology• and
philosophy. One might expect, prima facie, that naturalistic
enquiries would support popular realist positions. But I can
see no reason why things should ultimately turn out this way.M
Naturalism might well upset some of our most firmly held
philosophical views, au the present inquiry demonstrates.
55. I have not argued that a theory of justification can
be naturalized, although I think this is quite plausible.
56. In fact, Matheson (1989) argues that a naturalist
epistemology is more readily compatible with an ideal
verificationist theory of truth than with a realist, non-
epistemic theory.
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